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Abstract 
Recent predictions estimate that the global population will reach more than 9 billion by 
the year 2050 (Kochhar, 2014). Coupled with this challenge, environmental issues and climate 
change influence agricultural production over the globe (Jacobsen et al., 2013). Changes in the 
food chain have been in response to consumers becoming interested in how their food is 
produced as it relates to food safety. Some of these changes have come in the form of labeling of 
production methods and the increasing volume of organic products in the marketplace. In the 
livestock sector, production methods include administration of antibiotics and hormones to 
prevent disease, increase gains and increase the health of animals (Allen et al., 2013; Thornton, 
2010). A potential solution of decreasing the amount of antibiotics and hormones in the future is 
the use of ribonucleic acid interference (RNAi).  RNA interference is a method of silencing a 
targeted gene and suppressing expression (Bradford et al., 2016). The focus of this research is to 
explore the determinants of acceptance and willingness to pay for beef products utilizing RNAi 
technology in the food system. 
Through the means of a national survey, consumers were asked their demographic, food 
purchasing habits, and food safety concerns to identify potential acceptors of the technology. 
Respondents received information treatments and external articles regarding RNAi technology as 
well as information about governmental labeling regulations of the beef steaks. Choice 
experiment questions, and a dichotomous choice sequence were utilized to determine willingness 
to pay estimates of beef steak attributes by consumers.   
Results showed that respondents likely require a discount for beef steaks produced with 
RNAi technology. In some instances, some consumers would be willing to pay a premium for 
beef steaks with RNAi in certain label settings. These results of this study could be used in the 
  
realm of animal science to help with the introduction of this technology in the food system. The 
survey results could assist with future promotion and framing of the technology to a wide variety 
of consumers.   
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Various factors influence the behavior of consumers and their purchasing decisions. In 
recent years, consumers have become increasingly interested, aware of and concerned about the 
methods of production and associated attributes of food products. In the agriculture industry, 
farmers and ranchers have utilized technology and other resources to increase yields as well as 
mitigate production risks. In recent decades, biotechnology has been used to aid in production 
efforts. In the livestock sector, changes in the supply chain have been prompted not only by 
consumers but producers as well. To reduce risks, increase growth efficiency and improve the 
health of animals, producers have utilized growth hormones and administered antibiotics to 
livestock. 
This study was conducted as part of a Global Food Systems (GFS) seed project at Kansas 
State University. The purpose of the grant project is to explore the potential of RNA interference 
(RNAi) for applications in the agriculture industry. The GFS team comprised several academic 
areas in an attempt to approach this topic from a multidisciplinary mindset. These potential 
applications in study are focused around the livestock sector. Advances in technology could 
potentially allow producers to cut down on costs tied to raising livestock. RNAi is the process of 
inserting RNA into the nucleus of an organism’s cells to suppress the expression of a gene. The 
technology was discovered by scientists Andrew Z. Fire and Craig C. Mello at the Carnegie 
Institution of Washington and University of Massachusetts Medicine, respectfully. Their 
groundbreaking research was published in 1998, and the researchers were awarded a Nobel Prize 
in Physiology or Medicine 2006 (Zamore, 2006). With the use of RNAi, livestock producers 
could potentially inject small interfering RNA and suppress the protein production of an 
undesired gene that influences a disease, such as fatty liver disease. The main aim of this 
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technology is to improve overall health of livestock, which could influence carcass yield per 
animal. Another potential benefit of this technology is higher quality products. Beef products, 
such as beef steaks, are graded according to quality, marbling and other characteristics. The 
results of this technology could potentially yield higher meat quality. In addition, benefits 
include decreased long-term costs incurred by producers which are then passed on down the 
supply chain to cause decreased prices paid by consumers. While the potential benefits are 
promising, there could be adverse economic consequences for implementing this technology in 
the food system if consumers are not accepting of it. Consumers might not easily desire products 
derived from RNAi technology due to lack of trust, moral values, fear, health concerns, eating 
habits, or other reasons.  
To address some of these knowledge gaps, a national survey was conducted, composed of 
a series of questions to collect demographic information, household food expenditures, and food 
purchasing habits to identify potential consumers of food products derived from RNAi 
technology. To assess the acceptance of RNAi technology, an assortment of Likert-scale 
questions about respondents’ perceptions of the technology were asked. To analyze the 
willingness to pay for these products by consumers, choice experiments with varying attributes 
of beef products and dichotomous choice models with varying claims were administered. In 
addition, several information treatments regarding RNAi technology from a variety of sources 
were provided to respondents. The impact of these pieces of information on consumers’ 
acceptance and willingness to pay were also analyzed. 
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 1.1 Objectives 
The main objective of the study is to examine acceptance of RNA interference 
technology being used within the food system. The specific objectives for the research were as 
follows: 
 Determine which consumers will be more likely to accept RNAi technology in the 
food system in the form of beef products 
 
 Determine the amount consumers are willing to pay for beef steaks derived from 
RNAi technology  
 
 Determine the amount consumers are willing to pay for beef steaks with varying 
price, technology and production attributes across different label settings 
 
 Explore consumers’ use of information provided to them in regards to RNAi 
technology  
 
 
 1.2 Motivation 
The research is motivated by the potential benefits this technology boasts. There is 
potential application of RNAi technology within the livestock industry by farmers and ranchers, 
if consumers accept its use. In order to assess the future profitability of adopting RNAi 
technology, consumer acceptance and willingness to pay for the technology must be determined.  
 
 1.3 Format 
The format for the rest of this thesis research as it relates to RNAi technology is as 
follows: Chapter 2 – survey development and data; Chapter 3 – consumer acceptance; Chapter 4 
– consumer willingness to pay; and Chapter 5 – duration of information use. Chapter 6 provides 
a conclusion of the findings, implications, and a discussion of the results as well as limitations of 
the study and suggestions for future research. Chapter 7 provides a list of references used in the 
4 
study. Appendices are included afterward and include the survey instrument, survey design, 
summary statistics, approval letter from the KSU Institutional Review Board, and diagrams of 
the framework used for the choice experiment designs.  
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Chapter 2 - Survey Development and Data 
 2.1 Survey Methods 
The full survey instrument can be found in Appendix A. The survey instrument was 
distributed to consumers from all across the United States by the programming company Focus 
Vision. Focus Visions’ survey product, Decipher, was used to develop an online form of the 
survey as well as hosted and collected the initial data set. A soft launch of the survey was 
conducted to examine if the survey worked and variables desired were being collected. In the 
soft launch period, 300 respondents. Survey links were emailed out by the company on February 
9, 2016. Within three days, February 12, 2016, the survey was closed due to a desired response 
rate of more than 3,000 individuals. There was a total of 5,216 individuals who responded to the 
online survey. Out of those 3,000 were usable in the analysis after filtering out respondents with 
relatively quick response times and survey dropouts.  
Parameters used in the study included age, state of residence, highest level of education, 
range of household income, and frequency of meat purchases, weekly household food 
expenditure, number of adults and children in the household, primary source for news stories, 
previous purchases of beef products, willingness to pay for beef products with certain labels and 
knowledge of antibiotic and beef quality grades.  
 
 2.1.1 Development and Organization 
The survey instrument was constructed to not only identify potential consumers of RNAi 
technology through socio-demographic characteristics, but also assess willingness to pay of 
respondents and the effects of various forms of information treatments. Using methodology from 
previous studies (Lusk, 2003; Lusk and Coble, 2005; Cox and Evans, 2008; Liaukonyte, et al., 
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2013) regarding the adoption and concerns with new technology in the food system, the 
questions in these studies were modified to reflect RNA interference and new beef technologies. 
These primarily came in the form of Likert-scale questions, which are mainly discussed in 
Chapter 3 of this thesis. Respondents first encountered questions to identify socio-demographic 
information and food purchasing habits. Next, respondents went through the choice experiment 
scenarios asking their preference between two options of beef steaks with varying attributes or 
opting out. After the choice experiment, respondents were asked different questions assessing 
their acceptance and concerns about RNAi technology. Included in these questions, respondents 
provided feedback on the desirability of various applications of RNAi technology in the 
livestock sector. Respondents also ranked their preference in what form of technology should be 
used to make improvements in varying objectives in the livestock sector. Lastly, respondents 
were put through a restaurant selection situation in the form a double-bounded dichotomous 
choice sequence to assess the role of RNAi use in food service.   
 
 2.1.2 Food Values 
Lusk (2013) presents general food values and issues which motivate consumer behavior. 
Modifying the food items presented in the Oklahoma State University Food Demand Survey to 
identify important issues to consumers when new technology is implemented in the beef sector, 
the following issues were examined: animal welfare, food safety, price, taste, naturalness, 
antibiotic use, hormone use and labeling of food products. These items were used in this study to 
assess if the levels of concern for food values hold true for consumers in regards to the 
introduction of RNAi technology. 
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 2.2 Survey Results 
Full tables of summary statistics of socio-demographic variables can be found in 
Appendix C. The states were categorized into regions as according to the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Within the 3,000 sample, 1,057 were from the South, 557 from the Northeast, 700 from the West 
and 686 from the Midwest. Fifty-one percent of respondents were female. The sample is 
comparable to the U.S. population, as 50.8 percent of the population are female (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2014a).  
Household size was measured by the number of adults and number of children. A 
majority of respondents indicated 2 adults and 1 child. Since the questions in the survey were 
open-ended, respondents were able to provide exact numbers. The average number of adults was 
2.21 and the number of children were 0.71. 
 The average age of respondents was 42. Age categories were dispersed in intervals 
between 18 and 55. Through an open-ended question, respondents provided the number of years 
old they were. The comparison between U.S. and survey age ranges can be shown in Table 2.1.   
Table 2.1. Comparison of U.S. Population and Survey Sample by Age 
Range of Ages U.S. Populationa Survey Populationb 
18-24 12.86% 15.3% 
25-34 17.66% 21.0% 
35-44 16.62% 20.0% 
45-54 17.66% 23.8% 
55+ 35.20% 20.0% 
Average Age  41.9 
Notes:  
a Data from U.S. Census Bureau (2014a). Percentages adjusted by taking out children under 18. 
b Survey excluded persons under the age of 18. 
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Respondents were asked the highest level of education they had completed on a scale of 1 
(did not graduate from high school) to 5 (graduate or advanced college degree earned). 
Comparisons of the education levels of U.S. and survey populations can be found in Table 2.2.  
  
Respondents were asked about their frequency of meat consumption in the survey. These 
meat products included groundbeef (hamburger), steak, pork, chicken, and fish on a scale of 1 
(never) to 5 (at least every day of the week). For the survey sample, chicken was the most 
frequently consumed meat product. Groundbeef and hamburger were second, followed by steak. 
A small portion of respondents identified themselves as vegan and vegetarian, about 0.67 percent 
(20 respondents).  
Through an open-ended question, Question 9, respondents provided their average weekly 
expenditure on total food consumption. The average weekly food expenditure per household was 
$258. Respondents were also asked their willingness to pay for beef products with varying 
labels, on a scale from 1 ($0) to 10 (over $16), Question 15 in the survey. Within the question, a 
$7.79 average price of beef steaks was provided to respondents to serve as a base reference price. 
The price was based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics average for November 2015 (BLS, 
2016a). Respondents indicated they would be willing to pay more for beef products labeled as 
USDA choice. Table 2.3 provides the values for the willingness to pay for the respective labels. 
Table 2.2. Comparison of U.S. Population and Survey Sample by Education 
Education Level U.S. Populationa Survey Population 
Did not graduate from high school 13.1% 3.5% 
High school diploma 27.7% 41.2% 
Associate’s or trade degree 29.1% 20.6% 
Bachelor’s degree 18.7% 25.0% 
Graduate or advanced college degree 11.4% 9.7% 
Note:  
a Data from U.S. Census Bureau (2014b). 
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Table 2.3. Willingness to Pay for Beef Products by Label 
Label Valuea (USD) Mean Rank 
Organic 1.33 6.64 (3.96) 6 
Natural 1.31 6.71 (3.51) 7 
Animal Welfare Assured 1.10 6.05 (3.81) 8 
Grass Fed 1.39 6.72 (3.61) 4 
Antibiotic Free 1.40 6.49 (3.68) 3 
Hormone Free 1.44 6.52 (3.67) 1 
Choice 1.40 6.78 (3.14) 2 
Select 1.35 6.71 (3.22) 5 
Notes: 
* Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
a Values were calculated by taking the mean of each range multiplied by the percentage 
selection for that respective range. Values were rounded to the nearest hundredths. 
 
To assess respondents’ knowledge and perceptions of the livestock industry as well as 
antibiotic use and quality grades, they were asked to predict the U.S. cattle given antibiotics and 
what percentage range of cattle were graded as USDA choice during Questions 16 and 17. With 
the results of these two questions, the knowledge level of respondents was assessed. Results of 
this question can be found in Table 2.4.  
Table 2.4. Respondents Estimate of Percentage of Antibiotic Use and Choice Grade  
Percentage Range 
Percentage of Respondents 
Antibiotic Use Choice Grade 
10% or less 5.30 5.13 
11-30% 10.70 16.40 
31-50% 23.17 30.57 
51-70% 28.67 27.70 
71-90% 23.93 14.30 
91% or more 8.23 5.90 
 
Respondents were asked their primary source of news information. The largest share of 
respondents, 44 percent, indicated they received news from television broadcast, followed by 
social media with 26.2 percent.  
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Table 2.5. Frequency of Primary Source of Information. 
Source 
Percentage of 
Respondents 
Rank 
Physical newspapers 3.77 5 
Online newspapers 17.83 3 
Popular magazines 0.77 7 
Social media 26.20 2 
Radio broadcast 4.33 4 
TV broadcast 43.97 1 
Other 3.13 6 
Note: Respondents were allowed only to choose one primary source. 
 
 In Question 16, respondents were asked about their concern of beef attributes and 
production methods. The values were on a scale from 1 (not at all concerned) to 7 (very 
concerned). The results of this question can be found in Table 2.6. Food safety is the greatest 
concern of respondents. 
Table 2.6. Respondent Concern of Beef Attribute and Production Methods 
Attribute/Production Method Mean Rank 
Animal welfare 4.83 7 
Food safety 5.92 1 
Price 5.67 3 
Taste 5.87 2 
Naturalness 4.73 8 
Antibiotic use 4.91 6 
Hormone use 4.97 5 
Labeling of beef products 5.07 4 
Note: All attributes and production methods concerns were on a scale from 1 = not at all 
concerned to 7 = very concerned. 
 
 The results of the survey pertaining to the acceptance of RNAi technology and the choice 
experiment questions and dichotomous choice sequence will be discussed in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4, respectfully. 
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Chapter 3 - Consumer Acceptance 
 3.1 Introduction 
Consumers have become increasingly concerned about how food is produced in recent 
years (Gillman, 2012). Some of these concerns have come in the form of safety in regards to the 
use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), use of herbicides and pesticides, and use of 
chemical fertilizers, among other subjects within the food supply (Fatka, 2015). These 
production practices have increased efficiency in the supply chain as well as cut down the costs 
consumers pay in the marketplace (Dorward, 2013). Consumers may seek alternative products 
not derived from these methods, such as organic, natural, hormone free, etc., to avoid the 
perceived negative effects from these kinds of products (Lee & Yun, 2015). Specifically, in the 
livestock industry, consumers have voiced concerns about the use of hormones and antibiotics. 
These production methods are used for the purpose of increasing growth and preventing disease 
(Thornton, 2010). Some retailers, wholesalers and restaurants will provide products labeled as 
grass-fed or natural. While these alternative products may be more expensive due to the 
increased production costs, some consumers may be willing to pay more to purchase these 
products (Smith and Lin, 2009).  
The key to consumer acceptance of biotechnology is perceived risks and benefits (Bruhn, 
2003). In this chapter, the acceptance of RNAi technology by consumers is examined. Using 
conditional logit models, consumer acceptance of RNAi technology is estimated through the use 
of data obtained from Likert-scale questions. Responses to individual questions are analyzed to 
determine the attitudes and perceptions of RNAi technology by consumers. Through the 
summation of Likert-scale questions regarding the acceptance of RNAi, an index of RNAi 
acceptance was developed. With the summated RNAi acceptance index, conditional logit models 
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are used with demographic and other variables. Predicted results include negative reactions and 
apprehension of RNAi technology by respondents. The results of the conditional logit models 
generally yield negative reactions toward adoption of the technology in the beef industry, but a 
positive reaction of the technology being targeted to protect animals from disease and increase 
overall animal health. 
 
 3.2 Literature Review 
 3.2.1 Advantages of RNA interference technology 
The literature provides evidence of the benefits of RNAi technology use on the supply 
side of the food and agriculture system. RNAi is the process in which “intracellular double-
stranded RNA triggers a conserved response that leads to cleavage and degradation of 
complementary mRNA strands, thereby prevention production of the corresponding protein” 
(Bradford et al., 2016). Bradford et al. (2016) points out the different methodologies of the 
technology using exogenous RNA. These approaches include DNA microinjections, embryonic 
stem cell-mediated gene transfer, somatic cell nuclear transfer, retrovirus-mediated gene transfer 
and other methods. For example, with the DNA microinjection approach, the exogenous RNA 
carried on a transgene is inserted into the nucleus of a fertilized egg. Results of this technology 
within the livestock sector are expected to alter muscle development, alter sex ratios, support the 
transition between physiological states, and combat infectious diseases (Bradford et al., 2016).  
While not currently applied in the livestock sector of the food and agriculture industry, 
RNAi technology has been used in fruits and vegetables. For example, scientists used RNAi 
technology to support the production and longevity of papayas (Gonsalves, et al., 2004). In the 
early 1990s, the U.S. papaya supply had been drastically impacted by the Papaya ringspot virus 
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(PRSV) (Gonsalves et al,, 2004). The virus causes growth deficiencies in the papaya plant and its 
fruit. Through the use of RNAi technology, scientists were able to develop transgenic papayas 
which were resistant to PRSV. After the introduction of transgenic papayas, the production 
steadily increased in Hawaii. 
Bradford et al. (2016) point out several obstacles to the adoption of RNAi technology in 
animal agriculture and consumer acceptance is hard to gauge. Food safety concerns, consumer 
perceptions, and regulatory issues play a part in whether RNAi technology is accepted in the 
future.  
  
3.2.2 Consumer attitude toward biotechnology 
GMOs were first approved for use in the food system in the 1990s (Colson et al., 2008). 
After the commercial adoption of GM foods, consumers were unaware that GM technology was 
being used in the food sector (Hoban, 2002). Additionally, consumers were uncertain about the 
safety of GM foods (Hoban, 2002). This controversial debate in the food and agriculture sector 
has both ends of the spectrum disseminating information to the public (Lusk et al., 2004). On one 
end, consumer and environmental groups warn of the dangers and risk of consuming GMO food 
products (Lusk et al., 2004). On the other end, agribusinesses, commodity organizations and 
advocacy groups have touted the benefits (Lusk et al., 2004). 
Past studies have shown that some consumers are willing to pay a premium for 
genetically modified foods when the benefits of using biotechnology are specified (Lusk et al., 
2004). Rousu et al. (2007) used an experimental auction with information and labeling 
treatments to estimate the willingness to pay for genetically modified foods. The information 
treatments varied in tone and perspective on agricultural biotechnology. The results of this study 
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found that consumers were influenced by the source of the entity provided information, where 
anti-biotechnology information from environmental non-governmental organizations positively 
influenced bid price differences on genetically modified foods and pro-biotechnology 
information from the biotechnology industry negatively influenced bid price differences. Frewer 
et al. (1998) found the credibility of the source of information impacted the reactions of 
individuals to information about food biotechnology. In addition, the source credibility was 
strongly influenced by prior attitudes toward biotechnology (Fewer, 1998). 
In the fall of 2015, AquAdvantage salmon was approved by the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration for commercial use. This product is the first meat product using genetic 
modification technology. Using genetic information from other species of salmon, the salmon is 
able to produce growth hormone year round, which causes production time to be cut in one-half 
(FDA, 2015a). After critical and scientific analysis, the FDA determined that the AquAdvantage 
salmon was nutritionally comparable to non-GE salmon as provided under the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act and is not materially different from other Atlantic salmon (FDA, 2015a). The FDA 
provided manufacturers with voluntarily labeling language for food products that contained 
genetically engineered and non-genetically engineered ingredients (2015b). Controversy 
surrounding the adoption of this product focused on the effects on human health (Smith et al., 
2010). Very limited research is available regarding the influence on consumer health and 
wellness, especially in meats products. Smith et al. (2010) note the possibility of government 
intervention causing the price of genetically engineered salmon to decrease, which could lead to 
increased consumption and may have positive effects on human health and nutrition due to 
increased intake of omega-3 fatty acids.   
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 3.2.3 Food safety and animal health concerns 
Food safety, on an objective basis, is based on the assessment of the risk or potential 
hazard by scientists and food experts while it is more subjective to consumers (Grunert, 2005). 
Grunert (2005) explains that consumers may have safety concerns about certain production 
technologies, such as food irradiation and GMOs. These perceptions are often negative about the 
technology used and influence products in the marketplace (Lee & Yun, 2015). Concerns about 
health effects and food safety from these technologies have led to increases in the demand for 
organic and natural food products (Harper, 2007). While some studies have shown there are no 
significant nutritional differences between organic and GM products (Smith-Spangler et al., 
2012), government agencies have not identified this information via mandated labeling in food 
products.  
Concerns for the welfare of animals have been increasing as well. Knight and Herzog 
(2009) note the spectrum of use of animals in society is complex and differs due to people’s 
values and beliefs. On one end, people use animals for companionship while on the other end use 
them for research and consumption. While consumers may have an attitude about animal use in 
one particular application, it may not carry through to other uses (Knight & Herzog, 2009). 
Croney et al. (2012) point out that science alone does not dictate practices producers use, and the 
opinions of stakeholders in the food system should also be considered. Special interest groups, 
such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and the Human Society of the 
United States (HSUS), have disseminated information to the public about negative production 
practices used by farmers and ranchers as well as highlighting research that suggests having a 
non-animal protein diet may produce healthful benefits (PETA, 2016; HSUS, 2016). Several 
states have had ballot initiatives about animal agriculture production practices, e.g., the use of 
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gestation crates in the swine industry (Tonsor & Wolf, 2010). Previous studies have shown that 
consumers value certain production practice attributes and animal welfare attributes, such as 
individual gestation crates and stalls and antibiotic use (Olynk, Tonsor, and Wolf, 2010). 
 
 3.2.4 Risk perceptions and attitudes 
Consumers have varying risk perceptions and attitudes toward food. While there are very 
few food products in which consumers might have a risk preference for, or risk seeking, most 
food products fall in the risk attitude category of risk neutral and risk averse. Compared to risk 
perceptions, consumers will have different feelings toward risk. Perceptions about food safety 
risk are what the individual believes would be the amount of health risk, if any, they would face 
from consuming a food product (Schroeder et. al, 2007). With the introduction of new 
technology, consumers have a perception of risk based on previous experiences and information 
available to them. Schroeder et al. (2007) notes that people with varying levels of risk attitude 
respond with different behaviors. Perception of risk changes due to the setting and experience 
consumers face. Grunert (2005) describes that while meals prepared at home are often thought to 
be safer as opposed to ready-made meals, the opposite is actually true, objectively. While 
consumers may be aware of risk associated with meal preparation, consumers feel as if their own 
chances of being exposed to risk are lower than average consumers, which Grunert (2005) 
defines as optimistic bias. Another dimension of risk perception is history with food safety, as 
consumers are more aware of risks they have previously encountered. Consumers with no 
previous experience with food safety concerns will be more risk averse to those foods due to lack 
of information (Schroeder et al., 2007). 
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 3.3 Methods 
 3.3.1 RNAi Perceptions and Acceptance 
To assess the levels of acceptance of consumers, a series of Likert-scale questions has 
asked of respondents. These Likert questions ranged from asking the respondents’ desirability, 
willingness to eat, willingness to purchase and preference for the application of RNAi 
technology in the beef sector.  
The following methods were used in an analysis of the Likert scale item with the 
utilization of conditional logit modeling. The expected results were consumers in general are 
more risk averse with new technology and will likely not accept RNAi in the food system. 
Albeit, if consumers receive an information treatment or an external article with a promising or 
positive tone, it may influence their decision on the application of RNAi.  
Lusk and Coble (2005) developed a set of questions about the perception of risk in 
consuming genetically modified foods. This original set of questions used in the 2005 study were 
taken from Lusk et al. (2004). In Lusk and Coble’s (2005) study, the results of these that 
respondents were risk averse to genetically modified foods and less accepting of the technology. 
With this type of mindset, questions for this study were modified from Lusk and Coble (2005) to 
reflect risk in consuming RNAi technology. In addition to Lusk and Coble’s (2005) consumption 
risk, a set of questions was developed in regard to consumer acceptance of genetically modified 
foods. Because RNAi technology is not currently used in commercial beef products, the 
statement regarding previous consumption from Lusk and Coble’s (2005) study was not asked of 
respondents.  
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3.3.2 Food Technology Neophobia Scale 
Cox and Evans (2008) suggest a modified Food Neophobia Scale to assess the attributes 
of new technology with consumers. In the development of the Food Technology Neophobia 
Scale (FTNS), Cox and Evans (2008) hypothesized that a trait of the scale would have a positive 
relationship with distrust in science. In their study, they asked student respondents to rate their 
agreement with 13 statements about the acceptance of foods via a questionnaire. Respondents 
were asked to rate on a 7-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. One objective of 
their study was to decrease the number of items in order to group statements into factors. Using a 
rotated varimax maximum likelihood method through factor analysis, Cox and Evans (2008) 
were able to group the food technology acceptance statements into factors based on the relative 
magnitude and signs of the eigenvalues. The FTNS was used in this study to capture 
respondents’ attitudes toward new technologies in the beef sector. The 13 statements were 
modified for this study to reflect new beef technologies. Through the use of this method, the 
statements about perceptions and attitudes toward can be grouped into smaller factors and used 
in econometric models. 
 
 3.3.3. RNAi Acceptance Index 
Through the use of the Likert-scale questions modified from Lusk and Coble (2005), an 
index was developed to denote the acceptance of RNAi technology by respondents. Three 
statements were included in the Likert question set, which respondents rated on a scale of 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). If the combined value of the three statements equaled 
15 or greater, then the index had a value of -1 representing acceptance of RNAi technology. If 
the combined value was 14 or below, then the index had a value of 0 representing non-
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acceptance, or apprehension, of RNAi technology. Due to the programming in SAS, the 
conditional logit estimates the probability of the lowest value. The acceptance index was given a 
negative value for the model to explain the acceptance of respondents. Using the acceptance 
index as a dependent variable and demographics and other variables as explanatories, a 
conditional logit model was employed to estimate the marginal effects of respondents. Using the 
model developed by McFadden (1974), the conditional logit form can be expressed: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑗 is chosen as most and 𝑘 as least)  =  
𝑒𝜆𝑗𝑉𝑗𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝜆𝑗𝑉𝑘𝑖
 
(3.1) 
Where j is respondents who are acceptors of RNAi technology and k is respondents who are non-
accepting, 𝜆𝑗 signifies the fit of the value of acceptors, and V denotes the utility of respondents. 
The conditional logit models have the assumption that consumers have homogenous preferences 
(Lusk, Roosen, and Fox, 2003). 
 
 3.4 Results 
 3.4.1 Most preferred purpose and application 
Results of questions asked regarding the purpose and application of RNAi technology in 
the food system can be found in Table 3.1. The most preferred purpose of RNAi is protecting 
cattle from disease, followed by increasing overall animal health and keeping beef production 
and processing in the United States. 
Respondents also were asked to rank which technology or production practice they would 
prefer be used for improvements in animal health in beef cattle, safety of beef products, or price 
of beef products. Results of the number one rankings for each technology by goal can be found 
in Table 3.2. The most frequent technology ranked number one in improving animal health and 
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price of beef products was feed additives while antibiotics ranked number one in improving 
safety of beef products. More than half of the first rankings for each goal are feed additives and 
antibiotic use. Vaccines were the lowest of the technology ranked as number one with less than 
14 percent of respondents for each specific goal. RNAi technology received the second lowest of 
the number one rankings.  
Table 3.1. Preferred Purpose of RNAi technology 
Variable 
Means 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Percentage of 
Observations 
<=4 =5 =6 =7 
Keep beef production and processing in the U.S. 5.16  
(1.59) 
35.33 20.07 17.07 27.53 
Lower the price paid by beef consumers 5.05 
(1.65) 
37.63 19.23 16.80 26.33 
Improve the nutrition content of beef 4.93 
(1.61) 
40.60 21.70 15.63 22.07 
Reduce use of antibiotics 5.08 
(1.59) 
37.10 20.50 17.07 25.33 
Protect cattle from disease 5.24 
(1.58) 
31.33 20.93 19.07 28.67 
Reduce use of hormones 5.14 
(1.57) 
35.10 20.53 18.23 26.13 
Increase overall animal health 5.17 
(1.59) 
33.07 22.03 17.77 27.13 
Reduce death in cattle 5.03 
(1.57) 
37.57 22.33 16.37 23.73 
Increase carcass yield 4.47 
(1.61) 
53.03 21.37 12.23 13.37 
Reduce use of feed additives 5.00 
(1.57) 
38.43 22.17 16.93 22.47 
Reduce farmers’ time involved in labor 4.37 
(1.59) 
56.17 20.87 11.43 11.53 
Note: All questions were asked on a scale of 1 = very undesirable to 7 = very desirable.  
 
Table 3.2. Number One Rankings of Improvements by Technology 
Variable 
Animal Health in 
Beef Cattle 
Safety of Beef 
Products 
Price of Beef 
Products 
Feed Additives 321 (32.1%) 292 (29.2%) 345 (34.5%) 
Antibiotics 272 (27.2%) 301 (30.10%) 243 (24.3%) 
Vaccines 113 (11.3%) 125 (12.5%) 133 (13.3%) 
Genetic Technology 148 (14.8%) 155 (15.5%) 154 (15.4%) 
RNAi Technology 146 (14.6%) 127 (12.7%) 125 (12.5%) 
Note: The values above are those where respondents have a ranking of 1 for the respective variable. 
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3.4.2 Factor Analysis 
Table 3.3. Factor Analysis of New Food Technology Results 
Attribute of Beef Technology Factor 1a Factor 2b 
New beef technologies are something I am uncertain about. 0.577 0.098 
New beef products are not healthier than traditional beef products. 0.719 0.043 
The benefits of new beef technologies are often grossly overstated. 0.684 0.094 
There are plenty of tasty beef products around so we do not need to use new beef 
technologies to produce more. 
0.764 0.072 
New beef technologies decrease the natural quality of beef products. 0.764 0.008 
New beef technologies are unlikely to have long-term negative human health effects. -0.098 0.748 
New beef technologies give people more control over their beef product choices. -0.111 0.781 
New beef products using new technologies can help people have a balanced diet. -0.207 0.807 
New technologies in beef may have long-term negative environmental effects. 0.745 -0.034 
It can be risky to switch to new beef technologies too quickly. 0.714 -0.019 
Society should not depend heavily on new technologies in the beef industry to solve its 
food problems. 
0.742 -0.014 
There is no sense trying out high-tech beef products because the ones I eat are already 
good enough. 
0.698 0.103 
The media usually provides a balanced and unbiased view of new beef technologies. 0.133 0.682 
Notes:  
a Factor 1 had an eigenvalue of 4.670 and explains 35.9 percent of the variation across all questions. 
b Factor 2 had an eigenvalue of 2.343 and explains 17.9 percent of the variation across all questions. 
 
Results of the FTNS showed the statements of adopting new beef technologies could be 
grouped into or collapsed to two factors. Examining how each statement loaded on each factor 
provides a guide to labeling each factor. A full table of the results are provided in Table 3.3.  
The first factor can be described as general concerns, as it includes statements in which new beef 
technologies are framed negatively and reflect uncertainty. The statements included in this factor 
are: new beef technologies are something I am uncertain about, new beef product are not 
healthier than traditional beef products, the benefits of new beef technologies are often grossly 
overstated, there are plenty of beef products around so we do not need to use new beef 
technologies to produce more, new beef technologies decrease the natural quality of beef 
products, it can be risky to switch new beef technologies in the beef industry to solve its food 
problems, and there is no sense trying out high-tech beef products because the ones I eat are 
already good enough. The second factor can be labeled as general support as these statements 
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frame new beef technologies in a more positive light than the rest of the statements. The second 
factor includes new beef technologies are unlikely to have long-term negative human health 
effects, new beef technologies give people more control over their beef product choices, new 
beef product using new technologies can help people have a balanced diet and the media usually 
provides a balanced and unbiased view of new beef technologies.  
 
 3.4.3 RNAi Acceptance 
The results of the Likert-scale questions pertaining to the acceptance of RNAi technology 
can be found in Table 3.4. The results of the agreement with the three statements about RNAi 
technology are similar.  
 
In addition to asking respondents about their acceptance of RNAi, a set of Likert-scale 
questions were used to assess concern over the technology. Results of these questions can be 
found in Table 3.5. It is noted that items 2 and 3 were reverse coded. Similar to the acceptance 
results, the results are nearly split for items 1 and 4. For items 2 and 3, the results suggest 
respondents are more concerned about consuming food products using RNAi technology and are 
uncertain about the potential side-effects. 
Table 3.4. Acceptance of RNAi Technology 
Variable Definition Mean 
Percentage of Observations 
<=4 =5 =6 =7 
Eat I am willing to eat RNAi beef products 3.73 
(1.71) 
67.43 17.77 8.73 6.07 
Purchase I am willing to purchase RNAi beef products. 3.75 
(1.70) 
67.77 17.87 8.33 6.03 
Accept In general, I support the use of RNAi technology in 
food production. 
3.57 
(1.64) 
74.80 13.60 6.40 5.20 
Notes: 
* Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
All questions were asked on a scale of 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree. 
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Table 3.5. Perception of Risk in Consuming RNAi Technology 
Scale Item Definition Mean 
Item 1 RNAi technology in beef production will not pose risk to my family and me. 3.54 (1.56) 
Item 2 
My family and I could be exposed to great risks from RNAi technology in food 
production. 
4.52 (1.55) 
Item 3 
The side-effects from eating RNAi technology in food production are largely 
unknown. 
5.10 (1.50) 
Item 4 
There is little danger that RNAi technology in food production will results in new 
diseases for humans. 
3.63 (1.56) 
Notes:  
*Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.  
All questions were asked on a scale of 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree; however, Items 2 and 3 were framed 
negatively.  
 
Table 3.6. Acceptance of RNAi Technology by Information Treatment 
Information 
Treatment 
Variable Definition 
Percentage of Observations 
<=4 =5 =6 =7 
1 
Eat 
I am willing to eat RNAi beef products. 67.87 16.93 9.60 5.60 
2 66.93 16.67 8.93 7.47 
3 66.40 18.40 9.07 6.13 
4 68.53 19.07 7.33 5.07 
1 
Purchase 
I am willing to purchase RNAi beef products. 68.13 18.93 7.33 5.60 
2 65.60 18.53 9.07 6.80 
3 67.07 17.33 9.73 5.87 
4 70.27 16.67 7.20 5.87 
1 
Support 
In general, I support the use of RNAi 
technology in food production 
75.07 13.87 6.67 4.40 
2 75.20 12.53 6.27 6.00 
3 72.53 15.20 7.47 4.80 
4 76.40 12.80 5.20 5.60 
 
Looking into the acceptance of RNAi further, the results of the acceptance Likert-scale 
questions were broken down by which of the four information treatments the respondent 
received. These information treatments were selected from searching through various forms of 
online media focusing on the topic of RNAi. Results of the acceptance of RNAi can be found in 
Table 3.6. Respondents who received information treatments 2 and 3, which were framed in 
historical and promising perspectives, respectfully, had given the statements a values of 5 or 
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greater more frequently. Respondents who received the information treatment 4, which was 
framed RNAi in a concerning manner, received more values of 5 or less.   
Table 3.7. Expectation or Impression of RNAi Technology 
Variable Definition Mean 
Percentage of Observations 
<=4 =5 =6 =7 
Cattle Health Impact on health of beef cattle 4.00 
(1.61) 
64.73 17.97 10.00 7.30 
Production 
Costs 
Impact on production costs 4.13 
(1.54) 
61.00 21.87 9.47 7.67 
Price Paid Impact on price paid by consumers 4.07 
(1.59) 
61.63 20.87 9.73 7.77 
Taste Impact on taste of beef products 4.09 
(1.47) 
66.53 18.27 8.53 6.67 
Human Health Impact on human health from beef consumption 3.90 
(1.63) 
67.30 17.40 8.37 6.93 
Notes: 
* Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
** All variables are on a scale from 1 = strongly negative and 7 = strongly positive. 
 
Table 3.8. Expectation of RNAi technology by Information Treatment. 
Information 
Treatment 
Variable Definition 
Percentage of Observations 
<=4 =5 =6 =7 
1 
Cattle 
Health 
Impact on health of beef cattle 65.87 17.87 9.33 6.93 
2 66.00 16.53 8.80 8.67 
3 63.47 18.13 12.53 5.87 
4 63.60 19.33 9.33 7.73 
1 
Production 
Costs 
Impact on production costs 64.67 22.13 8.00 5.20 
2 58.53 22.13 9.60 9.73 
3 59.87 21.87 10.80 7.47 
4 60.93 21.33 9.47 8.27 
1 
Price Paid 
Impact on price paid by consumers 64.13 20.80 8.27 6.80 
2 59.47 22.53 9.60 8.40 
3 61.60 19.47 11.33 7.60 
4 61.33 20.67 9.73 8.27 
1 
Taste 
Impact on taste of beef products 68.13 17.47 8.00 6.40 
2 66.67 17.87 8.93 6.53 
3 66.40 19.73 8.40 5.47 
4 64.93 18.00 8.80 8.27 
1 Human 
Health 
Impact on human health from beef 
consumption 
69.07 18.28 6.53 6.13 
2 67.33 15.60 9.07 8.00 
3 64.27 18.80 10.40 6.53 
4 68.53 16.93 7.47 7.07 
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 Respondents also were asked about their impression and expectation of RNAi technology 
on different aspects of the beef food chain. In addition to the means and percentage of 
observations for each variable on an aggregate level, the percentage of observations was broken 
down by the information treatment the respondents received. The results can be found in Table 
3.7 and Table 3.8. Based on the results of the frequency by information treatment, it appears the  
results are the opposite of what was predicted for information treatment 4. With the negatively 
framed information, it was expected that the values would fall more on the neutral to strongly 
negative on the scale. 
 
 3.4.4 RNAi Acceptance Index 
 The RNAi acceptance index was built from the responses to the statements in Question 
27 in the survey. The specific statements can be found in Table 3.4. Respondents with a 
combined value from the statements of 15 or greater were given an RNAi acceptance index value 
of -1, which signifies acceptance. Respondents with a combined value of 14 or lower were given 
an index value of 0, which denotes non-acceptance. Summary statistic for the RNAi acceptance 
index can be found in Table 3.9. 
Table 3.9. Summary Statistics for RNAi Acceptance Index 
Variable N Percentage of Respondents 
-1 720 24 
0 2,280 76 
 
Results of the conditional logit models for acceptance of RNAi can be found in Table 
3.10. In the PROC LOGISTIC command in SAS 9.4, the probability being modeled is when the 
index is equal to -1. For interpretation, a negative (positive) coefficient would result in 
respondents to be less (more) likely to accept RNAi technology. In the model, the variables 
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female, age, race, previous purchases of grass fed beef, food safety concerns, and external 
articles 1 and 4 (article from The New York Times and The Scientist, respectively) have a 
negative relationship with acceptance. For example, with a one-unit increase of age, the 
acceptance of RNAi decreases by one unit. On the other hand, education, previous purchases of 
natural or animal welfare-assured beef, and price concerns have a positive relationship with 
acceptance. For example, with a one-unit increase in education, the acceptance of RNAi 
technology increased by one unit. Variables that were expected to be negative with RNAi 
acceptance were previous purchase of natural and animal welfare-assured beef. External article 
4, which put RNAi technology in a positive light, had a negative relationship with acceptance of 
RNAi. Through modeling the acceptance of RNAi technology, the characteristics of respondents 
and external factors that influenced it were identified. If RNAi technology is to be implemented 
in the livestock industry, then consumers with these characteristics can be targeted during the 
acceptance phase.  
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Table 3.10. Conditional Logit for RNAi Technology Acceptance   
Variable N Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Marginal 
Effectsa 
Female 3,000 -0.618* 0.092 -0.107 
Age 3,000 -0.015* 0.003 -0.003 
Education 3,000 0.380* 0.092 0.066 
Race: White 3,000 -0.255* 0.103 -0.044 
Children 3,000 0.009 0.042 N/A 
Adults 3,000 -0.120* 0.045 -0.021 
Groundbeef consumption 3,000 0.109 0.056 N/A 
Steak consumption 3,000 0.040 0.061 N/A 
New Source: TV  3,000 -0.166 0.094 N/A 
Food Source: Supermarkets 3,000 -0.148 0.113 N/A 
Previous Purchase: Natural 3,000 0.211* 0.100 0.037 
Previous Purchase: Animal Welfare-Assured 3,000 0.571* 0.133 0.099 
Previous Purchase: Grass Fed 3,000 -0.236* 0.100 -0.041 
Previous Purchase Choice 3,000 0.118 0.113 N/A 
Food Safety Concerns 3,000 -0.095* 0.029 -0.017 
Price Concerns 3,000 0.097* 0.033 0.017 
Information Treatment: Basic 3,000 -0.117 0.124 N/A 
Information Treatment: Historical 3,000 0.012 0.122 N/A 
Information Treatment: Promising 3,000 0.067 0.121 N/A 
External Article 1 3,000 -0.297* 0.127 -0.052 
External Article 2 3,000 -0.189 0.127 N/A 
External Article 3 3,000 -0.080 0.125 N/A 
External Article 4 3,000 -0.212* 0.126 -0.037 
External Article 5 3,000 -0.056 0.123 N/A 
External Article 6 3,000 -0.186 0.124 N/A 
External Article 7 3,000 -0.105 0.125 N/A 
Notes:  
* Indicates significance at the 0.05 level or higher. 
a Only the marginal effects of significant variables were estimated. 
   
28 
Chapter 4 - Consumer Willingness to Pay 
 4.1 Format 
In this chapter, willingness to pay for beef steak produced using RNAi technology is 
discussed and evaluation is included to gain food service channel insights. Through the use of 
choice experiment questions and dichotomous choice sequences, consumer willingness to pay is 
examined. After the introduction and literature review, the methodology and results of the choice 
experiment are presented follow by the methodology and results of the dichotomous choice 
sequence.  
 
 4.2 Introduction 
A wealth of literature exists for the willingness to pay for genetically modified (GM) 
foods (Lusk et al., 2004; Lusk, 2003; Rousu et al., 2007; Colson et al., 2008). These studies note 
that consumers’ willingness to pay changes with respondent attributes as well as information 
treatments provided. Few studies have examined the willingness to pay for RNAi technology in 
the food industry (Shew et al., 2016). 
To assess consumer willingness to pay, respondents were given a set of choice 
experiment questions and a double-bounded dichotomous choice sequence to simulate real-life 
shopping experience within the online survey. In the choice experiments, beef steaks were 
presented with varying attributes under different label settings. The label settings varied to 
simulate possible governmental regulatory policies regarding RNAi technology. Based on 
previous literature (Shew et al., 2016), it is hypothesized that consumers will require a discount 
for beef products with RNAi use as an attribute. In addition, it is expected that beef steaks with 
antibiotic use will result in a discount. In the set of scenarios where both RNAi and antibiotic use 
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are possibilities, results are predicted to be smaller discounts wanted for steaks derived from 
RNAi compared to those with antibiotic use due to the perceived benefits of the technology. 
Results show that consumers are willing to pay more for RNAi if it were used in an application 
to keep beef production with in the United States and protect cattle from disease compared to 
alternative stated uses. Results also include consumers requiring a discount to purchase beef 
steaks produced using RNAi and antibiotics. 
 
 4.3 Literature Review 
 4.3.1 Factors influencing willingness to pay 
Choice experiments have accurately predicted the success of new products in the market 
(Lusk, Roosen, and Fox, 2003). Choice experiments are used when real market data does not 
exist. As well, choice experiments offer a way to evaluate consumer willingness to pay (WTP) 
across multiple attributes (Lusk, Roosen, and Fox, 2003). Gao and Schroeder (2009) point out 
that attributes contained in WTP studies should not be limited and should be more reflective of 
the decisions consumers make. When the number of attributes contained in a choice experiment 
increased, consumers’ WTP changed significantly (Gao and Schroeder, 2009). Tonsor (2011) 
points out that label space is restricted in the marketing of food products, and choice experiments 
should focus primarily on actual market attributes.  
Shew et al. (2016) estimated the WTP across domestic and international consumers for 
RNAi technology in rice compared to Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) rice and conventionally-
produced rice. Results of the study show both products require a discount, but the discount for 
RNAi rice was 30 to 40 percent less than Bt rice. Results also showed that individuals from the 
U.S. and France with a bachelor’s degree require a discount for RNAi rice compared to the other 
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base education levels. In addition, consumers were more likely to eat RNAi rice over Bt rice. 
Although very few studies cover the willingness to pay for RNAi technology, a significant 
amount of literature exists in the WTP for comparable technology, such as genetically modified 
organisms and food. Lusk (2003) shows that some consumers may be willing to pay a premium 
for genetically modified technology in food when the benefits are explicitly stated.  Rousu et al. 
(2003) estimated the WTP for genetically modified food products. The results of the study 
showed respondents were willing to pay a premium for products that are non-GM in an 
experimental auction.  
Tonsor and Shupp (2011) and Lusk (2003) point out that consumers may overstate their 
willingness to pay when taking surveys, which creates hypothetical bias in the estimates. Lusk 
and Schroeder (2004) note that choice experiments are less likely to encounter hypothetical bias 
in WTP estimates over other methods. 
 
4.3.2 Labeling of food products 
Food is labeled as a way to inform consumers of the attributes of food products, such as 
method of production, absence of nutritional content, attributes, among others. Golan, Kuchler, 
and Mitchell (2001) discussed the economic efficiencies of labeling. A label is intended to help 
consumers differentiate the labeled product from otherwise similar products (Golan, Kuchler, 
and Mitchell, 2001). Labeling of food product based on ingredient occurs in three settings – 
voluntary, voluntary through third-party entities, and mandatory. Both voluntary label settings 
depend on the decisions made by individual firms while mandatory is enforced by the federal 
government. While labels provide information to consumers, they also serve as an advertising 
function to consumers while shopping. Golan, Kuchler, and Mitchell (2001) point out the costs 
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and benefits of mandatory labeling are borne by consumers. Products without labels may cause 
consumers to think it is defective by containing a harmful component or lacking a certain 
attribute. Firms can also use labeling as a part of product advertising to targeted consumers. In 
today’s shopping experience, labels may not provide consumers with full information of the 
products they intend to purchase. For example, there is a lack of a standardization definition for 
product labeled natural. Currently, the U.S. Department of Agriculture requires the following 
criteria to be met for a product to be labeled natural: “does not contain any artificial flavor or 
flavoring, coloring ingredient or chemical preservative, or any other artificial or synthetic 
ingredient” and “the product and its ingredients are not more than minimally processed” (USDA, 
2013). Yet, the Food and Drug Administration has no formal definition of natural. While no 
definition has been set for natural products, the FDA allows the wording to be used on the 
product if, “the food does not contain added color, artificial flavors, or synthetic substances” 
(FDA, 2016). 
Labels are seen primarily as an item of direct consumer information that may help reduce 
information asymmetry (Rabionwicz, 1999). In regards to labeling, mandatory labeling aims at 
correcting market inefficiencies whereas voluntary labeling attempts to differentiate products and 
call attention to desirable product attributes (Golan, Kuchler, and Mitchell, 2001). In recent 
years, government intervention in labeling has begun to target a new purpose, namely, 
influencing individual consumption choices to align them with social objectives (Golan, Kuchler, 
and Mitchell, 2001). Government agencies have shown interest in educating the public for the 
benefit of social welfare by reducing information asymmetries (Lusk et al., 2004).  
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 4.3.3 Random Utility Model 
Random utility theory was first introduction conceptually by Lancaster (1966). Random 
utility theory states that consumers seek to maximize their individual utility by making optimal 
choices. As well, the utility for a good can be separated into utilities for specific attributes in the 
product (Lancaster, 1966). The random utility model was developed by McFadden (1974) and 
can be expressed as the function:  
 𝑈𝑗𝑡 =  𝑣𝑗𝑡 +  𝜀𝑗𝑡 (4.1) 
where U is the utility obtained from selecting alternative j in choice scenario t,  𝑣 is the portion 
of utility that can be determined by the attributes of choice option j, and 𝜀 is the unobservable 
stochastic portion. The subscript i has been omitted which denotes specific individuals.  
Assuming 𝑣 is linear in parameters, the random utility function can be rewritten as the 
following: 
 𝑣𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑥𝑗1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑗𝑛 (4.2) 
where 𝑥𝑗𝑛 is the nth attribute value for alternative j, and the βs are parameters associated with the 
nth attributes. 
The probability of an individual choosing each alternative can be written as: 
 P𝑗𝑡 = P(𝑣𝑗𝑡 +  𝜀𝑗𝑡  > 𝑣𝑘𝑡 +  𝜀𝑘𝑡; 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘, ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶) (4.3) 
where C is the choice set of all possible alternatives for one individual. 
With the use of effects coding to separate values of zero for product attributes and the 
absence of attributes in the optout option, willingness to pay for attribute k can be calculated as: 
 
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑘 =  −(
2 ∗ 𝛽𝑘
𝛽𝑐
) 
(4.4) 
where 𝛽𝑘 is the coefficient of the attribute and 𝛽𝑐 is the coefficient of the price variable. 
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Using the delta method, 95 percent confidence intervals for the WTP estimates can be 
calculated (Greene, 2003). The delta method can be expressed as: 
 𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝑊𝑇?̂?𝑘) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝑊𝑇?̂?𝛽𝑘)
2
 𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝛽?̂?) + 𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝑊𝑇?̂?𝛽𝑐)
2
 𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝛽?̂?) 
+2 ∗ 𝑊𝑇?̂?𝛽𝑘 ∗  𝑊𝑇?̂?𝛽𝑐 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝛽?̂?, 𝛽?̂?) 
= [(
−2
𝛽?̂?
)
2
 𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝛽?̂?) + (
2𝛽?̂?
𝛽?̂?
2 )
2 
𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝛽?̂?) + 2 ∗ (
−2
𝛽?̂?
) (
2𝛽?̂?
𝛽?̂?
)  𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝛽?̂?, 𝛽?̂?)]  
(4.5) 
where 𝛽𝑘 and 𝛽𝑐 are the partial derivatives of the attribute k estimated WTP values with respect 
to 𝛽𝑘 and 𝛽𝑐. Using the variance estimates, the lower and upper bounds can be calculated using 
the following equation: 
 
𝑊𝑇?̂?𝑘  ± 𝑧𝛼/2 √𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝑊𝑇?̂?𝑘) 
(4.6) 
Where z is the critical value and α is the confidence level. A 95 percent confidence interval was 
used, thus 𝑧𝛼/2 equals 1.96 under a normal distribution.  
 
4.4 Methods 
 4.4.1 Choice experiment analysis 
Utilizing a split-sample experience approach, a four-choice experiment design that varied 
in number and mixture of attributes associated with beef steaks was employed. Pozo, Tonsor, 
and Schroeder (2012) found that using a split-sample with the presence and absence of pork 
production attributes changed conclusions regarding consumer preferences when studying the 
use of gestation crates. In each of the scenarios presented to respondents, options A and B had 
varying attribute levels of beef steaks while option C was an opt-out of options A and B. Across 
the scenarios presented to the respondents, the level of attributes changed to help determine 
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willingness to pay for attributes. A full design of the choice experiments used in this study can be 
found in Appendix B. In addition to the varying label of attributes, respondents were presented 
three different levels of label approval setting: no approval, approval, and approval with 
mandatory labeling. A full map of choice experiment design logic can be found in Appendix E. 
Through the variation in label wording, label setting and information treatment, several potential 
real-world environments were created in the form of choice experiments via SAS programming. 
At the current time, the introduction of RNAi technology in the food system is hard to predict. 
By estimating the willingness to pay across the several variations, the results map out a wider set 
of possible future outcomes for the technology. 
The attributes from the choice experiments include price, USDA grade, RNAi use, and 
antibiotic use, and USDA grade, depending on the design in which a respondent was randomly 
assigned. Panel data were constructed using individual response variables as well as the choice 
experiment design received. Since three of the choice experiment designs presented seven 
questions, or scenarios, with three options to respondents, a panel of 15,570 total observations 
were created for each choice experiment. This panel number was created by taking the number of 
people (750) times the number of scenarios per person (7) multiplied by the number of choices 
per scenario (3). In the case of choice experiment design four, a panel of 13,500 observations 
were created since respondents were given six scenarios (750 respondents, times 6 scenarios per 
person, times 3 choices per scenario).   
To assess respondents’ willingness to pay for beef products using RNAi technology, one-
fourth of respondents were randomly given one of four choice experiments. The four choice 
experiments included the following attributes outlined in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1. Outline of Choice Experiment Models 
Attribute Design 1 Design 2 Design 3 Design 4 
Price √ √ √ √ 
RNAi Use √ √  √ 
Antibiotic Use √  √  
USDA Grade  √ √  
Note: A check mark indicates inclusion in a given design. 
 
Figure 4.1. Example of a Choice Scenario from Design 1 
Beef Steak 
Attributes 
Option A Option B Option C 
Price ($/lb.) 
RNAi Use 
Antibiotic Use 
$15.75 
Free 
Free 
$11.75 
Used 
No Claim 
I choose not to 
purchase either of 
these products. 
 
Utilizing the PLAN and OPTEX procedures in Statistical Analysis Software (SAS) 9.4, 
two designs were generated. One of the designs created a sequence of variations for three 
attributes (price and two other beef steak attributes) for designs 1, 2 and 3, while the other design 
created a sequence of variations for two attributes (one price and one other beef steak attribute). 
Figure 4.2 is an example of one of the seven scenarios shown to respondents in design 1 of the 
survey. All respondents experienced seven scenarios in which to choose from the three options, 
except for respondents given choice experiment design 4. This design only contained six 
scenarios due to the reduced number of attributes. Each question had an option between two beef 
steak alternatives and an option to not choose any of the products. Price levels were set in 
reference to the Bureau of Labor Statistics average price of $8.29 for beef steaks during 
November 2015 (BLS, 2016b). The higher price levels were then taken from this base price with 
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a $3.50 increment to $11.29 and $13.79 and $15.29. The other attribute descriptions were 
presented to participants as: 
Antibiotic Use: 
 Used means the product was produced utilizing antibiotics. 
 Free means the product was produced without utilizing antibiotics. 
 No claim means that no claims on antibiotic use are being made. 
 
USDA Grade is the evaluation of the meat quality given by the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
where: 
 Choice means the beef steak is high quality and will be very tender, juicy, and flavorful.  
 Select means the beef steak is very uniform in quality, but may lack some of the juiciness 
and flavor of higher grades. 
 
RNAi Use: 
 Used means the product was produced utilizing RNAi technology. 
 Free means the product was produced not utilizing RNAi technology. 
 No claim means that no claims on RNAi use are being made. 
 
The attribute definitions only appeared to respondents if the attributes appeared in the 
choice experiment design. In addition, for RNAi use and antibiotic use, only two of the three 
definitions would appear to respondents. Respondents randomly received the pair of definitions, 
and the label wording shown to them would appear throughout the choice experiment for the 
respective attribute. The logic of the choice experiment can be found in Appendix E.  
With the given coding scheme, the option C of opting out had value of zero for each 
attribute present in every scenario across the four designs. The non-price beef steak attributes 
were effects coded, an approach to distinguish the non-price beef steak attributes from the opt-
out coefficient in estimation (Ouma, Abdulai, and Drucker, 2007).  
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Previous studies have used varying attributes across choice experiment designs (Pozo, 
Tonsor, and Schroeder, 2012). With the variation of the attributes contained choice experiment 
designs, the willingness to pay for beef steaks can be compared across the attributes in this study.   
Liaukonyte et al., (2013) varied the label wording of attributes contained in snack foods 
during choice experiments. In this study, the researchers used “free of X” and “contains X,” 
where X referred to food production attributes and characteristics. The results showed the 
negative effect of a “contains X” label was greater than the positive effect of a “free of X” label.  
In regards to this study’s choice experiment, one-third of respondents were given independently 
and randomly given one of the three label wording schemes through their scenarios for the RNAi 
use and antibiotic use attributes, regardless of the given choice experiment design: “free, used;” 
“free, no claim;” and “used, no claim.” In some instances, respondents may have saw products 
with antibiotic use and RNAi having the same, or common, label wording schemes. With this 
approach, consumers were exposed to one of three potential label wording schemes for the 
respective product attributes which government regulators may enforce or suggest in the future.  
Using a random utility model, willingness to pay by consumers for certain beef steak 
attributes was estimated. Using the marginal benefit of an attribute divided by marginal cost 
(price parameter), the willingness to pay is determined for each respective attribute in the choice 
experiment designs. The theoretical random utility model has been developed that shows the 
number of attributes changes in a consumer’s utility function given the changes in attributes. 
Consumer utility can be defined as:  
 𝑈𝑖𝑗 =  𝛼 ∗ 𝑝𝑖𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 +  𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗  
(4.7) 
Where U is the utility of the consumers, 𝛼 is the marginal utility of price for individual i, pij is 
the price of alternative j for individual i, 𝛽 is the marginal utility of the kth attribute, 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the 
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kth attribute of alternative j for individual i, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 denotes the stochastic disturbance of 
alternative j for individual i. As an example, respondents given Design 1 have utility which is 
specified as: 
 𝑣𝑗 =  𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗  +  𝛽2𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑗  +  𝛽3𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑗  + 𝛽4𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑗   (4.8) 
where Pricej is the price of beef steak in scenario j; RNAiUsej is either 0 for a free label and 1 for 
used label, 0 for a used label and 1 for a no claim label, or either 0 for a free label and 1 for a no 
claim label;  AntibioticUsej is either 0 for a free label and 1 for used label, 0 for a used label and 
1 for a no claim label, or either 0 for a free label and 1 for a no claim label; and OptOutj is a 
constant equal to one used to describe the consumer’s choice in selecting “I choose not to 
purchase with Option A or Option B.”  
Utility of respondents presented scenarios from Design 2 can be specified as: 
 𝑣𝑗 =  𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗  + 𝛽2𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑗  +  𝛽3𝑈𝑆𝐷𝐴𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗  + 𝛽4𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑗   (4.9) 
Where Price, RNAiUse and OptOut are the same as described above and USDAGrade is either 
zero for Choice or 1 for Select in scenario j. 
Utility of respondents presented scenarios from Design 3 can be specified as: 
 𝑣𝑗 =  𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗  +  𝛽2𝐴𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑗   + 𝛽3𝑈𝑆𝐷𝐴𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑗   (4.10) 
Where the variables are the same described above. 
Utility of respondents presented scenarios from Design 4 can be specified as 
 𝑣𝑗 =  𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗  +  𝛽2𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑖𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑗  + 𝛽3𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑗  (4.11) 
Where the variables are the same described above. 
Multinomial logit (MNL) models were employed to identify preferences broadly through 
the sign and magnitude in relation to the remaining attribute coefficients. Using a MNL, the 
point estimates for willingness to pay for specific attributes can be found. In MNL modeling, 
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parameters are assumed to be homogenous across respondents.  From the MNL models, 
willingness to pay estimates can be computed from the following negative ratio between 
attributes and price coefficients which is expressed in equation 4.4. In the equation, βk is the 
coefficient on the respective beef steak attribute, RNAi use, Antibiotic use, or USDA grade, and 
βc is the coefficient on price. The coefficient on the attribute k is multiplied by two in the WTP 
ratio due to effects coding (Lusk, Roosen, and Fox, 2003).  
Likelihood ratio (LR) test were employed to determine if the results from label settings, 
information treatments, and label wording can be pooled over estimates. The likelihood ratio 
uses and can be expressed as (The Pennsylvania State University, 2016): 
 ∆𝐺2 =  −2 log 𝐿 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 − (∑ −2 log 𝐿 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠). (4.12) 
With the LR test, the alternative hypothesis is the pooled model is true whereas the null 
hypothesis states the current models are true (The Pennsylvania State University, 2016). The 
degrees of freedom, k, are the number of attributes in the current models minus the number of 
attributes in the pooled model minus. Using a Chi-squared distribution, the results of the LR test 
and the degrees of freedom can be used to determine the p-value of the test: 
 p-value =  𝑋𝑘
2 > ∆𝐺2 (4.13) 
  In addition, a base statement was provided to all respondents about RNAi technology. 
The information treatments were displayed randomly, but proportionally, whereas each 
treatments was given to 750 respondents. The phrasing of the base statement was taken from 
TheStreet, a digital financial media news company, article focusing on the adoption of RNAi 
technology of medical drugs by pharmaceutical companies (Feuerstein, 2010).  
The base information statement read as follows: 
“RNA interference (RNAi for short) is a natural process of gene silencing in cells – think 
of it as a genetic switch that when turned off, tells the body to stop making a certain protein.”  
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In addition to the base statement about RNAi, an information treatment was provided to 
respondents. These articles were selected from searching through popular online media and 
scientific sources about RNAi technology. Four information treatments were randomly, but 
equally distributed to respondents, so each information treatment was provided to 750 
respondents. The four treatments include information were labeled as “basic and not biased,” 
“historical,” “promising and already used,” and “concerned and caution” due to the tone and 
perspective the respective articles had. The four information treatments were taken from 
different types of sources, varying in tone and information about RNAi.  
The basic and not biased information treatment read as follows: 
 “RNAi, as it's known, is an emerging science; the two US researchers who discovered 
it brought home a Nobel Prize in 2006. The process can be described like this: The cells of plants 
and animals carry their instructions in the form of DNA. To make a protein, the sequence of 
genetic letters in each gene gets copied into matching strands of RNA, which then float out of the 
nucleus to guide the protein-making machinery of the cell. RNA interference, or gene silencing, 
is a way to destroy specific RNA messages so that a particular protein is not made” (Philpott, 
2015).  
 
The historical information treatment read as follows: 
“RNA interference (RNAi)—the process by which small interfering RNAs (siRNAs) 
bind to and cleave complementary mRNA sequences, inhibiting their translation into proteins—
is not new to agriculture. In fact, as a naturally occurring biological process, RNAi was 
mediating plant metabolism, growth, and pathogen defense long before humans began 
cultivating crops for their own benefit. But in the last 15 years, RNAi’s role in agriculture has 
grown as researchers have developed greater understanding of the mechanisms underlying the 
phenomenon and employed it to improve pathogen resistance, nutrition, and yield of crop plants. 
RNAi-enhanced crops have been approved for cultivation by regulatory agencies in the United 
States, Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Brazil, and some of these crops—for 
example, papaya—have already reached our plates” (Nehra and Taylor, 2015). 
 
The promising and already used information treatment read as follows: 
“RNA interference (RNAi) is a method of designing gene function by inserting short 
sequences of ribonucleic acid (RNA) that match part of the target gene’s sequence, thus no 
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proteins are produced. Since Science named it as “Breakthrough of the Year” and Fortune 
magazine hailed it as “Biotech’s Billion Dollar Breakthrough” in 2003, RNAi has significantly 
gained prominence as the method of choice for researchers sleuthing the structure and function 
of important genes.  RNAi has provided a way to control pests and diseases, introduce novel 
plant traits and increase crop yield. Using RNAi, scientists have developed novel crops such as 
nicotine-free tobacco, non-allergenic peanuts, decaffeinated coffee, and nutrient fortified maize 
among many others” (ISAAA, 2008). 
 
The concern and caution information treatment read as follows: 
“As the Environmental Protection Agency develops a framework for assessing the risks 
posed by RNAi as pest-control strategy in plants, one consumer advocacy group has expressed 
concern over agricultural use of the technology and asked the agency to temporarily hold off on 
approving any such products.  Overall, Food & Water Watch urged the EPA to "carefully weigh 
the risks associated with RNAi and to design a new risk assessment framework that can 
adequately capture the unintended consequences of the introduction of dsRNA molecules into 
agriculture and the environment" (Donald Danforth Plant Science Center, 2014). 
 
 Along the lines of the base statement and information treatment, respondents were 
presented two of eight external articles about RNAi technology. The articles varied in tone and 
perspective on the use of RNAi. The links include the full title of the articles and name of the 
source. The two articles appeared in a random, but equal distribution. The list of the eight articles 
are presented in Chapter 5.  
To simulate a potential label setting by the FDA, respondents were given one of three 
settings in which RNAi technology could be labeled: no approval for labeling, approval for 
labeling, and approval with mandatory labeling.  
To help alleviate hypothetical bias, a cheap talk script was inserted into the survey, which 
is found before the choice experiment segment. The language provided in this script explained 
that the implications of this study were real and could influence future decisions. Oftentimes in 
surveys estimating willingness to pay, respondents overstate the amount because of the 
hypothetical situation they are placed under. In this situation, there is no immediate consequence 
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or feedback from their response. This hypothetical bias presents skewed information in important 
studies. In this study, a cheap talk script was employed stating that the results of the study would 
be used in the formation of policy. Cheap talk scripts have been shown to reduce the hypothetical 
bias provided by respondents of surveys (Tonsor and Shupp, 2011). 
 
 4.5 Results 
 4.5.1 Choice experiments 
The results of the MNL models for design 1 with RNAi use and antibiotic use as 
attributes can be found in Table 4.5. In general, respondents preferred products where RNAi is 
labeled as free when the label wording “free, used” and “free, no claim” are used. As well, 
respondents preferred products where antibiotic use is labeled as free when the label wording 
“free, used” and “free, no claim” are used. LR tests were employed to see if the individual 
models could be collapsed. We examined if the models could be collapsed in terms of label 
wording, label setting, information treatment, common and mixed labeling schemes, and various 
combinations of those qualities. The results of these hypothesis tests can be found in Table 4.6. 
In the hypothesis testing for pooled models, the LR tests showed that we failed to reject the null 
hypothesis that states the models can be collapsed. With the hypothesis testing in design 1, label 
setting and information treatment could be collapsed. The means that the MNL models were 
estimated for only the three label wording schemes. Models were estimated for labeling schemes 
with common, or matching, wording and mixed. In the common wording, the labels for RNAi 
use and antibiotic use were the same. In the mixed wording, the labels for the two attributes 
differed.  
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The results of the MNL models for pooled frameworks can be found in Table 4.7. Signs 
of the coefficients in the pooled models were similar to those in the individual MNL models. 
Since the WTP point estimates are a ratio of two coefficients, statistical significance must be 
examined through other means, such as the delta method. Using the delta method with a 95 
percent confidence interval, the lower and upper bound of the WTP values were estimated. If the 
WTP interval did not contain zero, statistically significance was met for the coefficients of the 
respective attributes. The results of these WTP intervals for the respective attributes can be found 
in Table 4.17. Included in the table are the point estimates for the respective attributes using 
equation 4.4.  
The results of the MNL models for design 2 with RNAi use and USDA grade as 
attributes can be found in Table 4.8. The coefficient results are similar to those in design 1. 
Respondents generally preferred products in which RNAi were labeled free when the wording 
“free, used” and “free, no claim” are used respectfully. As well, respondents preferred RNAi 
products labeled as no claim when the “used, no claim” wording was employed. With USDA 
grade, in all but one instance, respondents preferred choice steaks over ones that had a select 
grade attribute. With the use of LR tests, the collapsing, or pooling, of individual models were 
examined for label wording, label setting, information treatment, and their various combinations 
of those characteristics. These results can be found in Table 4.9. The rest results suggest all 
models cannot be pooled, except for pooling over information treatment and pooling over label 
setting. The results of the MNL models can be found in Table 4.10. The signs of the coefficients 
for the pooled attribute generally matched those in the individual models. The lower and upper 
bound of WTP estimates were calculated, and the results can be found in Table 4.18. Again the 
point estimates for the respective attributes are included in this table.  
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The results of the MNL models for design 3 with antibiotic use and USDA grade as 
attributes can be found in Table 4.11. Similar to the results from design 1, respondents generally 
preferred products labeled as free in terms of antibiotic use when the wording “free, used” and 
“free, no claim” are used. In addition, respondents preferred products when antibiotic use is 
labeled as no claim under the label wording of “used, no claim.” As for USDA grade, in all but 
two instances of the 36 models, the respondents preferred choice steaks over those with a select 
grade attribute. Again LR tests were employed to examine whether or not models could be 
pooled. The results of these tests can be found in Table 4.12. Similar to previous two designs, all 
models cannot be pooled except for information treatment and label setting. The pooled MNL 
model results can be found in Table 4.13. The pooled models produced similar results to those of 
the individual MNL models. To test for statistical significance and find the upper and lower 
bound for the WTP values, the delta method was used with a 95 percent confidence interval. The 
results of these WTP values can be found in Table 4.19. Point estimates for WTP for antibiotic 
use and grade can also be found in the table. 
The results of the MNL models for design 4 with RNAi use as the only non-price 
attribute can be found in Table 4.14. Similar to the results in designs 1 and 2, respondents 
preferred products in which RNAi is labeled as free under the label wording “free, used” and 
“free, no claim,” respectfully. As well, respondents preferred products in which RNAi is labeled 
as no claim in the label wording of “used, no claim.” LR tests again were employed to calculate 
whether models could be pooled together. The results of these hypothesis tests can be found in 
Table 4.15. The conclusions from these test showed that pooled over label setting and pooled 
over information can be collapsed. The results of the MNL models for pooled frameworks can be 
found in Table 4.16. The results were similar to those in the individual MNL models. Again, the 
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delta method was used to determine the lower and upper bound WTP values as well as statistical 
significance. The results of these WTP values can be found in Table 4.20. As well, the point 
estimates for RNAi use can be found in the table. 
Generally speaking, the pooled models of label setting and information treatment failed 
to reject the null hypothesis stating the individual models can be collapsed down for nearly half 
the instances in each of the choice experiment designs. Yet, the LR tests for when both label 
setting and information treatment reject the null hypothesis, and we must let the models remain 
individualized. Due to the results of the respective hypothesis tests in the individual designs, the 
pooled model results for label setting and information were left out from the reported tables.  
In virtually all designs, the coefficient of the Cdum variable, that captured opting out, 
was negative. These results denoted that respondents preferred either of the two options of beef 
steaks over having no beef at all. 
Table 4.2, Table 4.3, and Table 4.4 show the WTP estimates for the three label settings 
across choice experiment designs when label wording and information are collapsed in a pooled 
model.  In the no approval setting, the opt-out magnitudes are generally larger compared to the 
two other label settings, which indicates respondents preferred one of the beef steak options over 
the option of opting out. In the mandatory approval setting, the discount for the RNAi attribute is 
generally larger. These results make sense as if the government mandates the technology to be 
labeled, consumers would prefer to have a discount for beef steaks. In the approval label setting, 
the discount for the antibiotic use attribute is generally larger. It was assumed that if firms have 
the option of labeling, they would choose not to label the use of antibiotics, thus the discount 
magnitudes would be smaller. It is also noted that if consumers are unsure about the use of the 
label and antibiotic use in production, they would require a discount to purchase the beef steak.  
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Table 4.2.Willingness to Pay Estimates by Choice Experiment Design - No Approval 
Label Setting 
Attribute Design 1 Design 2 Design 3 Design 4 
RNAi Use [-2.11, -0.75]* [-1.94, -0.78]* N/A [-1.68, -1.12]* 
Antibiotic Use [-2.87, -2.42]* N/A [-2.28, -1.52]* N/A 
USDA Grade N/A [-2.11, -1.60]* [-1.98, -1.23]* N/A 
Opt-out -9.51 -10.55 -11.58 -10.82 
Notes:  
* indicates statistically significance. 
Non-price attributes are reported in WTP intervals and derived from Tables 4.16, 4.17, 4.18, 
and 4.19. 
 
Table 4.3.Willingness to Pay Estimates by Choice Experiment Design - Approval Label 
Setting 
Attribute Design 1 Design 2 Design 3 Design 4 
RNAi Use [-2.70, 1.29] [-3.74, 2.27] N/A [-1.63, -0.76]* 
Antibiotic Use [-2.76, -2.42]* N/A [-1.99, -0.96]* N/A 
USDA Grade N/A [-2.65, -2.02]* [-1.99, -1.39]* N/A 
Opt-out -9.45 -11.46 -10.83 -9.99 
Notes:  
* indicates statistically significance. 
Non-price attributes are reported in WTP intervals and derived from Tables 4.16, 4.17, 4.18, 
and 4.19. 
 
Table 4.4.Willingness to Pay Estimates by Choice Experiment Design - Approval, 
Mandatory Label Setting  
Attribute Design 1 Design 2 Design 3 Design 4 
RNAi Use [-2.22, -0.74]* [-2.46, -1.61]* N/A [-2.06, -1.67]* 
Antibiotic Use [-2.91, -2.39]* N/A [-2.24, -1.49]* N/A 
USDA Grade N/A [-2.57, -2.00]* [-1.87, -1.03]* N/A 
Opt-out -9.25 -10.14 -10.07 -10.37 
Notes:  
* indicates statistically significance. 
Non-price attributes are reported in WTP intervals and derived from Tables 4.16, 4.17, 4.18, 
and 4.19. 
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Table 4.5. Model Fit and Coefficients for Choice Experiment Design 1 
Info. 
Treatment 
Label Setting 
Label Wording Log 
Likelihood 
Cdum Price 
Antibiotic 
Use 
RNAi 
Use 
N 
Antibiotic RNAi 
1 No Approval Free, Used Free, Used -45.537 -2.902 -0.298 -0.637 -0.963 56 
1 No Approval Free, No Claim Free, Used -65.982 -2.443 -0.276 -0.285 -0.275 70 
1 No Approval Used, No Claim Free, Used -29.503 -1.646 -0.151 -0.185 0.066 28 
1 No Approval Free, Used Free, No Claim -46.066 -0.926 -0.194 -0.554 -0.948 56 
1 No Approval Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -6.159 -38.525 -4.660 -0.333 -0.104 14 
1 No Approval Used, No Claim Free, No Claim -6.535 -24.395 -0.591 -0.315 -0.193 14 
1 No Approval Free, Used Used, No Claim -29.905 -3.379 -0.300 -0.785 0.153 35 
1 No Approval Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -33.445 -2.802 -0.299 -0.078 -0.085 35 
1 No Approval Used, No Claim Used, No Claim -29.207 -3.592 -0.416 0.169 -0.131 35 
1 Approval Free, Used Free, Used -28.996 -2.324 -0.227 -0.986 -0.069 35 
1 Approval Free, No Claim Free, Used -45.354 -1.173 -0.230 -0.518 -0.631 56 
1 Approval Used, No Claim Free, Used -38.388 -0.839 -0.176 0.434 -0.225 42 
1 Approval Free, Used Free, No Claim -41.501 -4.062 -0.297 -0.969 -0.182 56 
1 Approval Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -24.356 -1.866 -0.263 -0.353 -0.689 28 
1 Approval Used, No Claim Free, No Claim -35.054 -0.202 -0.087 0.192 -0.493 35 
1 Approval Free, Used Used, No Claim -54.051 -1.396 -0.147 -1.014 0.284 63 
1 Approval Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -77.108 -1.942 -0.159 -0.421 0.372 77 
1 Approval Used, No Claim Used, No Claim -46.215 -2.597 -0.292 -0.101 -0.018 49 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Free, Used -43.608 -1.870 -0.266 -0.903 -0.746 56 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Free, Used -31.815 -3.246 -0.172 -0.676 -0.506 42 
1 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Free, Used -79.086 -1.379 -0.119 0.399 -0.347 77 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Free, No Claim -36.838 -1.713 -0.134 -0.960 0.299 42 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -35.676 -2.353 -0.357 -0.705 -0.796 49 
1 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Free, No Claim -26.679 -1.006 -0.171 -0.189 -0.368 28 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Used, No Claim -21.815 -7.073 -0.480 -1.504 0.789 42 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -40.347 -2.085 -0.186 -0.594 0.287 42 
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Table 4.5. Model Fit and Coefficients for Choice Experiment Design 1 continued 
1 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Used, No Claim -31.733 -4.713 -0.507 0.043 0.542 42 
2 No Approval Free, Used Free, Used -24.118 -5.577 -0.457 -0.767 -0.836 35 
2 No Approval Free, No Claim Free, Used -20.578 -2.247 -0.403 -1.596 -0.764 35 
2 No Approval Used, No Claim Free, Used -61.334 -1.597 -0.200 0.392 -0.492 63 
2 No Approval Free, Used Free, No Claim -25.460 -7.238 -0.591 -0.342 -0.913 35 
2 No Approval Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -42.248 -3.209 -0.317 -0.694 -0.301 49 
2 No Approval Used, No Claim Free, No Claim -10.915 -8.870 -0.775 1.434* 0.199 21 
2 No Approval Free, Used Used, No Claim -16.635 -4.419 -0.414 -0.797 0.212 21 
2 No Approval Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -26.556 -3.748 -0.128 -0.450 0.553 35 
2 No Approval Used, No Claim Used, No Claim -60.165 -0.441 -0.107 0.208 0.543 63 
2 Approval Free, Used Free, Used -44.281 -2.585 -0.273 -0.510 -0.532 49 
2 Approval Free, No Claim Free, Used -31.846 -1.949 -0.230 -0.598 -0.323 35 
2 Approval Used, No Claim Free, Used -36.540 -4.948 -0.563 -0.246 -0.612 49 
2 Approval Free, Used Free, No Claim -21.305 -2.553 -0.195 -1.051 -0.388 28 
2 Approval Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -44.783 -4.404 -0.429 -0.647* -0.624 56 
2 Approval Used, No Claim Free, No Claim -34.791 -2.104 -0.312 0.061 -0.473 42 
2 Approval Free, Used Used, No Claim -50.633 -1.196 -0.095 -0.391 0.344 49 
2 Approval Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -57.577 -0.205 -0.038 -0.599 0.926 63 
2 Approval Used, No Claim Used, No Claim -29.643 -3.580 -0.371 0.293 0.662 35 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Free, Used -61.880 -1.182 -0.089 -0.585 -0.712 70 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Free, Used -33.344 -3.334 -0.245 -0.320 -0.184* 35 
2 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Free, Used -27.584 -1.453 -0.171 0.177 -0.735 28 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Free, No Claim -86.597 -1.458 -0.153 -0.259 -0.213 84 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -51.082 -4.457 -0.303 -0.652 -0.061* 63 
2 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Free, No Claim -34.689 0.785 -0.067 1.090 -0.422 42 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Used, No Claim -41.441 1.831 0.063 -0.879 0.530 49 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -39.757 -1.224 -0.185 -0.125 0.256 42 
2 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Used, No Claim -30.886 6.129 -0.300 8.102 0.399 63 
3 No Approval Free, Used Free, Used -45.715 -0.560 -0.124 -0.530 -0.344 49 
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3 No Approval Free, No Claim Free, Used -34.685 -3.762 -0.316 -0.759 -0.284 42 
3 No Approval Used, No Claim Free, Used -44.344 -1.883 -0.223 0.270 -1.135 49 
3 No Approval Free, Used Free, No Claim -15.890 -4.878 -0.339 -0.826 0.372 21 
3 No Approval Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -26.986 -3.984 -0.237 -0.818 -0.061 35 
3 No Approval Used, No Claim Free, No Claim -67.626 -2.000 -0.234 0.399 -0.055 70 
3 No Approval Free, Used Used, No Claim -40.038 -2.119 -0.253 -0.929 0.310 49 
3 No Approval Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -26.640 -4.672 -0.154 -0.166 0.080 35 
3 No Approval Used, No Claim Used, No Claim -47.101 0.618 -0.113 -0.184 0.308 70 
3 Approval Free, Used Free, Used -55.268 -1.988 -0.269 -0.881 -0.718 70 
3 Approval Free, No Claim Free, Used -24.804 -6.339 -0.511 -0.682 -0.489 35 
3 Approval Used, No Claim Free, Used -38.058 -4.096 -0.379 0.145 -0.771 42 
3 Approval Free, Used Free, No Claim -66.901 -4.170 -0.303 -0.506* -0.140 77 
3 Approval Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -62.360 -0.960 -0.205 -0.683 -0.338 77 
3 Approval Used, No Claim Free, No Claim -37.233 -5.177 -0.484 0.795* -0.672 49 
3 Approval Free, Used Used, No Claim -47.791 -0.988 -0.145 -0.402 -0.327 49 
3 Approval Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -78.661 -0.885 -0.135 -0.549 0.436 84 
3 Approval Used, No Claim Used, No Claim -56.202 -2.955 -0.309 0.287 0.616* 63 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Free, Used -25.512 -7.155 -0.795 -1.052 -0.427 42 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Free, Used -26.919 -2.016 -0.212 -0.503 0.093 28 
3 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Free, Used -51.634 -0.617 -0.155 0.460 -0.428 56 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Free, No Claim -52.622 -0.656 -0.089 -0.714 -0.309 56 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -35.693 -0.737 -0.098 -0.297 -0.403 35 
3 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Free, No Claim -64.768 0.705 -0.039 0.670 0.032 70 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Used, No Claim -49.778 -2.671 -0.241 -0.774 0.199 56 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -32.993 -0.614 -0.145 -0.074 -0.560 35 
3 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Used, No Claim -46.167 -0.763 -0.143 0.650 0.145 49 
4 No Approval Free, Used Free, Used -33.380 -2.039 -0.303 -0.584 -0.166 42 
4 No Approval Free, No Claim Free, Used -93.655 -1.682 -0.236 -0.481 -0.371 105 
4 No Approval Used, No Claim Free, Used -19.511 -2.182 -0.255 0.391 -0.798 21 
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4 No Approval Free, Used Free, No Claim -33.427 -2.853 -0.332 -0.900 -0.351 42 
4 No Approval Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -55.549 -2.495 -0.167 -0.797 -0.580 70 
4 No Approval Used, No Claim Free, No Claim -24.508 -7.156 -0.611 0.609 0.439 35 
4 No Approval Free, Used Used, No Claim -61.333 -1.606 -0.167 -0.544 0.274 63 
4 No Approval Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -10.092 -4.214 -0.180 -0.810 0.339 14 
4 No Approval Used, No Claim Used, No Claim -44.562 1.012 -0.053 0.763 0.439 56 
4 Approval Free, Used Free, Used -42.330 -4.327 -0.424 -0.378 -0.247 49 
4 Approval Free, No Claim Free, Used -67.756 -3.216 -0.267 -0.231 -0.338 70 
4 Approval Used, No Claim Free, Used -56.826 -4.246 -0.383 0.324 -0.153 63 
4 Approval Free, Used Free, No Claim -27.571 -3.317 -0.345 -0.901 -0.512 35 
4 Approval Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -35.223 -1.907 -0.194 -0.329 -0.123 35 
4 Approval Used, No Claim Free, No Claim -85.350 -2.694 -0.293 0.410* -0.200 91 
4 Approval Free, Used Used, No Claim -53.861 -0.852 -0.186 -0.310 0.136 63 
4 Approval Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -36.822 -0.732 -0.115 -0.628 0.895 42 
4 Approval Used, No Claim Used, No Claim -8.282 -35.421 -4.482 0.105 0.214 28 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Free, Used -28.395 0.495 -0.059 -0.998 -0.390 35 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Free, Used -28.299 0.813 0.100 -0.239 -0.386 28 
4 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Free, Used -54.748 -4.419 -0.305 0.414* -0.296 63 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Free, No Claim -38.980 -2.983 -0.210 -1.049 0.277 49 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -84.421 -3.755 -0.303 -0.383* -0.106 91 
4 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Free, No Claim -56.227 -1.678 -0.285 0.183 -0.276 70 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Used, No Claim -36.168 -2.948 -0.312 -0.708 0.090 42 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -56.053 -1.311 -0.196 -0.629 0.026 63 
4 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Used, No Claim -46.289 -2.869 -0.297 0.300 0.142 49 
 5,250 
Note: * denotes statistical significance. 
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Table 4.6. Hypothesis Testing for Choice Experiment Design 1 
Info. 
Treatment 
Label Setting 
Label Wording 
Hypothesis LR Test DF P-Value Conclusion N 
RNAi Antibiotic 
Pooled Over Label Wording 
1 No Approval Pooled Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 69.231 32 0.000 Reject 343 
1 Approval Pooled Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 86.220 32 0.000 Reject 441 
1 
Approval, 
Mandatory Pooled Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 139.771 32 0.000 Reject 420 
2 No Approval Pooled Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 144.285 32 0.000 Reject 357 
2 Approval Pooled Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 94.590 32 0.000 Reject 406 
2 
Approval, 
Mandatory Pooled Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 168.577 32 0.000 Reject 476 
3 No Approval Pooled Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 155.303 32 0.000 Reject 420 
3 Approval Pooled Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 139.404 32 0.000 Reject 546 
3 
Approval, 
Mandatory Pooled Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 94.093 32 0.000 Reject 427 
4 No Approval Pooled Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 136.525 32 0.000 Reject 448 
4 Approval Pooled Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 104.960 32 0.000 Reject 476 
4 
Approval, 
Mandatory Pooled Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 130.793 32 0.000 Reject 490 
 5,250 
Pooled over Label Setting 
1 Pooled Free, Used Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 8.363 8 0.399 Fail 147 
1 Pooled Free, Used Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 33.491 8 0.000 Reject 168 
1 Pooled Free, Used Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 13.474 8 0.097 Fail 147 
1 Pooled Free, No Claim Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 28.140 8 0.000 Reject 154 
1 Pooled Free, No Claim Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 8.591 8 0.378 Fail 91 
1 Pooled Free, No Claim Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 23.177 8 0.003 Reject 77 
1 Pooled Used, No Claim Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 16.021 8 0.042 Reject 140 
1 Pooled Used, No Claim Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 6.253 8 0.619 Fail 154 
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1 Pooled Used, No Claim Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 5.068 8 0.750 Fail 126 
2 Pooled Free, Used Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 11.689 8 0.166 Fail 154 
2 Pooled Free, Used Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 20.783 8 0.008 Reject 105 
2 Pooled Free, Used Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 13.216 8 0.105 Fail 140 
2 Pooled Free, No Claim Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 16.809 8 0.032 Reject 147 
2 Pooled Free, No Claim Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 13.123 8 0.108 Fail 168 
2 Pooled Free, No Claim Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 24.613 8 0.002 Reject 105 
2 Pooled Used, No Claim Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 15.791 8 0.045 Reject 119 
2 Pooled Used, No Claim Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 31.616 8 0.000 Reject 140 
2 Pooled Used, No Claim Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 27.786 8 0.001 Reject 161 
3 Pooled Free, Used Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 14.005 8 0.082 Fail 161 
3 Pooled Free, Used Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 7.399 8 0.494 Fail 105 
3 Pooled Free, Used Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 12.982 8 0.112 Fail 147 
3 Pooled Free, No Claim Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 14.728 8 0.065 Fail 154 
3 Pooled Free, No Claim Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 29.500 8 0.000 Reject 147 
3 Pooled Free, No Claim Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 20.881 8 0.007 Reject 189 
3 Pooled Used, No Claim Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 8.935 8 0.348 Fail 154 
3 Pooled Used, No Claim Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 43.792 8 0.000 Reject 154 
3 Pooled Used, No Claim Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 27.989 8 0.000 Reject 182 
4 Pooled Free, Used Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 12.970 8 0.113 Fail 126 
4 Pooled Free, Used Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 25.092 8 0.001 Reject 203 
4 Pooled Free, Used Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 12.409 8 0.134 Fail 147 
4 Pooled Free, No Claim Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 11.594 8 0.170 Fail 126 
4 Pooled Free, No Claim Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 15.687 8 0.047 Reject 196 
4 Pooled Free, No Claim Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 24.779 8 0.002 Reject 196 
4 Pooled Used, No Claim Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 10.356 8 0.241 Fail 168 
4 Pooled Used, No Claim Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 19.628 8 0.012 Reject 119 
4 Pooled Used, No Claim Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 28.800 8 0.000 Reject 133 
 5,250 
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Table 4.6. Hypothesis Testing for Choice Experiment Design 1 continued 
Pooled Over Information Treatment 
Pooled No Approval Free, Used Free, Used 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 24.963 12 0.015 Reject 182 
Pooled No Approval Free, Used Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 21.771 12 0.040 Reject 252 
Pooled No Approval Free, Used Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 11.261 12 0.507 Fail 161 
Pooled No Approval Free, No Claim Free, Used 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 31.723 12 0.002 Reject 154 
Pooled No Approval Free, No Claim Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 34.691 12 0.001 Reject 168 
Pooled No Approval Free, No Claim Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 35.283 12 0.000 Reject 140 
Pooled No Approval Used, No Claim Free, Used 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 6.150 12 0.908 Fail 168 
Pooled No Approval Used, No Claim Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 35.440 12 0.000 Reject 119 
Pooled No Approval Used, No Claim Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 26.804 12 0.008 Reject 224 
Pooled Approval Free, Used Free, Used 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 12.079 12 0.439 Fail 203 
Pooled Approval Free, Used Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 28.028 12 0.005 Reject 196 
Pooled Approval Free, Used Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 24.643 12 0.017 Reject 196 
Pooled Approval Free, No Claim Free, Used 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 12.361 12 0.417 Fail 196 
Pooled Approval Free, No Claim Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 16.146 12 0.185 Fail 196 
Pooled Approval Free, No Claim Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 21.445 12 0.044 Reject 217 
Pooled Approval Used, No Claim Free, Used 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 24.789 12 0.016 Reject 224 
Pooled Approval Used, No Claim Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 13.391 12 0.341 Fail 266 
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Pooled Approval Used, No Claim Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 31.447 12 0.002 Reject 175 
Pooled 
Approval, 
Mandatory Free, Used Free, Used 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 36.235 12 0.000 Reject 203 
Pooled 
Approval, 
Mandatory Free, Used Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 20.432 12 0.059 Fail 133 
Pooled 
Approval, 
Mandatory Free, Used Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 29.012 12 0.004 Reject 224 
Pooled 
Approval, 
Mandatory Free, No Claim Free, Used 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 18.574 12 0.099 Fail 231 
Pooled 
Approval, 
Mandatory Free, No Claim Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 39.489 12 0.000 Reject 238 
Pooled 
Approval, 
Mandatory Free, No Claim Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 19.153 12 0.085 Fail 210 
Pooled 
Approval, 
Mandatory Used, No Claim Free, Used 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 38.732 12 0.000 Reject 189 
Pooled 
Approval, 
Mandatory Used, No Claim Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 14.114 12 0.293 Fail 182 
Pooled 
Approval, 
Mandatory Used, No Claim Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 36.184 12 0.000 Reject 203 
 5,250 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Label Setting 
1 Pooled Pooled Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording 
and Label Setting 304.500 32 0.000 Reject 1,204 
2 Pooled Pooled Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording 
and Label Setting 421.390 32 0.000 Reject 1,239 
3 Pooled Pooled Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording 
and Label Setting 400.649 32 0.000 Reject 1,393 
4 Pooled Pooled Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording 
and Label Setting 383.875 32 0.000 Reject 1,414 
 5,250 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Information Treatment 
Pooled No Approval Pooled Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording 
and Information Treatment 518.355 140 0.000 Reject 1,568 
Pooled Approval Pooled Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording 
and Information Treatment 442.295 140 0.000 Reject 1,869 
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Pooled 
Approval, 
Mandatory Pooled Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording 
and Information Treatment 556.119 140 0.000 Reject 1,813 
 5,250 
Pooled Over Label Setting and Information Treatment 
Pooled Pooled Free, Used Free, Used 
Pooled Over Label Setting and 
Information Treatment 76.891 44 0.002 Reject 588 
Pooled Pooled Free, Used Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Label Setting and 
Information Treatment 101.104 44 0.000 Reject 581 
Pooled Pooled Free, Used Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Label Setting and 
Information Treatment 82.740 44 0.000 Reject 581 
Pooled Pooled Free, No Claim Free, Used 
Pooled Over Label Setting and 
Information Treatment 84.568 44 0.000 Reject 581 
Pooled Pooled Free, No Claim Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Label Setting and 
Information Treatment 115.859 44 0.000 Reject 602 
Pooled Pooled Free, No Claim Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Label Setting and 
Information Treatment 113.495 44 0.000 Reject 567 
Pooled Pooled Used, No Claim Free, Used 
Pooled Over Label Setting and 
Information Treatment 78.511 44 0.001 Reject 581 
Pooled Pooled Used, No Claim Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Label Setting and 
Information Treatment 116.464 44 0.000 Reject 567 
Pooled Pooled Used, No Claim Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Label Setting and 
Information Treatment 109.088 44 0.000 Reject 602 
 5,250 
Pooled Over Common Label 
- - Mixed Mixed Pooled Over Mixed Label 943.859 284 0.000 Reject 3,458 
- - Common Common Pooled Over Common Label 556.819 140 0.000 Reject 1,792 
 5,250 
Pooled Over All 
Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Over All 1526.203 428 0.000 Reject 5250 
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Table 4.7. Pooled Models for Design 1 
Info. 
Treatment 
Label Setting 
Label Wording 
LL Cdum Price 
Antibiotic 
Use 
RNAi 
Use 
N 
RNAi Antibiotic 
Pooled Over Label Wording 
1 No Approval Pooled Pooled -326.956 -2.440 -0.263 -0.331* -0.312* 343 
1 Approval Pooled Pooled -434.133 -1.722 -0.189 -0.436 -0.074 441 
1 Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled -417.481 -2.131 -0.205 -0.387* -0.138 420 
2 No Approval Pooled Pooled -360.150 -2.447 -0.231 -0.209 -0.092 357 
2 Approval Pooled Pooled -398.695 -2.056 -0.217 -0.381 0.000 406 
2 Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled -491.549 -1.249 -0.148 -0.195* -0.170* 476 
3 No Approval Pooled Pooled -426.678 -1.701 -0.183 -0.268* -0.118 420 
3 Approval Pooled Pooled -536.980 -2.368 -0.244 -0.282* -0.146 546 
3 Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled -433.133 -1.174 -0.158 -0.129 -0.135 427 
4 No Approval Pooled Pooled -444.279 -1.772 -0.199 -0.330* -0.129 448 
4 Approval Pooled Pooled -466.500 -2.424 -0.261 -0.115 -0.079 476 
4 Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled -494.976 -2.164 -0.214 -0.248* -0.093 490 
 5,250 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Label Setting 
1 Pooled Pooled Pooled -1183.209 -2.052 -0.214 -0.388* -0.160* 1,204 
2 Pooled Pooled Pooled -1257.362 -1.849 -0.194 -0.257* -0.093 1,239 
3 Pooled Pooled Pooled -1402.715 -1.792 -0.198 -0.232* -0.133* 1,393 
4 Pooled Pooled Pooled -1411.554 -2.123 -0.224 -0.229* -0.101 1,414 
         5,250 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Information Treatment 
Pooled No Approval Pooled Pooled -1564.568 -2.037 -0.214 -0.283* -0.153* 1,568 
Pooled Approval Pooled Pooled -1844.868 -2.164 -0.229 -0.296* -0.081 1,869 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled -1848.581 -1.676 -0.181 -0.240* -0.134* 1,813 
         5,250 
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Table 4.7. Pooled Models for Design 1 continued 
Pooled Over Label Setting and Information Treatment 
Pooled Pooled Free, Used Free, Used -517.465 -2.170 -0.248 -0.652 -0.516 588 
Pooled Pooled Free, Used Free, No Claim -555.590 -2.142 -0.222 -0.456 -0.332 581 
Pooled Pooled Free, Used Used, No Claim -578.926 -2.190 -0.228 0.268 -0.421 581 
Pooled Pooled Free, No Claim Free, Used -535.441 -2.484 -0.220 -0.644 -0.204 581 
Pooled Pooled Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -562.467 -2.515 -0.245 -0.530 -0.308 602 
Pooled Pooled Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -541.122 -1.935 -0.238 0.401 -0.198 567 
Pooled Pooled Used, No Claim Free, Used -542.704 -1.760 -0.189 -0.664 0.215 581 
Pooled Pooled Used, No Claim Free, No Claim -574.282 -1.375 -0.137 -0.401 0.329 567 
Pooled Pooled Used, No Claim Used, No Claim -530.995 -1.481 -0.229 0.275 0.317 602 
 5,250 
Pooled Over Common Label 
- - Mixed Mixed -3511.554 -1.965 -0.200 -0.246* -0.098* 3,458 
- - Common Common -1738.418 -1.960 -0.225 -0.330* -0.171 1,792 
 5,250 
Pooled Over All 
Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled -5262.735 -1.952 -0.208 -0.273* -0.121* 5,250 
Note: * denotes statistical significance. 
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Table 4.8. Model Fit and Coefficients for Choice Experiment Design 2 
Info. 
Treatment Label Setting 
Antibiotic  
Label Wording 
LL Cdum Price Grade 
RNAi 
Use 
N 
1 No Approval Free, Used -154.224 -1.209 -0.146 -0.134 -0.591 154 
1 No Approval Free, No Claim -209.109 -2.630 -0.263 -0.005 -0.222 210 
1 No Approval Used, No Claim -77.367 -2.400 -0.285 -0.400* 0.646* 91 
1 Approval Free, Used -187.331 -1.957 -0.184 -0.235* -0.144 182 
1 Approval Free, No Claim -132.053 -2.797 -0.242 -0.137 -0.393* 133 
1 Approval Used, No Claim -131.255 -2.898 -0.149 -0.166 0.373 140 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -169.025 -1.234 -0.119 -0.169 -0.597 168 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -169.079 -2.494 -0.245 -0.036 -0.250 168 
1 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim -138.555 -2.898 -0.280 -0.328* 0.359* 147 
2 No Approval Free, Used -121.799 -2.702 -0.304 -0.285 -0.501* 133 
2 No Approval Free, No Claim -195.978 -3.421 -0.273 -0.226 -0.228 203 
2 No Approval Used, No Claim -196.244 -1.313 -0.115 -0.016 0.016 182 
2 Approval Free, Used -113.990 -2.990 -0.175 0.105 -0.275 119 
2 Approval Free, No Claim -97.214 -2.221 -0.186 -0.292 -0.407 98 
2 Approval Used, No Claim -111.876 -2.097 -0.202 -0.266 0.346 112 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -134.063 -0.757 -0.105 -0.305 -0.766 140 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -141.556 -1.705 -0.152 -0.266 -0.422 140 
2 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim -149.220 -1.235 -0.144 -0.252 0.308 147 
3 No Approval Free, Used -191.618 -2.490 -0.195 -0.273* -0.627* 203 
3 No Approval Free, No Claim -120.472 -3.047 -0.290 -0.309* -0.272 126 
3 No Approval Used, No Claim -188.062 -2.301 -0.225 -0.158 0.325* 189 
3 Approval Free, Used -150.063 -1.932 -0.178 -0.268 -0.256 147 
3 Approval Free, No Claim -170.972 -1.739 -0.200 -0.320* -0.395* 175 
3 Approval Used, No Claim -177.773 -2.564 -0.233 -0.318* 0.375* 182 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -119.003 -2.615 -0.235 -0.528* -0.637* 133 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -129.035 -1.697 -0.176 -0.230 -0.221 126 
3 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim -115.017 -2.321 -0.207 -0.074 0.196 112 
4 No Approval Free, Used -74.807 -2.532 -0.273 -0.080 -0.324 77 
4 No Approval Free, No Claim -193.225 -2.380 -0.219 -0.310* -0.367* 196 
4 No Approval Used, No Claim -149.167 -2.709 -0.260 -0.352* 0.596* 161 
4 Approval Free, Used -130.448 -1.766 -0.126 -0.412 -0.360 133 
4 Approval Free, No Claim -70.553 -2.862 -0.241 -0.048 -0.257 70 
4 Approval Used, No Claim -114.944 -1.100 -0.184 -0.034 0.418 126 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -154.074 -1.735 -0.194 -0.303* -0.657 161 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -92.319 -5.094 -0.426 -0.021 -0.277 105 
4 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim -144.739 -1.952 -0.242 -0.128 0.607* 161 
 5,250 
Note: * denotes statistical significance. 
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Table 4.9. Hypothesis Testing for Choice Experiment Design 2 
Info. 
Treatment 
Label Setting 
RNAi Label 
Wording 
Hypothesis LR Test DF P-value Conclusion N 
Pooled over Label Wording 
1 No Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 39.198 8 0.000 Reject 455 
1 Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 41.274 8 0.000 Reject 455 
1 Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 37.984 8 0.000 Reject 483 
2 No Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 33.630 8 0.000 Reject 518 
2 Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 36.617 8 0.000 Reject 329 
2 Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 36.669 8 0.000 Reject 427 
3 No Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 49.711 8 0.000 Reject 518 
3 Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 25.327 8 0.001 Reject 504 
3 Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 26.132 8 0.001 Reject 371 
4 No Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 35.552 8 0.000 Reject 434 
4 Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 54.790 8 0.000 Reject 329 
4 Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 72.055 8 0.000 Reject 427 
 5,250 
Pooled over Label Setting 
1 Pooled Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 12.463 8 0.132 Fail 504 
1 Pooled Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 5.651 8 0.686 Fail 511 
1 Pooled Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 54.694 8 0.000 Reject 378 
2 Pooled Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 54.687 8 0.000 Reject 392 
2 Pooled Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 7.430 8 0.491 Fail 441 
2 Pooled Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 11.443 8 0.178 Fail 441 
3 Pooled Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 12.407 8 0.134 Fail 483 
3 Pooled Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 4.762 8 0.783 Fail 427 
3 Pooled Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 3.678 8 0.885 Fail 483 
4 Pooled Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 18.052 8 0.021 Reject 371 
4 Pooled Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 13.109 8 0.108 Fail 371 
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Table 4.9. Hypothesis Testing for Choice Experiment Design 2 continued 
4 Pooled Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 14.367 8 0.073 Fail 448 
        5,250 
Pooled Over Information Treatment 
Pooled No Approval Free, Used 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 31.625 12 0.002 Reject 567 
Pooled No Approval Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 18.500 12 0.101 Fail 735 
Pooled No Approval Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 33.221 12 0.001 Reject 623 
Pooled Approval Free, Used 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 33.007 12 0.001 Reject 581 
Pooled Approval Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 13.017 12 0.368 Fail 476 
Pooled Approval Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 64.983 12 0.000 Reject 560 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Free, Used 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 13.294 12 0.348 Fail 602 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 22.832 12 0.029 Reject 539 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 19.596 12 0.075 Fail 567 
 5,250 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Label Setting 
1 Pooled Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording and 
Label Setting 146.174 32 0.000 Reject 1,393 
2 Pooled Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording and 
Label Setting 126.313 32 0.000 Reject 1,274 
3 Pooled Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording and 
Label Setting 106.621 32 0.000 Reject 1,393 
4 Pooled Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording and 
Label Setting 168.804 32 0.000 Reject 1,190 
 5,250 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Information Treatment 
Pooled No Approval Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording and 
Information Treatment 176.664 46 0.000 Reject 1,925 
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Table 4.9. Hypothesis Testing for Choice Experiment Design 2 continued 
Pooled Approval Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording and 
Information Treatment 184.668 46 0.000 Reject 1,617 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording and 
Information Treatment 191.299 46 0.000 Reject 1,708 
 5,250 
Pooled Over Label Setting and Information Treatment 
Pooled Pooled Free, Used 
Pooled Over Label Setting and 
Information Treatment 111.203 46 0.000 Reject 1,750 
Pooled Pooled Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Label Setting and 
Information Treatment 58.565 46 0.101 Fail 1,750 
Pooled Pooled Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Label Setting and 
Information Treatment 125.793 46 0.000 Reject 1,750 
 5,250 
Pooled Over All 
Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Over All 570.172 140 0.000 Reject 5,250 
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Table 4.10. Pooled Models for Design 2 
Info. 
Treatment 
Label Setting 
Antibiotic 
Label Wording 
LL Cdum Price Grade 
RNAi 
Use 
N 
Pooled over Label Wording 
1 No Approval Pooled -460.299 -1.985 -0.213 -0.114 -0.194* 455 
1 Approval Pooled -471.276 -2.285 -0.175 -0.179* -0.021 455 
1 Approval, Mandatory Pooled -495.651 -2.073 -0.200 -0.164* -0.198* 483 
2 No Approval Pooled -530.836 -2.324 -0.209 -0.160* -0.174* 518 
2 Approval Pooled -341.389 -2.280 -0.176 -0.127 -0.111 329 
2 Approval, Mandatory Pooled -443.175 -1.150 -0.123 -0.267* -0.263* 427 
3 No Approval Pooled -525.009 -2.373 -0.211 -0.241* -0.189* 518 
3 Approval Pooled -511.471 -2.010 -0.196 -0.298* -0.066 504 
3 Approval, Mandatory Pooled -376.120 -2.118 -0.195 -0.283* -0.216* 371 
4 No Approval Pooled -434.975 -2.369 -0.227 -0.281* -0.007 434 
4 Approval Pooled -343.340 -1.576 -0.158 -0.204* -0.087 329 
4 Approval, Mandatory Pooled -427.159 -2.347 -0.239 -0.167 -0.085 427 
 5,250 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Label Setting 
1 Pooled Pooled -1441.085 -2.075 -0.194 -0.152* -0.133* 1393 
2 Pooled Pooled -1325.098 -1.908 -0.171 -0.184* -0.184* 1274 
3 Pooled Pooled -1415.326 -2.168 -0.201 -0.272* -0.152* 1393 
4 Pooled Pooled -1208.678 -2.132 -0.211 -0.218* -0.057 1190 
 5,250 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Information Treatment 
Pooled No Approval Pooled -1960.404 -2.254 -0.214 -0.198* -0.146* 1925 
Pooled Approval Pooled -1680.806 -2.030 -0.177 -0.207* -0.065 1617 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Pooled -1751.335 -1.910 -0.188 -0.215* -0.192* 1708 
 5,250 
Pooled Over Label Setting and Information Treatment 
Pooled Pooled Free, Used -1756.047 -1.863 -0.174 -0.239* -0.467* 1750 
Pooled Pooled Free, No Claim -1750.846 -2.578 -0.237 -0.184* -0.303* 1750 
Pooled Pooled Used, No Claim -1757.116 -2.030 -0.200 -0.197* 0.350* 1750 
 5,250 
Pooled Over All 
Pooled Pooled Pooled -5401.316 -2.066 -0.193 -0.206* -0.134* 5,250 
Note: * denotes statistical significance. 
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Table 4.11. Model Fit and Coefficients for Choice Experiment Design 3 
Info. 
Treatment 
Label Setting 
Antibiotic 
Label Wording 
LL Cdum Price Grade 
Antibiotic 
Use 
N 
1 No Approval Free, Used -170.936 -2.994 -0.210 -0.003 -0.400* 175 
1 No Approval Free, No Claim -143.756 -2.915 -0.259 -0.150 -0.466* 147 
1 No Approval Used, No Claim -149.351 -2.278 -0.216 -0.263* 0.535* 154 
1 Approval Free, Used -114.460 -2.948 -0.288 -0.278* -0.200 119 
1 Approval Free, No Claim -113.985 -2.738 -0.238 -0.170 -0.651 119 
1 Approval Used, No Claim -107.001 -3.740 -0.340 -0.365* 0.412* 119 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -155.350 -3.043 -0.293 -0.219 -0.743* 168 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -188.818 -4.350 -0.370 -0.163 -0.606* 210 
1 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim -135.876 -1.081 -0.169 0.156 0.181 140 
2 No Approval Free, Used -173.657 -1.416 -0.185 -0.059 -0.814 182 
2 No Approval Free, No Claim -128.247 -3.801 -0.366 -0.171 -0.494* 140 
2 No Approval Used, No Claim -101.772 -1.309 -0.084 -0.263 0.384 98 
2 Approval Free, Used -204.284 -1.257 -0.158 -0.001 -0.563 203 
2 Approval Free, No Claim -124.453 -4.811 -0.333 -0.343* -0.294 147 
2 Approval Used, No Claim -100.676 -2.524 -0.289 -0.359* 0.314 112 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -138.444 -2.352 -0.201 -0.242* -0.460* 140 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -173.109 -2.346 -0.244 -0.373 -0.459* 182 
2 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim -143.515 -2.390 -0.264 -0.156 0.442* 154 
3 No Approval Free, Used -155.121 -2.669 -0.246 -0.281* -0.506* 161 
3 No Approval Free, No Claim -137.151 -3.044 -0.240 0.024 -0.489* 140 
3 No Approval Used, No Claim -145.562 -1.858 -0.186 -0.237* 0.477* 147 
3 Approval Free, Used -123.331 -2.913 -0.304 -0.385* -0.244 133 
3 Approval Free, No Claim -122.967 -3.051 -0.237 -0.089 -0.453* 126 
3 Approval Used, No Claim -140.626 -2.608 -0.264 -0.067 0.441* 147 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -122.521 -1.846 -0.137 -0.088 -0.374 119 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -115.417 -1.677 -0.130 -0.133 -0.392 112 
3 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim -175.534 -1.440 -0.212 -0.177 0.472* 196 
4 No Approval Free, Used -113.657 -3.349 -0.327 -0.383* -0.961* 133 
4 No Approval Free, No Claim -94.885 -5.416 -0.309 -0.140 -0.620* 126 
4 No Approval Used, No Claim -141.320 -2.446 -0.225 -0.185 0.612* 147 
4 Approval Free, Used -119.565 -2.313 -0.229 0.132 -0.456* 119 
4 Approval Free, No Claim -194.172 -3.128 -0.236 -0.259* -0.385 203 
4 Approval Used, No Claim -197.499 -0.896 -0.110 -0.188 0.225 189 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -89.060 -3.585 -0.309 -0.053 -0.876* 98 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -95.618 -3.513 -0.282 -0.017 -0.262 98 
4 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim -136.087 -1.517 -0.210 -0.153 0.380* 147 
 5,250 
Note: * denotes statistical significance. 
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Table 4.12. Hypothesis Testing for Choice Experiment Design 3 
Info. 
Treatment 
Label Setting 
Antibiotic  
Label Wording 
Hypothesis LR Test DF P-value Conclusion N 
Pooled over Label Wording 
1 No Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 49.757 8 0.000 Reject 476 
1 Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 27.988 8 0.000 Reject 357 
1 Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 59.843 8 0.000 Reject 518 
2 No Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 52.214 8 0.000 Reject 420 
2 Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 74.717 8 0.000 Reject 462 
2 Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 43.235 8 0.000 Reject 476 
3 No Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 44.587 8 0.000 Reject 448 
3 Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 40.963 8 0.000 Reject 406 
3 Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 69.626 8 0.000 Reject 427 
4 No Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 110.787 8 0.000 Reject 406 
4 Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 43.512 8 0.000 Reject 511 
4 Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 55.906 8 0.000 Reject 343 
 5,250 
Pooled over Label Setting 
1 Pooled Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 27.115 8 0.001 Reject 462 
1 Pooled Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 5.127 8 0.744 Fail 476 
1 Pooled Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 23.689 8 0.003 Reject 413 
2 Pooled Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 13.426 8 0.098 Fail 525 
2 Pooled Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 35.305 8 0.000 Reject 469 
2 Pooled Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 23.975 8 0.002 Reject 364 
3 Pooled Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 18.274 8 0.019 Reject 413 
3 Pooled Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 3.372 8 0.909 Fail 378 
3 Pooled Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 13.335 8 0.101 Fail 490 
4 Pooled Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 16.791 8 0.032 Reject 350 
4 Pooled Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 26.885 8 0.001 Reject 427 
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Table 4.12. Hypothesis Testing for Choice Experiment Design 3 continued 
4 Pooled Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 17.210 8 0.028 Reject 483 
 5,250 
Pooled Over Information Treatment 
Pooled No Approval Free, Used 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 43.683 12 0.000 Reject 651 
Pooled No Approval Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 50.943 12 0.000 Reject 553 
Pooled No Approval Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 10.603 12 0.563 Fail 546 
Pooled Approval Free, Used 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 21.515 12 0.043 Reject 574 
Pooled Approval Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 15.606 12 0.210 Fail 595 
Pooled Approval Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 21.589 12 0.042 Reject 567 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Free, Used 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 13.241 12 0.352 Fail 525 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 26.280 12 0.010 Reject 602 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 10.196 12 0.599 Fail 637 
 5,250 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Label Setting 
1 Pooled Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording and 
Label Setting 155.265 32 0.000 Reject 1,351 
2 Pooled Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording and 
Label Setting 175.359 32 0.000 Reject 1,358 
3 Pooled Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording and 
Label Setting 166.858 32 0.000 Reject 1,281 
4 Pooled Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording and 
Label Setting 226.823 32 0.000 Reject 1,260 
 5,250 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Information Treatment 
Pooled No Approval Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording and 
Information Treatment 276.334 46 0.000 Reject 1,750 
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Table 4.12. Hypothesis Testing for Choice Experiment Design 3 continued 
Pooled Approval Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording and 
Information Treatment 199.180 46 0.000 Reject 1,736 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording and 
Information Treatment 248.864 46 0.000 Reject 1,764 
 5,250 
Pooled Over Label Setting and Information Treatment 
Pooled Pooled Free, Used 
Pooled Over Label Setting and 
Information Treatment 101.060 46 0.000 Reject 1,750 
Pooled Pooled Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Label Setting and 
Information Treatment 106.656 46 0.000 Reject 1,750 
Pooled Pooled Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Label Setting and 
Information Treatment 84.798 46 0.000 Reject 1,750 
 5,250 
Pooled Over All 
Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Over All 745.392 140 0.000 Reject 5,250 
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Table 4.13. Pooled Models for Design 3 
Info. 
Treatment Label Setting 
Antibiotic 
Label 
Wording 
LL Cdum Price Grade 
Antibiotic 
Use 
N 
Pooled over Label Wording 
1 No Approval Pooled -454.304 -2.867 -0.249 -0.141 -0.452* 476 
1 Approval Pooled -449.123 -3.456 -0.299 -0.160 -0.567* 357 
1 Approval, Mandatory Pooled -404.072 -2.244 -0.231 -0.159* 0.374* 518 
2 No Approval Pooled -523.098 -1.583 -0.177 -0.089 -0.608* 420 
2 Approval Pooled -443.462 -3.336 -0.295 -0.294* -0.397* 462 
2 Approval, Mandatory Pooled -357.950 -1.967 -0.207 -0.239* 0.386* 476 
3 No Approval Pooled -410.110 -2.402 -0.223 -0.247* -0.380* 448 
3 Approval Pooled -377.221 -2.613 -0.204 -0.060 -0.443* 406 
3 Approval, Mandatory Pooled -468.389 -1.889 -0.217 -0.159 0.458* 427 
4 No Approval Pooled -330.677 -2.970 -0.278 -0.108 -0.732* 406 
4 Approval Pooled -398.118 -3.607 -0.255 -0.169* -0.416* 511 
4 Approval, Mandatory Pooled -483.511 -1.484 -0.169 -0.175* 0.380* 343 
 5,250 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Label Setting 
1 Pooled Pooled -1357.166 -2.688 -0.243 -0.159* -0.226* 1,351 
2 Pooled Pooled -1375.837 -2.152 -0.211 -0.200* -0.252* 1,358 
3 Pooled Pooled -1321.659 -2.087 -0.198 -0.159* -0.095 1,281 
4 Pooled Pooled -1295.275 -2.306 -0.203 -0.158* -0.173* 1,260 
 5,250 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Information Treatment 
Pooled No Approval Pooled -1793.581 -2.364 -0.204 -0.164* -0.194* 1,750 
Pooled Approval Pooled -1762.609 -2.405 -0.222 -0.188* -0.164* 1,736 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Pooled -1793.783 -2.162 -0.215 -0.156* -0.200* 1,764 
 5,250 
Pooled Over Label Setting and Information Treatment 
Pooled Pooled Free, Used -1730.916 -2.364 -0.225 -0.144* -0.529* 1,750 
Pooled Pooled Free, No Claim -1685.908 -3.224 -0.263 -0.173* -0.452* 1,750 
Pooled Pooled Used, No Claim -1717.217 -1.873 -0.205 -0.180* 0.400* 1,750 
 5,250 
Pooled Over All 
Pooled Pooled Pooled -5360.480 -2.303 -0.213 -0.169* -0.186* 5,250 
 5,250 
Note: * denotes statistical significance. 
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Table 4.14. Model Fit and Coefficients for Choice Experiment Design 4. 
Info. 
Treatment 
Label Setting 
RNAi  
Label Wording 
LL Cdum Price 
RNAi 
Use 
N 
1 No Approval Free, Used -122.111 -5.943 -0.486 -0.601* 138 
1 No Approval Free, No Claim -106.768 -3.109 -0.317 -0.343 108 
1 No Approval Used, No Claim -100.429 -3.034 -0.340 0.274 108 
1 Approval Free, Used -125.403 -2.974 -0.291 -0.475* 126 
1 Approval Free, No Claim -105.276 -2.487 -0.227 -0.416 102 
1 Approval Used, No Claim -118.661 -2.039 -0.224 0.386 120 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -155.060 -2.562 -0.217 -0.645* 156 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -155.158 -4.335 -0.405 -0.318* 162 
1 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim -97.800 -2.664 -0.249 0.215 96 
2 No Approval Free, Used -164.152 -3.044 -0.304 -0.550* 168 
2 No Approval Free, No Claim -120.793 -4.701 -0.460 -0.378* 132 
2 No Approval Used, No Claim -74.882 -4.476 -0.451 0.321 84 
2 Approval Free, Used -101.831 -4.305 -0.414 -0.403* 108 
2 Approval Free, No Claim -146.224 -4.277 -0.410 -0.744* 162 
2 Approval Used, No Claim -179.144 -3.488 -0.369 0.253 192 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -104.821 -5.120 -0.424 -0.594* 114 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -130.779 -2.184 -0.230 -0.626 132 
2 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim -92.240 -2.268 -0.218 0.263 90 
3 No Approval Free, Used -78.126 -2.251 -0.240 -0.515 78 
3 No Approval Free, No Claim -92.691 -3.479 -0.220 -0.390 96 
3 No Approval Used, No Claim -181.296 -3.424 -0.291 0.324* 186 
3 Approval Free, Used -91.407 -3.009 -0.301 -0.712* 96 
3 Approval Free, No Claim -108.759 -3.424 -0.317 -0.261 108 
3 Approval Used, No Claim -124.515 -2.070 -0.243 0.207 126 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -108.052 -5.007 -0.511 -0.545* 126 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -100.565 -4.342 -0.426 -0.412* 108 
3 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim -94.369 -1.935 -0.192 0.141 90 
4 No Approval Free, Used -144.934 -1.974 -0.205 -0.592 144 
4 No Approval Free, No Claim -136.214 -4.817 -0.395 -0.461* 144 
4 No Approval Used, No Claim -110.610 -4.550 -0.443 0.145 120 
4 Approval Free, Used -109.132 -2.999 -0.320 -0.541* 114 
4 Approval Free, No Claim -111.702 -2.739 -0.259 -0.213 108 
4 Approval Used, No Claim -161.503 -2.484 -0.252 0.318* 162 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -109.224 -4.147 -0.476 -0.540* 132 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -134.968 -3.064 -0.287 -0.628* 138 
4 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim -117.604 -3.396 -0.337 0.461* 126 
 4,500 
Note: * denotes statistical significance. 
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Table 4.15. Hypothesis Testing for Choice Experiment Design 4 
Info 
Treatment 
Label Setting 
RNAi 
Label Wording 
Hypothesis LR Test DF P-value Conclusion N 
Pooled over Label Wording 
1 No Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 37.822 6 0.000 Reject 354 
1 Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 24.173 6 0.000 Reject 348 
1 Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 27.480 6 0.000 Reject 414 
2 No Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 21.650 6 0.001 Reject 384 
2 Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 36.309 6 0.000 Reject 462 
2 Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 28.668 6 0.000 Reject 336 
3 No Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 40.415 6 0.000 Reject 360 
3 Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 21.629 6 0.001 Reject 330 
3 Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 16.566 6 0.011 Reject 324 
4 No Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 33.793 6 0.000 Reject 408 
4 Approval Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 21.146 6 0.002 Reject 384 
4 Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled over Label Wording 52.505 6 0.000 Reject 396 
 4,500 
Pooled over Label Setting 
1 Pooled Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 16.731 6 0.010 Reject 420 
1 Pooled Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 5.968 6 0.427 Fail 372 
1 Pooled Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 5.840 6 0.441 Fail 324 
2 Pooled Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 10.119 6 0.120 Fail 390 
2 Pooled Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 11.064 6 0.086 Fail 426 
2 Pooled Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 6.090 6 0.413 Fail 366 
3 Pooled Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 8.531 6 0.202 Fail 300 
3 Pooled Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 23.674 6 0.001 Reject 312 
3 Pooled Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 14.041 6 0.029 Reject 402 
4 Pooled Free, Used Pooled Over Label Setting 16.617 6 0.011 Reject 390 
4 Pooled Free, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 10.781 6 0.095 Fail 390 
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4 Pooled Used, No Claim Pooled Over Label Setting 5.399 6 0.494 Fail 408 
 4,500 
Pooled Over Information Treatment 
Pooled No Approval Free, Used 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 21.398 9 0.011 Reject 528 
Pooled No Approval Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 34.857 9 0.000 Reject 480 
Pooled No Approval Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 18.109 9 0.034 Reject 498 
Pooled Approval Free, Used 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 5.337 9 0.804 Fail 444 
Pooled Approval Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 11.675 9 0.232 Fail 480 
Pooled Approval Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 5.852 9 0.755 Fail 600 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Free, Used 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 50.532 9 0.000 Reject 528 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 13.261 9 0.151 Fail 540 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Information 
Treatment 5.591 9 0.780 Fail 402 
 4,500 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Label Setting 
1 
Pooled Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording and 
Label Setting 97.772 24 0.000 Reject 1,116 
2 
Pooled Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording and 
Label Setting 97.502 24 0.000 Reject 1,182 
3 
Pooled Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording and 
Label Setting 106.015 24 0.000 Reject 1,014 
4 
Pooled Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording and 
Label Setting 120.187 24 0.000 Reject 1,188 
 4,500 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Information Treatment 
Pooled No Approval Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording and 
Information Treatment 160.142 33 0.000 Reject 1,506 
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Pooled Approval Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording and 
Information Treatment 112.878 33 0.000 Reject 1,524 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Pooled 
Pooled Over Label Wording and 
Information Treatment 144.052 33 0.000 Reject 1,146 
 4,500 
Pooled Over Label Setting and Information Treatment  
Pooled Pooled Free, Used 
Pooled Over Label Setting and 
Information Treatment 81.418 33 0.000 Reject 1,500 
Pooled Pooled Free, No Claim 
Pooled Over Label Setting and 
Information Treatment 66.407 33 0.000 Reject 1,500 
Pooled Pooled Used, No Claim 
Pooled Over Label Setting and 
Information Treatment 39.769 33 0.194 Fail 1,500 
 4,500 
Pooled Over All  
Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled Over All 431.358 105 0.000 Reject 4,500 
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Table 4.16. Pooled Models for Design 4 
Info. 
Treatment 
Label Setting 
RNAi Label 
Wording 
LL Cdum Price 
RNAi 
Use 
N 
Pooled over Label Wording 
1 No Approval Pooled -410.939 -3.625 -0.314 -0.561* 354 
1 Approval Pooled -370.186 -3.417 -0.325 -0.351* 348 
1 Approval, Mandatory Pooled -319.810 -2.512 -0.266 0.295* 414 
2 No Approval Pooled -375.864 -3.896 -0.362 -0.510* 384 
2 Approval Pooled -403.327 -3.682 -0.362 -0.588* 462 
2 Approval, Mandatory Pooled -349.311 -3.343 -0.343 0.267* 336 
3 No Approval Pooled -281.851 -3.525 -0.360 -0.588* 360 
3 Approval Pooled -313.852 -3.528 -0.308 -0.348* 330 
3 Approval, Mandatory Pooled -407.201 -2.612 -0.250 0.249* 324 
4 No Approval Pooled -371.599 -2.813 -0.310 -0.557* 408 
4 Approval Pooled -388.273 -3.548 -0.314 -0.437* 384 
4 Approval, Mandatory Pooled -392.416 -3.336 -0.331 0.309* 396 
 4,500 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Label Setting 
1 Pooled Pooled -1135.551 -3.121 -0.294 -0.245* 1,116 
2 Pooled Pooled -1163.617 -3.570 -0.348 -0.295* 1,182 
3 Pooled Pooled -1032.788 -3.125 -0.296 -0.171* 1,014 
4 Pooled Pooled -1195.983 -3.161 -0.310 -0.210* 1,188 
 4,500 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Information Treatment 
Pooled No Approval Pooled -1513.076 -3.513 -0.325 -0.227* 1,506 
Pooled Approval Pooled -1539.994 -2.967 -0.297 -0.177* 1,524 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Pooled -1472.667 -3.281 -0.316 -0.295* 1,470 
 4,500 
Pooled Over Label Setting and Information Treatment 
Pooled Pooled Free, Used -1454.962 -3.408 -0.330 -0.544* 1,500 
Pooled Pooled Free, No Claim -1483.098 -3.534 -0.328 -0.435* 1,500 
Pooled Pooled Used, No Claim -1472.937 -2.947 -0.297 0.278* 1,500 
 4,500 
Pooled Over All 
Pooled Pooled Pooled -4532.880 -3.245 -0.312 -0.232* 4500 
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Table 4.17. Willingness to Pay for Design 1 
Info. 
Treatment 
Label Setting 
Label Wording RNAi Antibiotic 
RNAi Antibiotic 
Point 
Estimate 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Point 
Estimate 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 No Approval Free, Used Free, Used -6.47 -17.79 4.84 -4.28 -9.89 1.33 
1 No Approval Free, Used Free, No Claim -2.00 -8.08 4.09 -2.07 -6.32 2.18 
1 No Approval Free, Used Used, No Claim 0.87 -166.60 168.34 -2.45 -26.75 21.84 
1 No Approval Free, No Claim Free, Used -9.77 -62.90 43.37 -5.71 -25.06 13.64 
1 No Approval Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -0.04 -412.39 412.30 -0.14 -234.43 234.14 
1 No Approval Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -0.65 -77.40 76.09 -1.06 -17.96 15.83 
1 No Approval Used, No Claim Free, Used 1.02 -31.20 33.25 -5.24 -15.30 4.82 
1 No Approval Used, No Claim Free, No Claim -0.57 -106.00 104.86 -0.52 -89.09 88.05 
1 No Approval Used, No Claim Used, No Claim -0.63 -56.91 55.65 0.81 -22.25 23.88 
1 Approval Free, Used Free, Used -0.61 -167.78 166.56 -8.69 -55.04 37.66 
1 Approval Free, Used Free, No Claim -5.49 -20.43 9.46 -4.51 -15.19 6.18 
1 Approval Free, Used Used, No Claim -2.55 -20.17 15.06 4.93 -15.22 25.09 
1 Approval Free, No Claim Free, Used -1.23 -16.52 14.07 -6.54 -16.49 3.41 
1 Approval Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -5.23 -24.44 13.98 -2.68 -13.54 8.18 
1 Approval Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -11.29 -391.95 369.37 4.40 -68.35 77.15 
1 Approval Used, No Claim Free, Used 3.85 -11.78 19.49 -13.76 -150.41 122.88 
1 Approval Used, No Claim Free, No Claim 4.67 -5.32 14.67 -5.29 -16.98 6.39 
1 Approval Used, No Claim Used, No Claim -0.12 -1772.25 1772.01 -0.69 -39.89 38.50 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Free, Used -5.60 -18.05 6.85 -6.78 -23.61 10.05 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Free, No Claim -5.90 -36.61 24.82 -7.88 -59.93 44.17 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Used, No Claim -5.83 -30.17 18.51 6.70 -23.93 37.32 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Free, Used 4.47 -24.04 32.97 -14.36 -247.44 218.71 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -4.46 -11.85 2.93 -3.95 -9.97 2.06 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -4.30 -32.72 24.12 -2.21 -28.48 24.06 
1 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Free, Used 3.29 -0.67 7.24 -6.26 -12.97 0.44 
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1 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Free, No Claim 3.08 -8.53 14.69 -6.38 -29.91 17.15 
1 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Used, No Claim 2.14 -1.58 5.85 0.17 -300.77 301.11 
2 No Approval Free, Used Free, Used -3.66 -8.90 1.59 -3.36 -7.36 0.65 
2 No Approval Free, Used Free, No Claim -3.79 -14.68 7.10 -7.92 -39.44 23.60 
2 No Approval Free, Used Used, No Claim -4.91 -14.93 5.11 3.91 -3.33 11.15 
2 No Approval Free, No Claim Free, Used -3.09 -6.73 0.55 -1.16 -5.92 3.60 
2 No Approval Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -1.90 -9.57 5.78 -4.38 -9.96 1.19 
2 No Approval Free, No Claim Used, No Claim 0.51 -88.09 89.12 3.70 0.69 6.71 
2 No Approval Used, No Claim Free, Used 1.02 -31.34 33.39 -3.85 -11.76 4.06 
2 No Approval Used, No Claim Free, No Claim 8.64 -86.90 104.18 -7.02 -71.59 57.55 
2 No Approval Used, No Claim Used, No Claim 10.15 -104.59 124.89 3.89 -21.28 29.05 
2 Approval Free, Used Free, Used -3.90 -10.62 2.81 -3.74 -9.42 1.95 
2 Approval Free, Used Free, No Claim -2.81 -15.18 9.56 -5.20 -22.01 11.62 
2 Approval Free, Used Used, No Claim -2.17 -5.33 0.98 -0.87 -9.94 8.20 
2 Approval Free, No Claim Free, Used -3.99 -26.07 18.10 -10.79 -125.28 103.70 
2 Approval Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -2.91 -5.97 0.15 -3.01 -5.45 -0.58 
2 Approval Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -3.03 -9.97 3.90 0.39 -160.61 161.39 
2 Approval Used, No Claim Free, Used 7.26 -78.59 93.10 -8.24 -117.20 100.72 
2 Approval Used, No Claim Free, No Claim 48.75 -22568.74 22666.24 -31.51 -9480.66 9417.63 
2 Approval Used, No Claim Used, No Claim 3.57 -1.24 8.39 1.58 -6.41 9.57 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Free, Used -16.06 -434.05 401.93 -13.21 -296.25 269.82 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Free, No Claim -1.51 -21.00 17.99 -2.62 -9.84 4.61 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Used, No Claim -8.61 -89.98 72.76 2.07 -22.67 26.81 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Free, Used -2.77 -11.66 6.11 -3.38 -10.89 4.13 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -0.41 -101.30 100.48 -4.31 -8.16 -0.46 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -12.55 -770.82 745.73 32.44 -5008.14 5073.02 
2 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Free, Used -16.79 -1692.65 1659.06 27.88 -4581.14 4636.90 
2 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Free, No Claim 2.77 -11.12 16.65 -1.36 -35.26 32.55 
2 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Used, No Claim 2.67 -4.35 9.68 54.08 -26893.14 27001.29 
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3 No Approval Free, Used Free, Used -5.55 -48.66 37.57 -8.54 -100.93 83.85 
3 No Approval Free, Used Free, No Claim -1.80 -11.13 7.53 -4.81 -11.88 2.27 
3 No Approval Free, Used Used, No Claim -10.20 -57.57 37.18 2.42 -5.31 10.15 
3 No Approval Free, No Claim Free, Used 2.20 -8.89 13.29 -4.87 -15.90 6.16 
3 No Approval Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -0.51 -171.66 170.63 -6.91 -29.63 15.82 
3 No Approval Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -0.47 -118.65 117.71 3.42 -0.96 7.79 
3 No Approval Used, No Claim Free, Used 2.45 -6.27 11.18 -7.36 -29.40 14.69 
3 No Approval Used, No Claim Free, No Claim 1.05 -71.92 74.02 -2.16 -22.45 18.13 
3 No Approval Used, No Claim Used, No Claim 5.44 -48.11 58.99 -3.25 -36.30 29.80 
3 Approval Free, Used Free, Used -5.34 -14.20 3.53 -6.56 -18.69 5.58 
3 Approval Free, Used Free, No Claim -1.91 -7.40 3.57 -2.67 -5.51 0.17 
3 Approval Free, Used Used, No Claim -4.07 -8.77 0.63 0.76 -18.58 20.11 
3 Approval Free, No Claim Free, Used -0.92 -17.12 15.28 -3.34 -5.75 -0.93 
3 Approval Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -3.30 -11.79 5.19 -6.66 -25.28 11.96 
3 Approval Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -2.78 -5.72 0.16 3.29 1.39 5.18 
3 Approval Used, No Claim Free, Used -4.52 -26.80 17.76 -5.56 -34.26 23.14 
3 Approval Used, No Claim Free, No Claim 6.44 -19.04 31.92 -8.12 -47.13 30.89 
3 Approval Used, No Claim Used, No Claim 3.99 0.34 7.65 1.86 -2.87 6.59 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Free, Used -1.07 -8.34 6.19 -2.65 -5.66 0.37 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Free, No Claim 0.87 -99.15 100.90 -4.74 -23.06 13.58 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Used, No Claim -5.54 -29.09 18.01 5.95 -20.07 31.98 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Free, Used -6.92 -104.67 90.83 -16.02 -517.05 485.01 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -8.26 -170.60 154.08 -6.08 -97.33 85.18 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Used, No Claim 1.64 -340.74 344.02 34.24 -8467.49 8535.97 
3 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Free, Used 1.65 -10.39 13.68 -6.42 -18.81 5.98 
3 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Free, No Claim -7.73 -85.54 70.08 -1.02 -114.07 112.04 
3 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Used, No Claim 2.02 -23.53 27.58 9.09 -55.90 74.08 
4 No Approval Free, Used Free, Used -1.10 -31.86 29.67 -3.85 -11.72 4.01 
4 No Approval Free, Used Free, No Claim -3.14 -7.22 0.94 -4.08 -8.18 0.02 
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4 No Approval Free, Used Used, No Claim -6.25 -37.92 25.42 3.06 -9.80 15.92 
4 No Approval Free, No Claim Free, Used -2.12 -10.50 6.27 -5.43 -15.88 5.02 
4 No Approval Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -6.94 -32.45 18.58 -9.52 -56.04 36.99 
4 No Approval Free, No Claim Used, No Claim 1.44 -5.48 8.35 1.99 -0.08 4.07 
4 No Approval Used, No Claim Free, Used 3.29 -6.49 13.07 -6.53 -27.41 14.35 
4 No Approval Used, No Claim Free, No Claim 3.77 -32.64 40.17 -9.00 -147.67 129.67 
4 No Approval Used, No Claim Used, No Claim 16.62 -1565.60 1598.84 28.90 -4750.61 4808.42 
4 Approval Free, Used Free, Used -1.17 -11.80 9.46 -1.78 -5.19 1.63 
4 Approval Free, Used Free, No Claim -2.53 -6.77 1.71 -1.73 -6.60 3.13 
4 Approval Free, Used Used, No Claim -0.80 -20.54 18.94 1.69 -1.27 4.65 
4 Approval Free, No Claim Free, Used -2.97 -10.15 4.20 -5.23 -15.73 5.28 
4 Approval Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -1.27 -45.89 43.35 -3.38 -15.09 8.32 
4 Approval Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -1.37 -9.10 6.37 2.80 0.58 5.03 
4 Approval Used, No Claim Free, Used 1.46 -25.55 28.47 -3.33 -13.13 6.47 
4 Approval Used, No Claim Free, No Claim 15.60 -392.21 423.41 -10.94 -212.52 190.63 
4 Approval Used, No Claim Used, No Claim 0.10 -243.47 243.66 0.05 -338.97 339.06 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Free, Used -13.32 -1779.96 1753.32 -34.11 -11592.85 11524.64 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Free, No Claim 7.73 -142.44 157.90 4.78 -62.89 72.45 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Used, No Claim -1.94 -7.05 3.17 2.71 0.03 5.40 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Free, Used 2.64 -6.80 12.08 -10.01 -51.27 31.25 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -0.70 -24.20 22.80 -2.52 -4.50 -0.54 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -1.94 -9.58 5.70 1.28 -11.00 13.57 
4 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Free, Used 0.58 -81.51 82.67 -4.54 -11.70 2.62 
4 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Free, No Claim 0.27 -640.06 640.60 -6.41 -25.44 12.62 
4 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Used, No Claim 0.96 -24.85 26.77 2.02 -3.28 7.32 
Pooled over Label Wording 
1 No Approval Pooled Pooled -2.38 -3.43 -1.32 -2.52 -3.28 -1.76 
1 Approval Pooled Pooled -0.79 -10.73 9.16 -4.63 -6.01 -3.25 
1 Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled -1.35 -4.33 1.63 -3.77 -4.71 -2.83 
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2 No Approval Pooled Pooled -0.79 -8.46 6.87 -1.81 -3.04 -0.57 
2 Approval Pooled Pooled 0.00 -704021.98 704021.98 -3.51 -4.38 -2.65 
2 Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled -2.30 -4.33 -0.26 -2.64 -4.14 -1.14 
3 No Approval Pooled Pooled -1.29 -5.34 2.77 -2.93 -4.00 -1.85 
3 Approval Pooled Pooled -1.20 -3.37 0.97 -2.32 -2.88 -1.76 
3 Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled -1.71 -4.97 1.55 -1.63 -4.49 1.23 
4 No Approval Pooled Pooled -1.30 -4.62 2.02 -3.32 -4.23 -2.41 
4 Approval Pooled Pooled -0.61 -9.06 7.85 -0.88 -3.82 2.05 
4 Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled -0.87 -6.32 4.58 -2.32 -3.09 -1.55 
Pooled over Label Setting 
1 Pooled Free, Used Free, Used -4.91 -8.50 -1.33 -6.20 -11.20 -1.20 
1 Pooled Free, Used Free, No Claim -4.04 -6.94 -1.14 -3.98 -6.56 -1.40 
1 Pooled Free, Used Used, No Claim -3.42 -9.18 2.34 4.10 -1.90 10.09 
1 Pooled Free, No Claim Free, Used -2.61 -6.50 1.27 -8.05 -19.21 3.12 
1 Pooled Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -3.66 -6.72 -0.60 -2.83 -5.27 -0.38 
1 Pooled Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -4.18 -14.46 6.11 -0.36 -301.34 300.63 
1 Pooled Used, No Claim Free, Used 2.51 0.09 4.92 -7.41 -13.15 -1.68 
1 Pooled Used, No Claim Free, No Claim 2.65 -0.43 5.73 -4.01 -6.94 -1.07 
1 Pooled Used, No Claim Used, No Claim 0.59 -18.13 19.31 0.07 -928.73 928.87 
2 Pooled Free, Used Free, Used -6.23 -12.35 -0.11 -5.55 -10.42 -0.69 
2 Pooled Free, Used Free, No Claim -2.59 -6.64 1.46 -4.98 -9.85 -0.11 
2 Pooled Free, Used Used, No Claim -4.05 -6.28 -1.81 1.16 -4.31 6.63 
2 Pooled Free, No Claim Free, Used -2.94 -5.45 -0.42 -3.64 -5.86 -1.42 
2 Pooled Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -1.72 -4.03 0.59 -3.86 -5.08 -2.64 
2 Pooled Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -2.91 -6.49 0.67 5.02 0.41 9.64 
2 Pooled Used, No Claim Free, Used 7.98 -45.17 61.14 -12.48 -139.64 114.69 
2 Pooled Used, No Claim Free, No Claim 12.72 -83.92 109.36 -8.16 -48.64 32.32 
2 Pooled Used, No Claim Used, No Claim 4.80 1.05 8.55 4.20 0.92 7.48 
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3 Pooled Free, Used Free, Used -3.40 -5.49 -1.31 -5.03 -7.86 -2.21 
3 Pooled Free, Used Free, No Claim -1.30 -7.30 4.70 -4.02 -6.05 -2.00 
3 Pooled Free, Used Used, No Claim -6.37 -11.89 -0.85 2.39 -0.06 4.83 
3 Pooled Free, No Claim Free, Used -1.13 -10.68 8.41 -5.29 -8.75 -1.84 
3 Pooled Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -3.31 -8.34 1.71 -6.85 -18.29 4.59 
3 Pooled Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -1.20 -10.00 7.59 5.59 1.95 9.22 
3 Pooled Used, No Claim Free, Used 0.52 -56.54 57.59 -6.61 -13.27 0.05 
3 Pooled Used, No Claim Free, No Claim 2.03 -7.35 11.41 -4.88 -13.15 3.40 
3 Pooled Used, No Claim Used, No Claim 3.57 0.41 6.72 2.80 -0.40 6.00 
4 Pooled Free, Used Free, Used -1.83 -5.99 2.33 -3.98 -6.49 -1.47 
4 Pooled Free, Used Free, No Claim -3.74 -6.60 -0.87 -3.64 -6.16 -1.12 
4 Pooled Free, Used Used, No Claim -1.85 -4.15 0.44 2.30 1.13 3.46 
4 Pooled Free, No Claim Free, Used -0.80 -21.38 19.77 -6.98 -13.57 -0.39 
4 Pooled Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -2.35 -4.43 -0.27 -4.25 -6.10 -2.40 
4 Pooled Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -0.87 -8.79 7.05 2.22 1.08 3.36 
4 Pooled Used, No Claim Free, Used 1.77 -3.45 6.99 -4.94 -8.85 -1.03 
4 Pooled Used, No Claim Free, No Claim 5.14 -5.67 15.95 -8.44 -34.19 17.31 
4 Pooled Used, No Claim Used, No Claim 2.94 -1.79 7.68 4.71 -1.15 10.57 
Pooled Over Information Treatment 
Pooled No Approval Free, Used Free, Used -4.42 -6.87 -1.97 -4.81 -7.35 -2.27 
Pooled No Approval Free, Used Free, No Claim -2.61 -4.07 -1.15 -4.06 -5.42 -2.71 
Pooled No Approval Free, Used Used, No Claim -5.99 -11.73 -0.26 2.48 -0.40 5.36 
Pooled No Approval Free, No Claim Free, Used -3.19 -4.99 -1.39 -3.97 -5.72 -2.22 
Pooled No Approval Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -3.04 -5.27 -0.80 -5.89 -9.81 -1.96 
Pooled No Approval Free, No Claim Used, No Claim 0.12 -411.40 411.65 2.41 1.37 3.45 
Pooled No Approval Used, No Claim Free, Used 2.09 -0.75 4.93 -5.93 -9.67 -2.18 
Pooled No Approval Used, No Claim Free, No Claim 2.61 -2.06 7.29 -3.33 -7.44 0.79 
Pooled No Approval Used, No Claim Used, No Claim 5.19 -1.98 12.35 3.29 -1.74 8.32 
Pooled Approval Free, Used Free, Used -2.86 -4.30 -1.42 -4.43 -6.01 -2.85 
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Pooled Approval Free, Used Free, No Claim -2.92 -4.45 -1.38 -3.13 -4.37 -1.90 
Pooled Approval Free, Used Used, No Claim -2.17 -3.50 -0.83 1.01 -2.26 4.28 
Pooled Approval Free, No Claim Free, Used -1.63 -4.31 1.05 -5.24 -7.20 -3.29 
Pooled Approval Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -3.04 -4.84 -1.25 -4.04 -5.83 -2.26 
Pooled Approval Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -2.59 -3.94 -1.25 2.80 1.79 3.81 
Pooled Approval Used, No Claim Free, Used 1.85 -5.63 9.33 -7.86 -21.05 5.33 
Pooled Approval Used, No Claim Free, No Claim 10.29 -14.23 34.80 -8.99 -27.83 9.84 
Pooled Approval Used, No Claim Used, No Claim 2.50 0.91 4.08 0.95 -5.61 7.52 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Free, Used -5.80 -10.62 -0.98 -7.02 -13.60 -0.43 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Free, No Claim -4.21 -12.32 3.90 -6.66 -22.47 9.14 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Free, Used Used, No Claim -4.32 -7.21 -1.43 4.32 1.60 7.04 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Free, Used -0.69 -40.57 39.18 -8.87 -22.59 4.85 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -1.74 -4.05 0.58 -3.55 -4.66 -2.44 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -2.89 -8.69 2.91 6.55 -4.91 18.01 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Free, Used 2.83 0.51 5.15 -7.45 -13.63 -1.26 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Free, No Claim 0.44 -90.95 91.84 -4.50 -8.47 -0.52 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim Used, No Claim 1.87 -0.48 4.22 3.37 2.02 4.71 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Label Setting 
1 Pooled Pooled Pooled -1.50 -2.33 -0.67 -3.63 -3.93 -3.32 
2 Pooled Pooled Pooled -0.96 -3.13 1.21 -2.66 -3.00 -2.32 
3 Pooled Pooled Pooled -1.34 -2.33 -0.35 -2.34 -2.66 -2.01 
4 Pooled Pooled Pooled -0.90 -2.59 0.79 -2.04 -2.33 -1.75 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Information Treatment 
Pooled No Approval Pooled Pooled -1.43 -2.11 -0.75 -2.64 -2.87 -2.42 
Pooled Approval Pooled Pooled -0.71 -2.70 1.29 -2.59 -2.76 -2.42 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Pooled Pooled -1.48 -2.22 -0.74 -2.65 -2.91 -2.39 
Pooled Over Label Setting and Information Treatment 
Pooled Pooled Free, Used Free, Used -12.94 -55.76 29.87 -8.56 -27.95 10.83 
Pooled Pooled Free, Used Free, No Claim -3.99 -12.34 4.35 -4.13 -10.80 2.54 
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Pooled Pooled Free, Used Used, No Claim 1.74 -168.04 171.51 -4.91 -48.97 39.16 
Pooled Pooled Free, No Claim Free, Used -19.54 -229.25 190.17 -11.43 -84.33 61.47 
Pooled Pooled Free, No Claim Free, No Claim -0.09 -472.60 472.42 -0.29 -854.06 853.49 
Pooled Pooled Free, No Claim Used, No Claim -1.31 -79.51 76.90 -2.13 -22.32 18.06 
Pooled Pooled Used, No Claim Free, Used 2.05 -31.30 35.40 -10.48 -47.46 26.49 
Pooled Pooled Used, No Claim Free, No Claim -1.13 -106.84 104.58 -1.04 -89.85 87.77 
Pooled Pooled Used, No Claim Used, No Claim -1.26 -57.79 55.27 1.63 -21.87 25.12 
Pooled Over Common Label 
- - Mixed Mixed -4.76 -6.50 -3.01 -5.04 -6.58 -3.50 
- - Common Common -1.57 -11.60 8.46 -9.25 -14.10 -4.40 
Pooled Over All 
Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled -1.16 -1.48 -0.85 -2.63 -2.70 -2.56 
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Info. 
Treatment 
Label Setting 
RNAi Label 
Wording 
RNAi Grade 
Point 
Estimate 
LB UB 
Point 
Estimate 
LB UB 
1 No Approval Free, Used -8.09 -25.29 9.12 -1.83 -9.13 5.48 
1 No Approval Free, No Claim -1.69 -4.35 0.96 -0.03 -3919.95 3919.88 
1 No Approval Used, No Claim 4.54 0.80 8.27 -2.81 -5.55 -0.06 
1 Approval Free, Used -1.56 -7.81 4.69 -2.56 -5.04 -0.08 
1 Approval Free, No Claim -3.25 -5.80 -0.70 -1.14 -7.70 5.43 
1 Approval Used, No Claim 5.01 -1.30 11.32 -2.23 -7.49 3.04 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -10.04 -44.42 24.35 -2.84 -9.04 3.35 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -2.04 -4.82 0.74 -0.29 -79.62 79.04 
1 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim 2.56 0.77 4.35 -2.34 -3.96 -0.71 
2 No Approval Free, Used -3.29 -5.40 -1.19 -1.88 -4.03 0.28 
2 No Approval Free, No Claim -1.67 -4.16 0.81 -1.66 -3.36 0.04 
2 No Approval Used, No Claim 0.28 -408.17 408.72 -0.27 -380.22 379.68 
2 Approval Free, Used -3.15 -7.57 1.28 1.20 -10.38 12.78 
2 Approval Free, No Claim -4.37 -10.72 1.98 -3.14 -7.47 1.19 
2 Approval Used, No Claim 3.42 -0.20 7.04 -2.64 -6.11 0.83 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -14.64 -135.93 106.65 -5.82 -26.24 14.59 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -5.55 -14.18 3.08 -3.50 -8.12 1.13 
2 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim 4.26 -1.84 10.37 -3.49 -8.53 1.56 
3 No Approval Free, Used -6.42 -11.82 -1.02 -2.79 -4.79 -0.80 
3 No Approval Free, No Claim -1.88 -5.16 1.40 -2.13 -4.02 -0.25 
3 No Approval Used, No Claim 2.89 1.09 4.70 -1.41 -5.43 2.62 
3 Approval Free, Used -2.88 -6.74 0.98 -3.00 -6.09 0.09 
3 Approval Free, No Claim -3.95 -7.07 -0.83 -3.20 -5.53 -0.87 
3 Approval Used, No Claim 3.22 1.52 4.92 -2.73 -4.31 -1.14 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -5.42 -10.27 -0.56 -4.49 -7.74 -1.23 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -2.51 -7.68 2.66 -2.61 -6.58 1.35 
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3 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim 1.90 -3.48 7.28 -0.72 -28.30 26.86 
4 No Approval Free, Used -2.38 -6.93 2.17 -0.59 -37.48 36.31 
4 No Approval Free, No Claim -3.36 -5.44 -1.27 -2.83 -4.46 -1.20 
4 No Approval Used, No Claim 4.59 2.51 6.66 -2.71 -4.29 -1.13 
4 Approval Free, Used -5.69 -18.83 7.45 -6.52 -22.52 9.49 
4 Approval Free, No Claim -2.13 -8.26 4.00 -0.39 -100.67 99.89 
4 Approval Used, No Claim 4.55 -1.08 10.18 -0.37 -164.27 163.54 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -6.77 -14.38 0.84 -3.12 -5.83 -0.41 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -1.30 -5.35 2.75 -0.10 -344.61 344.41 
4 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim 5.02 2.08 7.96 -1.06 -9.56 7.45 
Pooled over Label Wording 
1 No Approval Pooled -1.82 -3.39 -0.24 -1.07 -4.12 1.98 
1 Approval Pooled -0.24 -99.54 99.06 -2.04 -3.34 -0.74 
1 Approval, Mandatory Pooled -1.98 -3.38 -0.59 -1.64 -3.05 -0.22 
2 No Approval Pooled -1.66 -3.21 -0.12 -1.53 -2.85 -0.21 
2 Approval Pooled -1.26 -6.34 3.83 -1.45 -4.55 1.65 
2 Approval, Mandatory Pooled -4.28 -7.22 -1.34 -4.35 -7.10 -1.59 
3 No Approval Pooled -1.79 -3.15 -0.44 -2.28 -3.01 -1.55 
3 Approval Pooled -0.68 -10.84 9.49 -3.03 -3.80 -2.27 
3 Approval, Mandatory Pooled -2.21 -3.85 -0.57 -2.90 -3.94 -1.87 
4 No Approval Pooled -0.06 -1044.45 1044.32 -2.48 -3.21 -1.75 
4 Approval Pooled -1.09 -9.92 7.73 -2.58 -4.42 -0.73 
4 Approval, Mandatory Pooled -0.71 -8.49 7.07 -1.39 -2.95 0.16 
Pooled over Label Setting 
1 Pooled Free, Used -5.72 -8.36 -3.09 -2.44 -3.89 -0.99 
1 Pooled Free, No Claim -2.22 -3.01 -1.43 -0.41 -12.81 11.98 
1 Pooled Used, No Claim 3.90 2.91 4.89 -2.45 -3.41 -1.50 
2 Pooled Free, Used -5.40 -7.67 -3.14 -1.58 -3.89 0.73 
2 Pooled Free, No Claim -3.06 -3.98 -2.14 -2.35 -3.15 -1.54 
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2 Pooled Used, No Claim 2.57 0.72 4.42 -2.09 -4.17 0.00 
3 Pooled Free, Used -5.15 -6.66 -3.64 -3.43 -4.28 -2.58 
3 Pooled Free, No Claim -2.78 -3.81 -1.75 -2.64 -3.45 -1.84 
3 Pooled Used, No Claim 2.79 2.07 3.51 -1.77 -2.82 -0.72 
4 Pooled Free, Used -5.20 -7.46 -2.93 -3.25 -4.52 -1.98 
4 Pooled Free, No Claim -2.27 -3.18 -1.37 -1.26 -2.77 0.24 
4 Pooled Used, No Claim 4.70 3.69 5.72 -1.64 -3.05 -0.23 
Pooled Over Information Treatment 
Pooled No Approval Free, Used -5.21 -6.39 -4.03 -1.99 -2.83 -1.15 
Pooled No Approval Free, No Claim -2.11 -2.67 -1.55 -1.56 -2.17 -0.94 
Pooled No Approval Used, No Claim 3.20 2.54 3.85 -1.88 -2.81 -0.94 
Pooled Approval Free, Used -2.99 -4.04 -1.94 -2.47 -3.42 -1.53 
Pooled Approval Free, No Claim -3.49 -4.39 -2.60 -2.03 -2.95 -1.12 
Pooled Approval Used, No Claim 3.95 3.08 4.82 -2.20 -3.15 -1.26 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -8.24 -12.32 -4.15 -3.93 -5.11 -2.74 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -2.46 -3.21 -1.72 -1.16 -2.87 0.54 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim 3.42 2.75 4.08 -1.86 -2.81 -0.91 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Label Setting 
1 Pooled Pooled -1.37 -2.30 -0.44 -1.57 -2.12 -1.01 
2 Pooled Pooled -2.16 -2.76 -1.56 -2.15 -2.62 -1.68 
3 Pooled Pooled -1.51 -2.25 -0.77 -2.71 -2.97 -2.44 
4 Pooled Pooled -0.54 -6.42 5.34 -2.07 -2.44 -1.70 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Information Treatment 
Pooled No Approval Pooled -1.36 -1.94 -0.78 -1.86 -2.11 -1.60 
Pooled Approval Pooled -0.74 -3.74 2.27 -2.34 -2.65 -2.02 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Pooled -2.04 -2.46 -1.61 -2.29 -2.57 -2.00 
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Pooled Over Label Setting and Information Treatment 
Pooled Pooled Free, Used -5.36 -5.89 -4.84 -2.74 -3.02 -2.45 
Pooled Pooled Free, No Claim -2.56 -2.78 -2.34 -1.55 -1.85 -1.25 
Pooled Pooled Used, No Claim 3.51 3.27 3.75 -1.97 -2.28 -1.66 
Pooled Over All 
Pooled Pooled Pooled -1.39 -1.63 -1.14 -2.13 -2.22 -2.04 
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Info. 
Treatment 
Label Setting 
Antibiotic 
Label Wording 
Antibiotic Use Grade 
PE LB UB PE LB UB 
1 No Approval Free, Used -3.81 -6.34 -1.28 -0.02 -13659.87 13659.82 
1 No Approval Free, No Claim -3.60 -5.79 -1.40 -1.16 -6.25 3.94 
1 No Approval Used, No Claim 4.96 1.75 8.16 -2.43 -4.87 0.01 
1 Approval Free, Used -1.39 -7.13 4.35 -1.93 -4.23 0.38 
1 Approval Free, No Claim -5.48 -10.59 -0.37 -1.43 -6.52 3.67 
1 Approval Used, No Claim 2.42 0.75 4.10 -2.15 -3.69 -0.60 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -5.07 -7.53 -2.61 -1.49 -3.85 0.86 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -3.27 -4.29 -2.26 -0.88 -3.88 2.12 
1 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim 2.14 -4.07 8.35 1.85 -5.22 8.92 
2 No Approval Free, Used -8.78 -20.81 3.25 -0.64 -29.88 28.60 
2 No Approval Free, No Claim -2.70 -4.23 -1.17 -0.94 -5.33 3.46 
2 No Approval Used, No Claim 9.17 -73.88 92.22 -6.28 -47.05 34.50 
2 Approval Free, Used -7.13 -16.03 1.77 -0.02 -62413.03 62413.00 
2 Approval Free, No Claim -1.77 -4.20 0.66 -2.06 -3.31 -0.82 
2 Approval Used, No Claim 2.17 -0.82 5.17 -2.48 -4.66 -0.31 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -4.58 -8.75 -0.41 -2.41 -5.26 0.45 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -3.76 -5.89 -1.63 -3.06 -4.62 -1.51 
2 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim 3.34 1.57 5.12 -1.18 -6.73 4.37 
3 No Approval Free, Used -4.12 -6.57 -1.67 -2.29 -4.12 -0.46 
3 No Approval Free, No Claim -4.08 -6.88 -1.28 0.20 -190.04 190.44 
3 No Approval Used, No Claim 5.12 0.50 9.74 -2.54 -5.82 0.73 
3 Approval Free, Used -1.60 -5.50 2.30 -2.53 -4.07 -0.99 
3 Approval Free, No Claim -3.83 -6.83 -0.83 -0.75 -16.55 15.05 
3 Approval Used, No Claim 3.34 1.60 5.08 -0.51 -29.58 28.56 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -5.46 -16.78 5.86 -1.28 -18.91 16.35 
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3 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -6.04 -21.85 9.76 -2.06 -11.69 7.58 
3 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim 4.46 1.65 7.26 -1.67 -5.71 2.37 
4 No Approval Free, Used -5.87 -9.52 -2.23 -2.34 -3.81 -0.87 
4 No Approval Free, No Claim -4.01 -7.16 -0.86 -0.91 -7.49 5.68 
4 No Approval Used, No Claim 5.43 1.89 8.96 -1.64 -5.74 2.46 
4 Approval Free, Used -3.99 -7.41 -0.56 1.16 -7.11 9.42 
4 Approval Free, No Claim -3.26 -5.01 -1.51 -2.19 -3.73 -0.65 
4 Approval Used, No Claim 4.09 -3.39 11.57 -3.41 -9.86 3.03 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -5.67 -10.63 -0.70 -0.34 -60.89 60.21 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -1.86 -5.98 2.27 -0.12 -536.21 535.96 
4 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim 3.62 0.53 6.71 -1.45 -8.12 5.22 
Pooled over Label Wording 
1 No Approval Pooled -3.63 -4.20 -3.06 -1.13 -2.85 0.58 
1 Approval Pooled -3.79 -4.43 -3.15 -1.07 -2.97 0.83 
1 Approval, Mandatory Pooled 3.24 2.48 4.00 -1.37 -2.73 -0.02 
2 No Approval Pooled -6.88 -9.97 -3.80 -1.01 -6.16 4.14 
2 Approval Pooled -2.70 -3.20 -2.19 -2.00 -2.49 -1.50 
2 Approval, Mandatory Pooled 3.74 2.79 4.68 -2.31 -3.18 -1.45 
3 No Approval Pooled -3.41 -4.17 -2.64 -2.21 -2.98 -1.45 
3 Approval Pooled -4.35 -5.58 -3.11 -0.59 -12.36 11.19 
3 Approval, Mandatory Pooled 4.21 3.31 5.11 -1.46 -3.16 0.23 
4 No Approval Pooled -5.26 -6.08 -4.43 -0.77 -4.19 2.64 
4 Approval Pooled -3.26 -3.75 -2.76 -1.32 -2.49 -0.15 
4 Approval, Mandatory Pooled 4.50 2.31 6.69 -2.08 -4.04 -0.11 
Pooled over Label Setting 
1 Pooled Free, Used -1.13 -5.40 3.14 -1.23 -3.46 1.00 
1 Pooled Free, No Claim -1.15 -3.85 1.56 -1.95 -2.55 -1.36 
1 Pooled Used, No Claim -2.99 -3.60 -2.39 -0.90 -4.18 2.39 
2 Pooled Free, Used -3.39 -4.47 -2.30 -1.45 -3.28 0.38 
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2 Pooled Free, No Claim -2.39 -3.53 -1.24 -1.73 -2.86 -0.60 
2 Pooled Used, No Claim -1.59 -3.77 0.59 -2.41 -3.41 -1.40 
3 Pooled Free, Used -1.57 -4.13 1.00 -1.63 -3.24 -0.03 
3 Pooled Free, No Claim -0.52 -15.66 14.61 -1.42 -2.83 -0.01 
3 Pooled Used, No Claim -0.76 -16.34 14.82 -1.82 -4.31 0.67 
4 Pooled Free, Used -1.83 -4.50 0.85 -2.11 -3.27 -0.95 
4 Pooled Free, No Claim -1.84 -4.37 0.68 -1.64 -3.57 0.29 
4 Pooled Used, No Claim -1.36 -3.35 0.63 -0.78 -5.89 4.34 
Pooled Over Information Treatment 
Pooled No Approval Free, Used -5.43 -6.41 -4.46 -1.37 -2.50 -0.25 
Pooled No Approval Free, No Claim -3.65 -4.20 -3.10 -0.76 -3.40 1.89 
Pooled No Approval Used, No Claim 5.52 4.12 6.92 -2.57 -3.45 -1.68 
Pooled Approval Free, Used -3.42 -4.10 -2.74 -0.98 -3.44 1.48 
Pooled Approval Free, No Claim -3.31 -3.84 -2.77 -1.74 -2.35 -1.13 
Pooled Approval Used, No Claim 2.92 2.30 3.54 -1.97 -2.76 -1.18 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -5.11 -6.21 -4.02 -1.44 -2.68 -0.20 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -3.37 -3.89 -2.85 -1.45 -2.25 -0.64 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim 3.49 2.83 4.16 -0.85 -4.92 3.22 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Label Setting 
1 Pooled Pooled -1.86 -2.25 -1.47 -1.31 -1.81 -0.80 
2 Pooled Pooled -2.39 -2.75 -2.02 -1.90 -2.26 -1.53 
3 Pooled Pooled -0.96 -2.87 0.94 -1.60 -2.17 -1.04 
4 Pooled Pooled -1.70 -2.34 -1.07 -1.56 -2.11 -1.01 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Information Treatment 
Pooled No Approval Pooled -1.90 -2.28 -1.52 -1.60 -1.98 -1.23 
Pooled Approval Pooled -1.48 -1.99 -0.96 -1.69 -1.99 -1.39 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Pooled -1.87 -2.24 -1.49 -1.45 -1.87 -1.03 
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Table 4.19. Willingness to Pay for Design 3 continued 
Pooled Over Label Setting and Information Treatment 
Pooled Pooled Free, Used -4.71 -5.00 -4.42 -1.29 -1.76 -0.81 
Pooled Pooled Free, No Claim -3.45 -3.62 -3.27 -1.32 -1.64 -1.00 
Pooled Pooled Used, No Claim 3.91 3.66 4.16 -1.76 -2.14 -1.39 
Pooled Over All 
Pooled Pooled Pooled -1.75 -1.88 -1.61 -1.58 -1.70 -1.47 
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Table 4.20. Willingness to Pay for Design 4 
Info. 
Treatment 
Label Setting 
RNAi Label 
Wording 
RNAi 
Point 
Estimate 
LB UB 
1 No Approval Free, Used -2.47 -3.39 -1.55 
1 No Approval Free, No Claim -2.16 -4.49 0.16 
1 No Approval Used, No Claim 1.61 -1.51 4.74 
1 Approval Free, Used -3.26 -5.34 -1.18 
1 Approval Free, No Claim -3.67 -7.86 0.53 
1 Approval Used, No Claim 3.44 -0.39 7.27 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -5.95 -11.88 -0.02 
1 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -1.57 -3.03 -0.11 
1 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim 1.73 -3.49 6.95 
2 No Approval Free, Used -3.62 -5.19 -2.04 
2 No Approval Free, No Claim -1.64 -3.03 -0.25 
2 No Approval Used, No Claim 1.42 -1.40 4.25 
2 Approval Free, Used -1.94 -3.57 -0.32 
2 Approval Free, No Claim -3.63 -4.70 -2.56 
2 Approval Used, No Claim 1.37 -0.54 3.28 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -2.80 -4.08 -1.51 
2 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -5.44 -10.90 0.01 
2 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim 2.41 -2.63 7.46 
3 No Approval Free, Used -4.29 -10.33 1.75 
3 No Approval Free, No Claim -3.54 -8.50 1.42 
3 No Approval Used, No Claim 2.22 0.69 3.76 
3 Approval Free, Used -4.73 -8.60 -0.86 
3 Approval Free, No Claim -1.65 -4.76 1.47 
3 Approval Used, No Claim 1.71 -2.84 6.26 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -2.13 -3.12 -1.15 
3 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -1.93 -3.51 -0.35 
3 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim 1.48 -10.36 13.31 
4 No Approval Free, Used -5.76 -12.41 0.89 
4 No Approval Free, No Claim -2.33 -3.48 -1.19 
4 No Approval Used, No Claim 0.65 -7.75 9.06 
4 Approval Free, Used -3.38 -5.47 -1.29 
4 Approval Free, No Claim -1.64 -6.20 2.91 
4 Approval Used, No Claim 2.52 0.38 4.65 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -2.27 -3.38 -1.15 
4 Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -4.37 -6.93 -1.80 
4 Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim 2.74 1.08 4.39 
Pooled over Label Wording 
1 No Approval Pooled -3.57 -4.27 -2.86 
1 Approval Pooled -2.16 -2.80 -1.52 
1 Approval, Mandatory Pooled 2.22 1.43 3.01 
2 No Approval Pooled -2.82 -3.27 -2.36 
2 Approval Pooled -3.25 -3.65 -2.85 
2 Approval, Mandatory Pooled 1.55 0.61 2.50 
3 No Approval Pooled -3.27 -3.72 -2.81 
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Table 4.20. Willingness to Pay for Design 4 continued 
3 Approval Pooled -2.26 -3.00 -1.52 
3 Approval, Mandatory Pooled 1.99 0.62 3.36 
4 No Approval Pooled -3.59 -4.20 -2.99 
4 Approval Pooled -2.79 -3.34 -2.24 
4 Approval, Mandatory Pooled 1.87 1.18 2.55 
Pooled over Label Setting 
1 Pooled Free, Used -1.33 -2.28 -0.38 
1 Pooled Free, No Claim -1.37 -3.50 0.75 
1 Pooled Used, No Claim -2.20 -3.13 -1.27 
2 Pooled Free, Used -1.60 -2.30 -0.91 
2 Pooled Free, No Claim -1.29 -2.24 -0.34 
2 Pooled Used, No Claim -2.48 -3.29 -1.67 
3 Pooled Free, Used -0.36 -39.64 38.92 
3 Pooled Free, No Claim -1.51 -3.12 0.10 
3 Pooled Used, No Claim -1.53 -2.19 -0.86 
4 Pooled Free, Used -1.97 -2.74 -1.21 
4 Pooled Free, No Claim -0.58 -8.89 7.72 
4 Pooled Used, No Claim -1.35 -2.40 -0.29 
Pooled Over Information Treatment 
Pooled No Approval Free, Used -3.58 -4.08 -3.09 
Pooled No Approval Free, No Claim -2.27 -2.70 -1.84 
Pooled No Approval Used, No Claim 1.50 0.85 2.15 
Pooled Approval Free, Used -3.18 -3.66 -2.69 
Pooled Approval Free, No Claim -2.79 -3.26 -2.32 
Pooled Approval Used, No Claim 2.05 1.48 2.62 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Free, Used -3.12 -3.47 -2.77 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Free, No Claim -2.94 -3.32 -2.56 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Used, No Claim 2.22 1.30 3.15 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Label Setting 
1 Pooled Pooled -1.66 -2.01 -1.32 
2 Pooled Pooled -1.70 -1.93 -1.46 
3 Pooled Pooled -1.16 -1.85 -0.46 
4 Pooled Pooled -1.36 -1.77 -0.95 
Pooled Over Label Wording and Information Treatment 
Pooled No Approval Pooled -1.40 -1.68 -1.12 
Pooled Approval Pooled -1.20 -1.63 -0.76 
Pooled Approval, Mandatory Pooled -1.86 -2.06 -1.67 
Pooled Over Label Setting and Information Treatment 
Pooled Pooled Free, Used -3.29 -3.44 -3.15 
Pooled Pooled Free, No Claim -2.66 -2.80 -2.52 
Pooled Pooled Used, No Claim 1.88 1.65 2.10 
Pooled Over All 
Pooled Pooled Pooled -1.48 -1.58 -1.39 
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 4.6 Methods 
 4.6.1 Dichotomous choice sequences 
Respondents were put in one of two scenarios of purchasing beef steaks from a restaurant 
using different beef sources. One-half of respondents were asked the premium they would pay 
for the beef steak from the restaurant in question versus a beef steak from an alternative 
restaurant. In the first scenario, the steaks were supplied from producers who may utilize RNAi 
technology. Within the scenario, respondents were shown one of 11 reasons why the restaurant 
supplied steaks with RNAi technology. In the second scenario, the other one-half were asked 
about the premium they would pay for beef steaks that were supplied from sources that did not 
use RNAi technology. The same method used in the other scenario was followed except 
respondents were shown one of the same 11 reasons why the restaurants supplied steaks that did 
not use RNAi. With the approach of the two scenarios, the results could be compared for the two 
different sources as well as the 11 reasons. Respondents were given one of five prices in which 
they answered yes or no. The premium levels were $0.50, $1.50, $2.50, $3.50, $4.50. 
Respondents were given one of the five prices randomly. If respondents answered with yes, the 
same question would be asked yet the new price shown would be twice as large as the original 
price. If respondents answered with no, the same question would be asked yet the new price 
shown would be the original divided in half. The table of possible premium levels in the 
dichotomous choice models can be found in Table 4.21. In this model, half of respondents were 
asked their willingness to pay while the remainder were asked their willingness to avoid 
compared to alternative steaks.  
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Cameron (1988) and Cameron and Quiggin (1994) offer a model for interval censored 
models, or double-bounded dichotomous models. The dichotomous choice models can be 
expressed as:  
 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑘
∗ =  𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑗𝑘 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘 (4.14) 
Where j represents the respective beef steak, k represents one of the 11 attributes, Xi is a vector of 
explanatory variables pertaining to respondent i, 𝛽𝑗𝑘 is the conformable vector of coefficients, 
and  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘 is an i.i.d. normal error term. 
Table 4.21. Table of Premiums Possible in Double-Bounded Dichotomous Choice 
Sequences 
Original Price: $0.50 $1.50 $2.50 $3.50 $4.50 
Second Price (Yes to Question 1): $1.00 $3.00 $5.00 $7.00 $9.00 
Second Price (No to Question 1): $0.25 $0.75 $1.25 $1.75 $2.25 
 
 4.7 Results  
 4.7.1 Dichotomous choice sequences 
The results of the dichotomous choice model with suppliers who used RNAi technology 
can be found in Table 4.22. Consumers were willing to pay $2.82 for beef steaks from 
restaurants for the purpose of keeping beef production and processing within the United States as 
opposed to increasing carcass yield which only had a $0.42. A majority of the reasons that 
ranked in the top five for WTP pertained to benefits of cattle rather than production, consumer 
and producer benefits.  The willingness to pay for increasing carcass yield was shown to be 
statistically insignificant. A likelihood ratio (LR) test was employed to determine whether or not 
the results of the 11 WTP estimates in the interval censored regressions could be pooled together. 
The results of the LR test provides evidence to reject the null hypothesis that states the WTP can 
be pooled, thus the individual WTP values should be used.  
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The results of the dichotomous choice model with suppliers who did not use RNAi 
technology can be found in Table 4.23. On the other hand, in the willingness to pay for non-
RNAi beef steaks dichotomous choice model, all attributes were statistically significant. The 
attribute respondents were most willing to pay more to avoid RNAi beef steaks was reducing 
farmers’ time involved in labor at $3.28. The lower bound for this model was in the attribute of 
increasing carcass yield at $2.12. An LR test was used to determine if the results of the 11 WTP 
estimates could be pooled. The LR test results shows that we fail we to reject the null hypothesis 
which states the the WTP estimates can be pooled.  The pooled model premium value for this 
sequence showed a $2.82 premium by respondents.   
With the results of the two sequences, the reasons can be compared between each other. 
In the sequences, respondents showed larger willingness to pay for beef steaks when it was to 
keep beef production and processing in the United States. On the other end, respondents showed 
the smaller willingness to pay to reduce farmers’ time involved in labor.  
The results of the interval censored regression model showed to have social desirability 
bias. The results of the second dichotomous choice model, the beef steaks from non-RNAi 
sources, is the opposite of what was expected in the dichotomous choice models. As most results 
showed consumers prefer a discount on products which were derived from RNAi technology, 
consistent with the choice experiment results, the magnitudes of the WTP in the non-RNAi beef 
steaks was expected to be smaller than those of the RNAi steaks. An explanation of this could be 
respondents did not see “suppliers who did not use RNAi technology.” It cannot be specifically 
determined a particular reason of why the results were positive in the willingness to pay for non-
RNAi steaks scenario and in the WTP for RNAi scenario. 
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Table 4.22. Willingness to Pay for RNAi Steaks by Attribute 
Reason 
WTP per meal 
(USD) 
N 
Ranking 
of WTP 
Keeping beef production and processing in the U.S. 2.49 137 1 
Lowering the price paid by beef consumers 1.61 136 6 
Improving the nutrition content of beef 2.02 137 5 
Reducing use of antibiotics 1.59 137 7 
Protecting cattle from disease 2.29 136 4 
Reducing use of hormones 2.47 136 2 
Increasing overall animal health 2.44 136 3 
Reducing death in cattle 1.37 136 8 
Increasing carcass yield 0.43 136 11 
Reducing use of feed additives 1.34 136 9 
Reducing farmers’ time involved in labor 1.21 136 10 
Pooled among all attributes 1.78 1,500  
 
Table 4.23. Willingness to Pay for non-RNAi Beef Steaks by Attribute 
Reason 
WTP per meal 
(USD) 
N 
Ranking 
of WTP 
Keeping beef production and processing in the U.S. 3.21 136 2 
Lowering the price paid by beef consumers 3.04 137 4 
Improving the nutrition content of beef 2.82 136 6 
Reducing use of antibiotics 3.10 137 3 
Protecting cattle from disease 2.80 136 7 
Reducing use of hormones 2.46 136 10 
Increasing overall animal health 2.82 136 5 
Reducing death in cattle 2.72 137 8 
Increasing carcass yield 2.48 136 9 
Reducing use of feed additives 3.22 137 1 
Reducing farmers’ time involved in labor 2.40 136 11 
Pooled among all attributes 2.82 1,500  
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Chapter 5 - Duration of Consumers’ Information Consumption and 
Impact of Information Source on Consumers’ Acceptance of RNAi  
 5.1 Introduction 
With the large amount of information provided to consumers on a daily basis, it may be 
difficult for accurate messaging to reach target audiences through any kind of channel. Some 
consumers may inadvertently miss information delivered to them through various 
communication channels, such as food product labels, news stories or online articles, while some 
consumers are apathetic or passive when this kind of information is provided. Economic theory 
states that consumers seek to maximize utility with their purchasing decisions (Verbeke, 2005); 
however, consumers may behave irrationally (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). When credible 
information about food safety is absent, consumers become uncertain and incur costs for seeking 
information (Hobbs, 2004). Information search behavior is prompted by a lack of information, 
but also a desire to find information (Verbeke, 2005). In this part of the study component, the 
duration spent reading various forms of information as well as the impact of information 
treatments and articles on consumer acceptance of RNAi were analyzed. The predicted results of 
this study component were respondents more apprehensive of RNAi technology were more 
likely to spend more time reading external articles and information treatments. In comparison, 
respondents more like to accept RNAi were more likely to spend less time reading information 
treatments and external articles. In addition, consumers with certain demographic features, (e.g., 
gender, age, household with children, etc.,) will spend more time reading articles compared to 
others. With the use of Tobit models, duration of time is the dependent variable while 
information treatments, external links and RNAi acceptance and risk factors are explanatory 
variables. Results include that age is statistically significant in a full Tobit model of choice 
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experiment designs 1, 2 and 4. In choice experiment design 3, gender and income are statistically 
significant in the full Tobit model.  
 
 5.2 Literature Review 
 5.2.1 Food information and consumer information processing 
In neo-classical microeconomics, assumptions are made to maximize consumer utility by 
making optimal choices (Verbeke, 2005). The first major assumption is in regards to the access 
and availability of information (Verbeke, 2005). The second falls on the consumers’ ability and 
willingness to process information. While several credible food safety and quality indicators are 
provided by trustworthy sources, consumers encounter uncertainty and incur costs by searching 
information (Hobbs, 2004). In the realm of psychology and behavioral economics, the decisions 
made by consumers are more complex than perceived when there is not perfect information 
(Verbeke, 2005). Kahnemann and Tversky (1973) suggest that when faced with uncertainty in a 
decision-making situation, consumers do not behave in a manner to maximize expected utility. 
Further studies focus on limitations in regards to inputs, cognitive capabilities and willpower to 
engage in active reasoning (Camerer & Loewenstein, 2004). McCluskey and Swinnen (2004) 
suggest a hypothesis that consumers are imperfectly informed in cases of food safety issues. 
Dissemination of information through labeling of food serves to mitigate the problems resulting 
from information asymmetry (Lusk et al., 2004). Lusk et al. (2004) described the use of labeling 
as an effective tool to translate important information to consumers in symmetric settings.  
During market failures where asymmetric information is the main cause, solutions incorporating 
better information and transparency are reasonable (McCluskey & Swinnen, 2004).   
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 5.2.2 Uncertainty, knowledge and needs of consumers 
While consumers may face frequent instances of uncertainty in food purchasing 
decisions, firms and governmental agencies might feel inclined to provide information to 
consumers. The cost of providing this information would fall eventually on consumers. The 
information needs and information processing of an individual are closely tied with an 
individual’s knowledge base. Bettman and Park (1980) observed that consumers seek out 
information by comparing product attributes more when they have low to moderate levels of 
prior knowledge and experience rather than having the motivation or processing the information 
in the current decision moment. Lusk et al. (2004) found that previous knowledge of genetically 
modified food influenced changes in bids in an experimental auction, whereas the higher the 
subject knowledge, the smaller the bid changes. Information provided to respondents during a 
test was shown not to be as influential as prior knowledge (Gwin et al., 2012). Previous literature 
throughout the years has contradictory findings (Lusk et al., 2004; Radecki & Jaccard, 1995), but 
the consensus from these studies show that knowledge is important in the processing of 
information (Verbeke, 2005). Functional foods have been a large concern in the past decade with 
consumers as the perception of health benefits being merely a marketing ploy in the food 
industry (Verbeke, 2005). With the creation of a positive image of these foods without credible 
information, consumers questioned the potential risk and issues focusing around food safety and 
health (Verbeke, 2005).  
Government agencies have expressed interest in educating the public sector about 
biotechnology as a means to improve social welfare and reduce asymmetric information (Lusk et 
al., 2004). The costs of funding these outreach efforts to provide more information to the public 
would be passed on to consumers. 
98 
 
 5.2.3 Information search behavior 
While consumers may be provided information about food safety, they may not have a 
full comprehension of the respective subject (Verbeke, 2005). Consumers may seek out 
information if they perceive there is need for it (Verbeke, 2005). The need for information could 
be caused by uncertainty or risk about well-being could prompt the information search process 
(Aaker et al., 1992).  In today’s food and agriculture environment, consumers who encounter 
uncertainty about risk and food safety decisions make those choices based on heuristics or 
peripheral routes of information processing (Frewer et al., 1997, 2005). Another aspect of this is 
consumer apathy toward information searches. While information may be available to 
consumers, consumers neither read nor process the information provided to them (Verbeke, 
2005).  
Previous literature explained that individual personality influences the processing of 
information. Personality is defined as a particular pattern of organization that makes one person 
unique compared to others (Engel, Blackwell, & Miniard, 1995). Verbeke (2005) describes 
personalities with lower emotional stability as ones with more need for information during a 
crisis event; however, these persons are not easily identifiable through behavioral or socio-
demographic factors.  
Consumers use information from a variety of sources, (e.g., government, universities, 
physicians and dieticians, etc.,) to formulate their views of food safety (Tonsor and Wolf, 2009). 
The risk behavior of consumers is a function of their trust of entities providing risk information.  
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 5.2.4 Impact of information on willingness to pay 
Information effects have been a concern for research when observing human behavior in 
economics research (Czajkowski, Hanley, and LaRiviere, 2016). Several studies have examined 
the effects of information on willingness to pay estimates (Czajkowski, Hanley, and LaRiviere, 
2016; Fox, Hayes, and Shogren, 2002; Colson et al., 2008; Lusk et al., 2004). Czajkowski, 
Hanley, and LaRiviere (2016) estimated the impact using the method in a random utility model. 
In this particular study, it was found that information does influence consumers’ willingness to 
pay. When respondents were provided additional information and retain information by learning, 
the WTP for the good decreased (Czajkowski, Hanley, and LaRiviere, 2016). Fox, Hayes, and 
Shogren (2002) looked at the influence of positively and negatively toned information treatments 
on WTP for irradiated food. Three groups of respondents were provided information treatments. 
One group received positive information, one received negative information, and the third 
received both positive and negative. Respondents provided a positive (negative) information 
treatment provided larger (smaller) WTP values. When provided both negative and positive 
information treatments, negative treatments had a greater effect on respondents and their 
willingness to pay values decreased (Fox, Hayes, and Shogren, 2002). Lusk et al. (2004) added 
to the literature by providing one of three information treatments from the perspective of 
benefiting the environment, health, and the world.  Lusk et al. (2004) found that providing 
information treatments to people for an experimental auction for cookies with non-GMO and 
GMO ingredients, the willingness to pay varied across individuals from different countries. Few 
studies have examined the duration spent on information treatments in the realm of agricultural 
economics. This study aims to add to the literature by providing insight about the impact of the 
time respondents spend reading information treatments. 
100 
 
5.3 Methods 
To assess the use of information in this study, different external articles and information 
treatments were presented to respondents. The eight articles were selected after searching 
through popular online media and scientific articles about RNAi technology. The information 
treatments were paragraphs derived from four external articles. Two external articles and one 
information treatment was randomly provided to respondents before the choice experiment 
scenarios in the designs where RNAi use was an attribute of the beef steak products. In the one 
choice experiment design where RNAi use was not an attribute, design 3, the external articles 
and information treatment was presented to respondents after completing the choice experiment 
scenarios. The title of the articles and sources were provided in hyperlinks. Respondents had the 
opportunities to click the hyperlinks and read the articles before returning back to the survey. 
The outline of the eight articles can be found in Table 5.1. Using respondents’ time between 
entering the choice experiment information and the first choice experiment question in choice 
experiments designs 1, 2 and 4, a variable for duration was created. In choice experiment design 
3, respondents were presented a similar format of information treatments and external articles yet 
after the set of choice experiment questions were answered due to RNAi use not being an 
attribute of the beef steaks. The time after the last choice experiment and the first RNAi-related 
Likert-scale question was used for the duration variable.  
The acceptance level of RNAi by consumers was compared to the duration of time spent 
with RNAi-related information. Using the answers provided in the Likert-scale questions, a 
model was employed to determine if a relationship existed between acceptance of RNAi and 
duration of time.  
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Table 5.1. Outline of External Articles 
Article Title Source URL 
1 Genetic Weapon Against 
Insect Raises Hope and Fear 
in Farming 
The New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2014
/01/28/business/energy-
environment/genetic-weapon-
against-insects-raises-hope-
and-fear-in-
farming.html?_r=0 
2 The Next Great GMO 
Debate 
MIT Technology 
Review 
http://www.technologyreview.
com/featuredstory/540136/the
-next-great-gmo-debate/ 
3 Transgenic Pigs Resistant to 
Foot-and-Mouth Disease 
Columbia University 
Virology Course 
Blog 
http://www.virology.ws/2015/
07/23/transgenic-pigs-
resistant-to-foot-and-mouth-
disease/ 
4 Improving Crops with RNAi The Scientist http://www.the-
scientist.com/?articles.view/ar
ticleNo/43020/title/Improving
-Crops-with-RNAi/ 
5 New Monsanto Spray Kills 
Bugs by Messing With 
Their Genes 
Mother Jones http://www.motherjones.com/
tom-philpott/2015/08/coming-
farm-field-near-you-gene-
silencing-pesticides-RNA-
RNAi 
6 Developing Disease-
Resistant Poultry May Be 
Solution for Multiple Virus 
Issues 
University of 
Georgia’s UGA 
Today 
http://news.uga.edu/releases/a
rticle/developing-disease-
resistant-poultry-0615/ 
7 RNAi for Crop 
Improvement 
International Service 
for the Acquisition of 
Agri-Biotech 
Applications 
https://isaaa.org/resources/pub
lications/pocketk/34/default.as
p 
8 Advocacy Groups Urges 
Caution Over Agricultural 
RNAi 
Danforth Plant 
Science Center 
https://www.danforthcenter.or
g/news-media/news-
releases/news-
item/(genomeweb)-advocacy-
group-urges-caution-over-
agricultural-rnai 
 
To analyze the impact of RNAi information on respondents, Tobit models were 
employed. With the duration of time spent on external articles as the endogenous variable, 
several models were conducted using socio-demographic factors as well as external links and 
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information presented. Only seven of the eight articles and three of the four information 
treatments were used in the models. The last external article and information treatment were left 
out to avoid multicollinearity problems. Greene (2003) presents a general Tobit model equation, 
which can be expressed as: 
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖
′ 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖 
𝑦𝑖 = 0  if 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 0, 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖
∗ if 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≥ 0, 
(5.1) 
Where yi represents the optimal level of the ith consumer. The model had a lower bound of zero, 
but no upper bound due to time being a continuous variable for each respondent. 
To determine the impact of information on the acceptance of RNAi technology, a Tobit 
regression model was conducted. The values of the Likert-scale questions were highly correlated 
to each other. To use the responses of the Likert-scale questions regarding RNAi acceptance, the 
values were collapsed to fewer variables through factor analysis.  Models were employed to 
explain the variation in the duration of reading articles through the use of acceptance factor(s) as 
independent variable(s). The same procedure was followed for risk perception of RNAi 
technology. A Tobit model was employed to explain the variation of duration by risk factors. 
 
 5.4 Results 
 5.4.1 Duration of time by consumer 
Summary statistics for duration can be found in Table 5.2. On average, respondents spent 
81.94 seconds in designs 1, 2 and 4 and 54.95 seconds in design 3. Econometric models were 
constructed using duration as the dependent variable. With the dependent variable being 
continuous, Tobit models were utilized in regression efforts. Three models were designed for 
103 
each of the two duration times. These models included socio-demographics, information 
treatments, and RNAi external links as the exogenous variables, respectively. The results of the 
specified Tobit model can be found in Table 5.3 and Table 5.5. 
Table 5.2. Summary Statistics for Duration 
Variable N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Duration for Designs 1, 2 and 4 2,250 81.94 3.64 8,332.34 
Duration for Design 3 750 54.95 3.31 5,882.86 
Note: Means, maximums, and minimums units are seconds. 
 
Correlation and multicollinearity tests were conducted to determine if independent 
variables had correlation with each other. A majority of the variables had no strong relationship 
with another except for education and income. Due to this, the education variable was taken out 
of the Tobit models. Full Tobit models were employed using the factors listed above. In 
conjunction with the full Tobit models, joint tests were conducted to determine if the coefficient 
on the independent variables jointly equal zero. Table 5.4 and Table 5.6 provide results of these 
joint tests. Because there is no statistical significance found in the tests for designs 1, 2 and 3, we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis which states that the sum of the coefficients on the independent 
variables equals zero. It could be stated that socioeconomic and demographic factors of 
respondents, the information treatment and the external links presented to respondents are not 
correlated with the amount of time spent reading information about RNAi technology. However, 
in design 3, this is not the case. The joint test provides statistical evidence that the sum of the 
coefficients on socio-demographic variables does equal zero meaning they are unique and 
independent. 
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Table 5.3. Full Tobit Regression Results on Duration of Time on External Links for 
Choice Experiments Designs 1, 2 and 4 
Variable N Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 2,250 108.734* 40.289 
Age 2,250 0.948* 0.407 
Female 2,250 -4.974 10.928 
Income 2,250 -4.336 3.234 
Adults 2,250 -5.193 5.428 
Children 2,250 -3.960 5.116 
News Source: TV 2,250 -14.253 11.228 
Race: White 2,250 -16.278 12.839 
Food Source: Supermarket 2,250 -26.993 14.200 
Groundbeef Consumption 2,250 5.653 6.356 
Info. Treatment: Basic and No Bias 2,250 -2.669 14.972 
Info. Treatment: Historical 2,250 -5.395 14.945 
Info. Treatment: Promising 2,250 -7.775 14.878 
External Article 1 2,250 -14.833 16.179 
External Article 2 2,250 1.006 16.346 
External Article 3 2,250 -15.429 15.876 
External Article 4 2,250 1.268 16.398 
External Article 5 2,250 -7.158 15.961 
External Article 6 2,250 -14.859 15.983 
External Article 7 2,250 12.199 16.367 
Sigma 2,250 250.158* 3.729 
Note:* indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level or higher 
 
 
Table 5.4. Joint Tests on Variables Used in Full Tobit Regression Results on Duration of 
Time on External Links for Choice Experiments Designs 1, 2 and 4 
Label Type Statistic P-value 
Age = 0, Female = 0, Income = 0, Adults = 0, Children = 0, 
Race: White=0, TV=0,  Supermarket=0, Groundbeef 
Consumption = 0 
Wald 15.94 0.0681 
Info. Treatment 1 = 0, Info. Treatment 2 = 0, Info. Treatment 3 = 
0 
Wald 0.31 0.9588 
CE Link 1 = 0, CE Link 2 = 0, CE Link 3 = 0, CE Link 4 = 0, CE 
Link 5 = 0, CE Link 6 = 0, CE Link 7 = 0 
Wald 5.47 0.6032 
Note:* indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level or higher 
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Table 5.5. Full Tobit Regression Results on Duration of Time on External Links for Choice 
Experiments Design 3 
Variable N Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 750 -65.917 62.867 
Age 750 0.693 0.607 
Female 750 -27.285 16.506 
Income 750 -8.438 5.083 
Adults 750 40.358* 8.760 
Children 750 1.483 7.845 
News Source: TV 750 -10.190 16.990 
Race: White 750 -30.731 19.412 
Food Source: Supermarket 750 4.971 20.357 
Groundbeef Consumption 750 12.756 10.047 
Information Treatment: Basic and No Bias 750 -3.008 22.908 
Information Treatment: Historical 750 27.469 22.806 
Information Treatment: Promising 750 23.793 23.042 
External Article 1 750 8.972 25.022 
External Article 2 750 -4.753 24.970 
External Article 3 750 -6.206 25.220 
External Article 4 750 -9.022 23.601 
External Article 5 750 7.629 24.293 
External Article 6 750 31.016 24.674 
External Article 7 750 32.970 24.670 
Sigma 750 216.902* 5.600 
Note:* indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level or higher 
 
Table 5.6. Joint Tests on Variables Used in Full Tobit Regression Results on Duration of 
Time on External Links for Choice Experiments Design 3 
Label Type Statistic P-value 
Age = 0, Female = 0, Income = 0, Adults = 0, Children = 0, Race: 
White=0, TV=0,  Supermarket=0, Groundbeef Consumption = 0 
Wald 31.12* 0.003 
Info. Treatment 1 = 0, Info. Treatment 2 = 0, Info. Treatment 3 = 
0 
Wald 2.92 0.4037 
CE Link 1 = 0, CE Link 2 = 0, CE Link 3 = 0, CE Link 4 = 0, CE 
Link 5 = 0, CE Link 6 = 0, CE Link 7 = 0 
Wald 5.54 0.5941 
Note:* indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level or higher 
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 5.4.2 Impact of information 
Using the results of the Likert-scale questions, the impact of the information treatments 
provided to respondents was analyzed. To observe if there is an influence between information 
treatment presented and the responses to Likert-scale RNAi questions, Tobit models were used to 
estimate the relationship.  
In Question 27 of the survey, respondents were asked about their agreement with eating 
RNAi beef products, purchasing RNAi beef products, and supporting the use of RNAi 
technology in food production. Through factor analysis, the acceptance variables were collapsed 
to one factor. The results of these Tobit models can be found in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8. The 
independent variable for each model was not statistically significant; however, the sign of the 
coefficient matched the predicted results. If respondents already had prior knowledge of RNAi 
technology or had developed their perception of the technology, then they may have not wanted 
to spend time to find more information. This was not explored due to the fact that RNAi 
technology is a new development, and the number of respondents who may have had previous 
knowledge of the technology would be relatively small. As well, the survey was developed to 
assess perceptions and acceptance of RNAi technology and not capture prior knowledge or pre-
survey perceptions. 
Table 5.7. Regression Results on Duration of Time on Acceptance Factor – Designs 1, 2 
and 4 
Variable 
N Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 2,250 81.896* 5.297 
Acceptance Factor 2,250 -6.548 -5.300 
Sigma 2,250 251.273* 3.745 
Note:* indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level or higher 
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Table 5.8. Regression Results on Duration of Time on Acceptance Factor  - Design 3 
Variable 
N Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 750 55.052* 8.132 
Acceptance Factor 750 -4.980 8.123 
Sigma 750 222.669* 38.73 
Note:* indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level or higher 
 
In Question 30 of the survey, respondents were asked about their agreement with the 
perception of concern RNAi technology had to them, their families and human health. Using 
factor analysis, these variables were collapsed down to two factors. The statements of “My 
family and I could be exposed to great risks from RNAi technology in beef production” and “The 
side-effects from eating RNAi technology in beef production are largely unknown” loaded on the 
first factor. The first factor can be labeled as personal concern. The statements of “RNAi 
technology in beef production will not pose risks to my family and me” and “There is little 
danger that RNAi technology in beef production will result in new disease for humans” loaded 
on the second factor. This factor can be identified as general concern. The results of the Tobit 
models can be found in Table 5.9 and Table 5.10. Both factors were significant in choice 
experiment designs 1, 2 and 4. If respondents’ risk perception of RNAi was higher, they spent 
more time reading external articles and the information treatment. For choice experiment design 
3, respondents were not given information treatments and external articles until all scenarios 
were finished due to beef steaks only having antibiotic use and USDA grade attributes. 
Respondents in the three remaining designs had more exposure to RNAi technology in the 
scenarios, which may explain the larger magnitudes and significance. 
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Table 5.9. Regression Results on Duration of Time on Risk Factors - Designs 1, 2 and 4 
Variable N Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 2,250 81.911* 5.289 
Personal Concern Factor 2,250 12.200* 5.247 
General Concern Factor 2,250 10.855* 5.296 
Sigma 2,250 250.833* 3.739 
Note:* indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level or higher 
 
Table 5.10. Regression Results on Duration of Time on Risk Factors  - Design 3 
Variable N Estimate Standard Error 
Intercept 750 54.815* 8.136 
Personal Concern Factor 750 8.069 8.356 
General Concern Factor 750 2.513 8.123 
Sigma 750 222.567* 5.747 
Note:* indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level or higher 
 
  
109 
Chapter 6 - Conclusions and Implications  
 6.1 Summary of Results 
The beef sector in the United States will continue to be shaped by the preferences of 
consumers and the practices of producers. Implementing new practices is dependent on the 
acceptance and willingness to pay by consumers for products derived from these production 
practices as well as the costs incurred by farmers and ranchers. 
The research in this thesis measures consumer acceptance and WTP for beef steaks 
utilizing RNAi technology compared to conventional-raised beef. A national consumer survey 
was completed online by 3,000 respondents, representing a sample of the U.S. population. Data 
from the choice experiment scenarios and dichotomous choice sequences provide a better 
understanding of WTP for RNAi use in beef steaks while Likert-scale questions yielded insight 
into general RNAi technology acceptance.  
In Chapter 3, consumer acceptance was observed through the use of Likert-scale 
questions. The results of these analyses showed a mixed acceptance of RNAi. Respondents were 
asked to rate their agreement about their willingness to eat RNAi beef products, willingness to 
purchase RNAi beef products, and overall support of RNAi technology in food production. 
Results showed that the means of the three statements were generally around the middle 
indicating a split in acceptance. If RNAi were to be used for a specific purpose, respondents 
would prefer that the technology be used to protect cattle from disease. In addition, respondents 
were asked to rate their concern of RNAi through four statements about risks associated with the 
technology. The results yield a mean toward the middle for the two statements putting RNAi in a 
positive framework. Yet, the statements in a negative light yielded higher concerns from 
respondents. For consumers to accept RNAi technology, the risks associated with the technology 
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as well as benefits it brings, especially animal agriculture, should be noted. A majority of 
respondents noted food safety as the main concern in regards to beef and production method. 
With that noted, food safety information should be supplied to consumers. Additionally, in 
Chapter 3, adoption of new beef technologies was examined using the Food Technology 
Neophobia Scale (FTNS). The FTNS yielded results that split the adopting of beef technology 
into two groupings. One of these factors can be used to describe human effects while the other 
factor describes the product and food system effects. Due to these results, the two factors were 
included in various empirical models in this study.  
In Chapter 4, consumer WTP was estimated through the use of choice experiment 
scenarios and double-bounded dichotomous choice sequences. Based on the choice experiment 
results, there appears to be a potential market for beef steaks using RNAi technology. In the 
specific choice experiment designs, varying attributes of beef steaks were examined. These 
included price, RNAi use, antibiotic use, and USDA grade. Along the lines of the choice 
experiment, label setting and label wording also were analyzed. In a general sense, cases where 
the wording for “free and used,” and “free and no claim,” showed respondents would want a 
discount for products labeled with RNAi use. On the other hand, label wording with “used, no 
claim” showed respondents wanted to pay a premium for products with no claim about RNAi 
use. In some cases of RNAi use and antibiotic use in beef steaks, the magnitudes of the point 
estimates for RNAi are smaller than those for antibiotic, which suggests respondents would want 
to avoid products labeled with antibiotic use more than RNAi. Using the point estimates of the 
choice experiment designs with the delta method, the lower and upper bound for willingness to 
pay for beef steaks was calculated. In most cases, consumers would be willing to pay a discount 
for products with RNAi use. As for the other attributes, the results for antibiotic use were similar 
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to RNAi use. Under the label wording of “free, used” and “free, no claim,” respondents wanted a 
discount for products labeled with antibiotic use. For a large majority of the designs with USDA 
grade, respondents preferred choice steaks over select. In all the cases in the choice experiment 
questions, respondents preferred the two beef steaks over opting out of either steak option. The 
way that RNAi use will be labeled in the future in unknown, if it is to be implemented in the 
food sector. By varying the label wording among the different schemes as well as label approval, 
this research provides potential scenarios of what may happen in the marketplace. When RNAi 
use and other attributes, such as antibiotic use, are labeled in beef products, the WTP by 
consumers changes.   
Through the dichotomous choice sequences, the premium for production benefits could 
be examined. The premium was the largest in magnitude for restaurants who supplied beef steaks 
using RNAi technology for the reason of keeping beef production in the United States. The 
second and third largest willingness to pay magnitudes were for the reasons of protecting cattle 
from disease and improving overall animal health. In the scenario where beef was from non-
RNAi sources, the magnitude of the premium was higher for restaurants who did not supply beef 
steaks due to reducing the use of hormones. In addition, keeping beef production in the United 
States and reducing the use of antibiotics were second and third, respectively. It was predicted 
that the WTP estimates in this non-RNAi source scenario would be smaller than those of the beef 
steaks from suppliers who did utilize RNAi technology. The results of these models suggest that 
stating the benefits of supporting animal health will result in consumers willing to pay premiums. 
In Chapter 5, the impact and use of information was observed. Respondents were given 
one of four information treatments from different sources as well as two of eight links to external 
articles that varied in tone and viewpoint about RNAi technology. Respondents had the ability to 
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click on the links provided and utilize the articles to gather more information before providing 
responses to choice experiment scenarios. A base information treatment was given to all 
respondents to briefly describe how the technology works along with the information treatment. 
Given the differences in information treatment and articles provided to respondents, the 
influence of that information on respondents’ answers to Likert-scale questions was analyzed. 
The results of these Tobit models found that socio-demographic factors, presentation of external 
articles, and information treatment presented did not affect the duration of time spent on the 
external articles. Along the lines of the external links provided to respondents, models were 
employed to observe if the articles presented influenced the acceptance of RNAi technology. The 
results of the models showed statistical insignificance for the explanatory variables. 
Additionally, Tobit models were used to see if duration could be explained by respondents 
concern over RNAi technology. The values of the four concern Likert-scale statements were 
collapsed down to two risk factors. The results showed statistically significance on the 
explanatory variables for the model with the duration of choice experiment design 1, 2 and 4 as 
the dependent variable. The two risk factors had a positive coefficient, meaning the higher the 
rating they provided on the concern Likert-scale statements, the longer time they spent reading 
the information treatment and external articles provided to them. With the relatively short time 
respondents spent on the information provided to them, it should be noted that the way 
information is presented and the amount should be considered when implementing the 
technology in the food industry. 
The results of this study adds to the literature through the topics of RNAi, labeling 
schemes, and duration of information consumption. Acceptance of RNAi is mixed among 
consumers. The major concern of respondents is the side effects of consuming beef products 
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derived from RNAi technology. Consumers should be given full information about the benefits 
and costs of the technology as to have more complete information during purchasing decisions. 
In regards to willingness to pay, consumers require a discount for beef steaks derived from RNAi 
technology. When other controversial attributes are in question in these products, such as 
antibiotic use, a potential market share exists for products with a RNAi label. Depending on the 
wording scheme used and the other attributes labeled, respondents’ willingness to pay will 
change. In future, the way RNAi technology is labeled in food products matters. In order to have 
a market share, the way in which the technology is labeled should be approached cautiously. 
Using “free of RNAi use” may create food stigmas in the mind of consumers. Lastly, with 
information consumption, the more concerned consumers are about RNAi technology, the longer 
amount of time they will spend seeking information about RNAi technology.    
 
 6.2 Limitations 
 6.2.1 Online Consumer Survey 
One limitation was caused by lack of communication with the survey developers. One 
intended data variable desired for collection in the survey administration was the use of the two 
articles. It was intended for a variable to capture if respondents clicked on the external articles 
presented to them. The other was the duration on those articles if respondents decided to click on 
the links provided and assess the information provide in the articles. These variables could have 
been used in the analysis of consumer use and impact of information whereas the use of one 
articles or sources of information may have been utilized more than others. Through the 
separation of the articles being presented to respondent versus actually clicking on them may 
have warranted different results in the analysis. Instead, the total duration spent between the 
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beginning and end of the choice experiment in designs 1, 2 and 4 as well as post-choice 
experiment design 3 and before Likert-scale questions were used as a proxy for the duration of 
time spent on external articles. 
   
 6.2.2 Label Wording 
 It was the intention of this research to use a common labeling scheme for choice 
experiment design 1.  In this particular design, the beef steaks contained RNAi use and antibiotic 
use attributes. Respondents should have seen a common labeling scheme of “free or used,” 
“used, no claim,” or “free or no claim” for both two beef steak attributes. In the administering of 
the survey, the attributes were given a label wording scheme randomly and independently rather 
than a random and common scheme. For example, respondents may have seen “free or used” for 
antibiotic use while RNAi use could have been labeled as “used or no claim.” While the intended 
procedure was not followed, there were limited instances when respondents were given a 
common label wording for both attributes. Albeit, due to the two different label wording 
schemes, testing for common labeling and mixed labeling could be employed. In the mixed label 
case, hypothetically, it would be more likely that one of the attributes contained in the choice 
experiment steaks, antibiotic use and RNAi use, would have a different labeling scheme 
compared to the other.   
  
 6.2.3 Dichotomous Choice and Choice Experiment Results 
 Another limitation was the hypothetical bias present in the dichotomous choice sequences 
and choice experiment models. In the dichotomous choice sequence, the respondents were asked 
whether or not they would purchase beef steaks from a restaurant with suppliers who did not 
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utilize RNAi technology compared to a restaurant that did. The results of these models were 
expected to have all smaller magnitudes of the coefficients rather than larger magnitudes. 
Although the specific reason why the results of the non-RNAi source suppliers were larger, there 
is speculation of why the current results are inconsistent. In the willingness to pay for non-RNAi 
steaks scenario, the phrasing of the question may have caused some confusion with respondents 
as to the intention of why restaurants sourced beef steaks that did not utilize RNAi technology. 
Another alternative is that respondents may have felt socially responsible when given admirable 
qualities in the scenario. 
 In the choice experiment, hypothetical bias may exist in the willingness to pay estimates. 
Even with the use of a cheap talk script, the WTP estimated by respondents may be overstated 
given the hypothetical study and products. In future research in this subject area, two groups of 
respondents could be used – one given the cheap talk script and one without. Using this 
approach, the WTP estimates can be compared to each other to check if the cheap talk script had 
an impact on surveyor responses.  
 
 6.3 Future Research 
This study only looked at acceptance and willingness to pay for RNA interference 
technology within the United States. As the global population increases, much of the growth will 
occur in developing countries where modern agricultural technologies are not heavily utilized as 
they are in developed countries. International consumers may have different perceptions and 
concerns for the technology being used within their own countries. In addition, international 
trade and policy must also be considered. While U.S. consumers may be accepting of the 
technology, international consumers may be apprehensive of the technology resulting in the 
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implementation of policies to design the importation of products using ingredients derived from 
RNAi technology. 
While this study focused on consumer acceptance, another aspect to consider is producer 
acceptance. It would be interesting to analyze and determine the acceptance of RNAi technology 
with livestock producers and other key players in the supply chain, such as wholesalers and 
retailers. Previous studies have shown that consumers are less likely to accept genetically 
engineered fresh foods and meat products (Lusk, McFadden, and Rickard, 2015). Along the 
terms of the consumer side of the food industry, there have been few studies about consumer 
acceptance of RNAi technology in fruits, vegetables and processed foods. Future studies could 
investigate more into the application of RNAi technology in different livestock species or 
different types of food.  
Information is limited about the human health effects of consuming meat or beef products 
utilizing RNAi technology. Past studies have explored the use of RNAi technology in crops. If 
significant studies provide results of the impact of these types of products on human health, 
further consumer surveys can employ this information in assessing willingness to pay and 
acceptance of RNAi in the food sector.  
In regards to information processing and knowledge, a set of questions could have been 
asked in a way to assess the retention of RNAi information on respondents. If respondents were 
asked questions in which they would have to recall the information provided to them in the 
external links or information treatments, it may have provided a way to assess the validity of 
impact of the RNAi information provided to respondents in the survey. In that mindset, an 
analysis could have been conducted to see if a correlation of duration and consumer knowledge 
exist. 
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Appendix A - Survey Instrument 
Research on food shopping behavior 
This is a short survey designed to obtain important information from U.S. consumers. This 
project is being conducted by Kansas State University faculty and graduate students. 
We want to emphasize that your participation in this survey is entirely voluntary and all your 
responses will be kept in strict confidence. Typical demographic questions are included to ensure 
our sample is representative of U.S. consumers and will remain strictly confidential. If you wish 
to comment on any questions, please feel free to do so at the end of the survey. 
We very much appreciate your assistance with this important project and look forward to 
receiving your completed survey. If you have any questions or comments regarding this survey, 
please feel free to contact Dr. Glynn Tonsor by email (gtonsor@ksu.edu) or by phone (785-532-
1518). 
Consumer Survey 
1. Please indicate your gender: (check one) 
a. Male 
b. Female 
 
2. What is your present age?  
a. ___ years old. (fill-in the blank) 
 
3. The best description of the highest degree education you obtained is: 
a. Did not graduate from high school 
b. Graduated from high school 
c. Associate’s or trade degree earned 
d. Bachelor’s college degree earned 
e. Graduate or advanced college degree earned 
 
4. What best describes your race? 
a. American Indian 
b. Asian or Pacific Islander 
c. Black or African American 
d. Mexican or Latino 
e. White or Caucasian 
f. Other (please describe): __________ 
 
5. Your primary state of residence is: _______________. (drop-down menu of 50 states) 
 
6. How many adults (18 years or older), including yourself, live in your household? ___ 
(fill-in the blank) 
 
7. How many children under the age of 18 live in your household? _____ (fill-in the blank) 
 
8. Your annual, pre-tax household income is: 
a. Less than $25,000 
b. $25,000-$49,999 
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c. $50,000-$74,999 
d. $75,000-$99,999 
e. $100,000-$124,999 
f. $125,000-$149,999 
g. $150,000-$174,999 
h. $175,000 or more 
 
9. How much would you estimate your household spends each week for total food 
consumption including eating at home, in restaurants, take-out orders, etc.? $______ 
(Please provide your best estimate.) 
 
10. What is your primary source for news stories and current events? 
a. Physical newspapers 
b. Online newspapers 
c. Popular magazines 
d. Social media 
e. Radio broadcast 
f. TV broadcast 
g. Other (please describe): ___________________ 
 
11. Approximately, how often does your household consume the following products? 
Matrix rows: 
Ground beef or hamburger 
Steak 
Chicken 
Pork 
Fish 
Matrix columns: 
a. Never 
b. Less than once a week 
c. About once a week 
d. 3-4 times a week 
e. At least every day of the week 
 
12. Do you consider yourself a vegetarian or vegan? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
i. Do you most closely associate yourself with being: 
a. Vegetarian 
b. Vegan 
c. Both 
 
13. Consumers purchase food from many sources. What best describes where you typically 
purchase beef products for at-home consumption? 
a. Supermarket retailer (e.g. Wal-Mart, Kroger, Safeway) 
b. Targeted retailer (e.g. Whole Foods, Trader Joe’s) 
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c. Convenience store (e.g. 7-Eleven) 
d. Farmers’ market 
e. Direct from a farmer 
f. Other (please describe): ________________ 
 
14. Have you ever purchased the following beef products? 
Matrix rows: 
Organic beef steak 
Natural beef steak 
Animal welfare assured beef steak 
Grass-fed beef steak 
Antibiotic-free beef steak 
Hormone-free beef steak 
USDA Choice beef steak 
USDA Select beef steak 
Matrix columns: 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. I Don’t Know 
 
15. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reports the average price of beef steaks in November 
of 2015 was $7.79. What is the maximum price you would pay for a one pound, boneless 
beef steak possessing the following labels? 
Matrix rows: 
Organic 
Natural 
Animal welfare assured 
Grass-fed 
Antibiotic-free 
Hormone-free 
USDA Choice 
USDA Select 
Matrix columns: 
a. $0 
b. $0.01-$2.00 
c. $2.01-$4.00 
d. $4.01-$6.00 
e. $6.01-$8.00 
f. $8.01-$10.00 
g. $10.01-$12.00 
h. $12.01-$14.00 
i. $14.01-$16.00 
j. Over $16.00  
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16. How concerned are you about the following attributes of beef and methods of 
production? 
Matrix rows: 
Animal welfare (well-being of cattle used in beef production) 
Food safety (eating the beef will not make you sick) 
Price (the price you pay) 
Taste (the flavor of the beef in your mouth) 
Naturalness (made without modern food technologies and ingredients) 
Antibiotic use (information on whether cattle received antibiotics or not) 
Hormone use (information on whether cattle received hormones or not) 
Labeling of beef products (information on production practices used) 
Matrix columns of: 
NOT AT ALL CONCERNED 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 VERY CONCERNED 
  
17. What portion of the beef cattle produced in the U.S. do you think are given antibiotics? 
a. 10% or less  
b. 11-30% 
c. 31-50% 
d. 51-70% 
e. 71-90% 
f. 91% or more  
 
18. What portion of the beef produced in the U.S. do you think are graded USDA Choice? 
a. 10% or less  
b. 11-30% 
c. 31-50% 
d. 51-70% 
e. 71-90% 
f. 91% or more  
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Information Treatments (Statements and Definition of Attributes); Cheap Talk Script 
The next portion of this survey presents you with multiple different sets of hypothetical pairs of 
beef steaks available for purchase in a retail store where you typically shop. All products have 
been USDA inspected and are of the same size and weight. Prices vary for each product and are 
all in $/lb. units. Besides the attributes listed below, each beef steak possesses the same 
characteristics (e.g., similar color, freshness, packaging date, etc.) For each pair of beef steaks, 
please select the one you would purchase or neither if you would not purchase either product. 
For your information in interpreting alternative steaks note: 
 
Antibiotic Use: 
 Used means the product was produced utilizing antibiotics. 
 Free means the product was produced without utilizing antibiotics. 
 No claim means that no claims on antibiotic use are being made. 
 
USDA Grade is the evaluation of the meat quality given by the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
where: 
 Choice means the beef steak is high quality and will be very tender, juicy, and flavorful.  
 Select means the beef steak is very uniform in quality, but may lack some of the juiciness 
and flavor of higher grades. 
 
RNAi Use: 
 Used means the product was produced utilizing RNAi technology. 
 Free means the product was produced not utilizing RNAi technology. 
 No claim means that no claims on RNAi use are being made. 
 
Suppose the Food and Drug Administration has given {no approval/approval/approval with 
mandatory labeling} for the following beef steaks.  
 
RNA interference (RNAi for short) is a natural process of gene silencing in cells – think of it as a 
genetic switch that when turned off, tells the body to stop making a certain protein. {Info 
Treatment}. For more information on RNAi, please review the following resources: 
 
Title 1 (Source 1)  
Title 2 (Source 2) 
 
Please answer the following questions. The experience from previous similar surveys is that 
people often state a higher willingness to pay than what one actually is willing to pay for the 
good.  It is important that you make your selections like you would if you were actually facing 
these choices in your retail purchase decisions, noting that allocation of funds to purchase beef 
steak means you will have less money available for other purchases.   
19. CE Scenario #1 
20. CE Scenario #2 
21. CE Scenario #3 
22. CE Scenario #4 
23. CE Scenario #5 
24. CE Scenario #6 
25. CE Scenario #7 (if applicable) 
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26. If given the opportunity involving real money, how certain are you in the selections you 
indicated previously? Please select one number on the certainty scale below: 
VERY UNCERTAIN 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9 – 10 VERY CERTAIN 
 
{only shown in given CE design 3} RNA interference (RNAi for short) is a natural process of 
gene silencing in cells – think of it as a genetic switch that when turned off, tells the body to stop 
making a certain protein. {Info Treatment}. For more information on RNAi, please review the 
following resources: 
 
Title 1 (Source 1)  
Title 2 (Source 2){/only shown in given CE design 3} 
 
27. Please consider the following statements: 
Matrix rows: 
I am willing to eat beef products produced with the use of RNAi technology. 
I am willing to purchase beef products produced with the use of RNAi technology. 
In general, I support the use of RNAi technology in beef production. 
Matrix columns of:  
STRONGLY DISAGREE 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 STRONGLY AGREE 
 
28. Based on what you learned about RNAi, what is your impression or expectation of this 
technology in the beef industry? 
Matrix rows: 
Impact on health of beef cattle 
Impact on production costs 
Impact on price paid by consumers 
Impact on taste of beef products 
Impact on human health from beef consumption 
Matrix columns of: 
STRONGLY NEGATIVE 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 STRONGLY POSITIVE 
 
29. What is your opinion on new technologies being implemented into the U.S. beef industry 
system? 
Matrix rows: 
New beef technologies are something I am uncertain about. 
New beef products are not healthier than traditional beef products. 
The benefits of new beef technologies are often grossly overstated. 
There are plenty of tasty beef products around so we do not need to use new beef 
technologies to produce more. 
New beef technologies decrease the natural quality of beef products. 
New beef technologies are unlikely to have long-term negative human health effects. 
New beef technologies give people more control over their beef product choices. 
New beef products using new technologies can help people have a balanced diet. 
New technologies in beef may have long-term negative environmental effects. 
It can be risky to switch to new beef technologies too quickly. 
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Society should not depend heavily on new technologies in the beef industry to solve its food 
problems. 
There is no sense trying out high-tech beef products because the ones I eat are already good 
enough. 
The media usually provides a balanced and unbiased view of new beef technologies 
Matrix columns of: 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 STRONGLY AGREE 
 
30. Please indicate your agreement with the following statements. 
Matrix rows: 
RNAi technology in beef production will not pose risks to my family and me. 
My family and I could be exposed to great risks from RNAi technology in beef production. 
The side-effects from eating RNAi technology in beef production are largely unknown. 
There is little danger that RNAi technology in beef production will results in new disease for 
humans. 
Matrix columns of: 
STRONGLY DISAGREE 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 STRONGLY AGREE 
 
31. What best describes your desirability of adopting RNAi technology in the beef industry 
for the following purposes or outcomes? 
Matrix rows: 
Keep beef production and processing in the U.S. 
Lower the price paid by beef consumers 
Improve the nutritional content of beef 
Reduce use of antibiotics 
Protect cattle from disease 
Reduce use of hormones 
Increase overall animal health 
Reduce death in cattle 
Increase carcass yield (the amount of meat produced per head) 
Reduce use of feed additives 
Reduce farmers’ time involved in labor 
Matrix columns of: VERY UNDESIRABLE 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 VERY 
DESIRABLE 
 
32. Please rank how you would like improvements in QUALITYW to be achieved. (1 = most 
favored, 5 = least favored) 
a. Change in magnitude and/or type of livestock feed additives used 
b. Change in magnitude and/or type of antibiotics used 
c. Change in magnitude and/or type of vaccines used 
d. Change in magnitude and/or type of genetic technology used 
e. Change in magnitude and/or type of RNAi technology used 
i. In your own words, please describe why you ranked RNAi technology as #? 
 
33. Suppose a dine-in restaurant claims that 100% of its beef steaks are purchased from 
suppliers who use RNAi technology for the purpose of QUALITYY. Would you be 
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willing to pay $X more for a beef steak meal from that restaurant compared to one from 
an alternative restaurant? 
a. Yes, I would pay $X more 
b. No, I would not pay $X more 
i. If Yes, repeat question and answers, but change X to X*2 
ii. If No, repeat question and answers, but change X to X/2  
 
34. Suppose a dine-in restaurant claims that 100% of its beef steaks are purchased from 
suppliers who do not use RNAi technology for the purpose of QUALITYZ. Would you 
be willing to pay $Y more for a beef steak meal from that restaurant compared to one 
from an alternative restaurant? 
a. Yes, I would pay $Y more  
b. No, I would not pay $Y more 
i. If Yes, repeat question and answers, but change X to X*2 
ii. If No, repeat question and answers, but change X to X/2  
 
Thank you for your time in completing this survey. Your input will strengthen research and help 
obtain more accurate conclusions. If you wish to add any comments, please feel free to do so 
here:   
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Appendix B - Survey Designs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Design of Choice Experiment Designs 1, 2 and 3. 
 
Option A Option B 
Observations Price Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Price Attribute 1 Attribute 2 
1 3 1 1 3 0 1 
2 3 0 0 2 1 0 
3 2 1 0 3 1 0 
4 2 0 0 2 0 1 
5 2 0 1 1 0 0 
6 1 0 1 3 1 1 
7 1 0 0 3 0 0 
8 1 1 1 2 0 0 
9 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Notes: Observations 3 and 7 were dropped because the same levels for each non-price attribute are 
used. 
Design 1 – attribute 1: RNAi Use; attribute 2: Antibiotic Use.  
Design 2 – attribute 1: RNAi Use; attribute 2: USDA Grade. 
Design 3 – attribute 1: Antibiotic Use; attribute 2: USDA Grade. 
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Design of Choice Experiment Design 4. 
 Option A Option B 
Observations Price RNAi Use Price RNAi Use 
1 3 0 3 0 
2 3 0 2 1 
3 3 1 1 1 
4 2 1 3 1 
5 2 0 1 0 
6 1 1 2 0 
7 1 0 1 1 
Note: Observation 1 was dropped because the same price and attribute levels are used. 
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Appendix C - Summary Statistics 
Summary Statics for Variables 
Variable Description 
Mean or 
Frequency 
Std. 
Dev. 
Gender 1 if individual is female, 0 otherwise 
Male 
Female 
0.51 
1,470 (49%) 
1,530 (51%) 
0.50 
Age Age in years 
18-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-54 
Over 55 
41.93 
458 (15%) 
629 (21%) 
600 (20%) 
713 (24%) 
600 (20%) 
15.12 
Education: 
Raw 
Highest degree education received 
Did not graduate from high school 
Graduate from high school 
Associate’s or trade degree earned 
Bachelor’s college degree earned 
Graduate or advanced college degree earned 
2.96 
106 (4%) 
1,235 (41%) 
618 (21%) 
749 (25%) 
292 (10%) 
1.09 
Education 1 if bachelor’s degree or higher, 0 otherwise 0.35 0.48 
Race American Indian 
Asian or Pacific Islander 
Black or African American 
Mexican or Latino 
White or Caucasian 
Other 
33 (1%) 
127 (4%) 
259 (9%) 
240 (8%) 
2,284 (76%) 
57 (2%) 
 
Region Northeast 
Midwest 
South 
West 
557 (19%) 
686 (23%) 
1,057 (35%) 
700 (23%) 
 
Adults Number of adults in household 2.17 1.00 
Children Number of children in household 0.78 1.10 
Income Annual income ($) 
Less than 25,000 
25,000-49,999 
50,000-74,999 
75,000-99,999 
100,000-124,999 
125,000-149,999 
150,000-174,999 
 175,000 or more 
 
720 (24%) 
1,074 (36%) 
572 (19%) 
302 (10%) 
83 (3%) 
83 (3%) 
84 (3%) 
82 (3%) 
 
Food 
Expenditure 
Average weekly household expenditure on food ($) 258.00  
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Primary 
News Source 
Physical newspapers 
Online newspapers 
Popular magazines 
Social media 
Radio broadcast 
TV broadcast 
Other 
113 (4%) 
535 (18%) 
23 (1%) 
786 (26%) 
130 (4%) 
1,319 (44%) 
94 (3%) 
 
Meat 
Consumption 
Number of meals at household of the respective 
products: 
Ground beef or hamburger: 
Never 
Less than once a week 
About once a week 
3-4 times a week 
 At least every day of the week 
Steak: 
Never 
Less than once a week 
About once a week 
3-4 times a week 
 At least every day of the week 
Chicken: 
Never 
Less than once a week 
About once a week 
3-4 times a week 
 At least every day of the week 
Pork: 
Never 
Less than once a week 
About once a week 
3-4 times a week 
 At least every day of the week 
Fish: 
Never 
Less than once a week 
About once a week 
3-4 times a week 
 At least every day of the week 
 
 
 
 
143 (5%) 
649 (22%) 
1,398 (47%) 
765 (26%) 
45 (2%) 
 
256 (9%) 
1,669 (56%) 
869 (29%) 
169 (6%) 
37 (1%) 
 
49 (2%) 
254 (8%) 
1,167 (39%) 
1,145 (47%) 
115 (4%) 
 
309 (10%) 
1,159 (39%) 
1,216 (41%) 
275 (9%) 
41 (1%) 
 
365 (12%) 
1,009 (45%) 
39 (34%) 
1,344 (8%) 
243 (1%) 
 
Vegetarian/ 
Vegan 
Vegetarian 
Vegan 
Both 
10 (0%) 
10 (0%) 
00 (0%) 
 
Food Source Supermarket retailer (e.g. Wal-Mart, Kroger, Safeway) 
Targeted retailer (e.g. Whole Foods, Trader Joe’s) 
Convenience store (e.g. 7-Eleven) 
2,461 (82%) 
245 (8%) 
25 (1%) 
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Farmers’ market 
Direct from a farmer 
Other 
48 (2%) 
52 (2%) 
169 (6%) 
Previous 
Purchases of 
Beef Product 
Have you ever purchased the following beef products? 
Organic beef steak: 
 Yes 
 No 
 I Don’t Know 
Natural beef steak: 
 Yes 
 No 
 I Don’t Know 
Animal welfare assured beef steak: 
 Yes 
 No 
 I Don’t Know 
Grass-fed beef steak: 
 Yes 
 No 
 I Don’t Know 
Antibiotic beef steak: 
 Yes 
 No 
 I Don’t Know 
Hormone-free beef steak: 
 Yes 
 No 
 I Don’t Know 
USDA Choice beef steak: 
 Yes 
 No 
 I Don’t Know 
USDA Select beef steak: 
 Yes 
 No 
 I Don’t Know 
 
 
881 (29%) 
1,481 (49%) 
638 (21%) 
 
1,230 (41%) 
889 (30%) 
881 (29%) 
 
352 (12%) 
1,439 (48%) 
1,209 (40%) 
 
1,326 (44%) 
910 (30%) 
764 (25%) 
 
813 (27%) 
1,193 (40%) 
994 (33%) 
 
885 (30%) 
1,165 (39%) 
950 (32%) 
 
2,300 (77%) 
355 (12%) 
345 (12%) 
 
2,131 (71%) 
436 (15%) 
433 (14%) 
 
WTP for Beef 
Steak Labels 
What is the maximum price you would pay for a one 
pound, boneless beef steak possessing the following 
labels? 
Organic: 
 $0 
 $0.01-$2.00 
 $2.01-$4.00 
 $4.01-$6.00 
 $6.01-$8.00 
 $8.01-$10.00 
 
 
 
 
426 (14%) 
64 (2%) 
218 (7%) 
426 (14%) 
735 (25%) 
602 (20%) 
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 $10.01-$12.00 
 $12.01-$14.00 
 $14.01-$16.00 
 Over $16.00 
Natural: 
 $0 
 $0.01-$2.00 
 $2.01-$4.00 
 $4.01-$6.00 
 $6.01-$8.00 
 $8.01-$10.00 
 $10.01-$12.00 
 $12.01-$14.00 
 $14.01-$16.00 
 Over $16.00 
Animal welfare assured: 
 $0 
 $0.01-$2.00 
 $2.01-$4.00 
 $4.01-$6.00 
 $6.01-$8.00 
 $8.01-$10.00 
 $10.01-$12.00 
 $12.01-$14.00 
 $14.01-$16.00 
 Over $16.00 
Grass-fed: 
 $0 
 $0.01-$2.00 
 $2.01-$4.00 
 $4.01-$6.00 
 $6.01-$8.00 
 $8.01-$10.00 
 $10.01-$12.00 
 $12.01-$14.00 
 $14.01-$16.00 
 Over $16.00 
Antibiotic-free: 
 $0 
 $0.01-$2.00 
 $2.01-$4.00 
 $4.01-$6.00 
 $6.01-$8.00 
 $8.01-$10.00 
 $10.01-$12.00 
 $12.01-$14.00 
316 (11%) 
120 (4%) 
55 (2%) 
38 (1%) 
 
253 (8%) 
83 (3%) 
243 (8%) 
533 (18%) 
868 (29%) 
585 (20%) 
278 (9%) 
82 (3%) 
39 (1%) 
36 (1%) 
 
476 (16%) 
92 (3%) 
252 (8%) 
492 (16%) 
774 (26%) 
543 (18%) 
233 (8%) 
75 (3%) 
37 (1%) 
26 (1%) 
 
288 (10%) 
74 (2%) 
251 (8%) 
507 (17%) 
802 (27%) 
620 (21%) 
291 (10%) 
95 (3%) 
33 (1%) 
39 (1%) 
 
368 (12%) 
71 (2%) 
240 (8%) 
478 (16%) 
798 (27%) 
645 (22%) 
242 (8%) 
88 (3%) 
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 $14.01-$16.00 
 Over $16.00 
Hormone-free: 
 $0 
 $0.01-$2.00 
 $2.01-$4.00 
 $4.01-$6.00 
 $6.01-$8.00 
 $8.01-$10.00 
 $10.01-$12.00 
 $12.01-$14.00 
 $14.01-$16.00 
 Over $16.00 
USDA Choice: 
 $0 
 $0.01-$2.00 
 $2.01-$4.00 
 $4.01-$6.00 
 $6.01-$8.00 
 $8.01-$10.00 
 $10.01-$12.00 
 $12.01-$14.00 
 $14.01-$16.00 
 Over $16.00 
USDA Select: 
 $0 
 $0.01-$2.00 
 $2.01-$4.00 
 $4.01-$6.00 
 $6.01-$8.00 
 $8.01-$10.00 
 $10.01-$12.00 
 $12.01-$14.00 
 $14.01-$16.00 
 Over $16.00 
44 (1%) 
26 (1%) 
 
361(12%) 
80 (3%) 
236 (8%) 
468 (16%) 
786 (26%) 
662 (22%) 
251 (8%) 
99 (3%) 
30 (1%) 
27 (1%) 
 
130 (4%) 
92 (3%) 
277 (9%) 
571 (19%) 
963 (32%) 
620 (21%) 
221 (7%) 
63 (2%) 
34 (1%) 
29 (1%) 
 
148 (5%) 
97 (3%) 
289 (10%) 
583 (19%) 
929 (31%) 
605 (20%) 
221 (7%) 
61 (2%) 
31 (1%) 
35 (1%) 
Beef and 
Method of 
Production 
Concerns  
Concern about the following attributes of beef and 
methods of production: 
Animal welfare  
Food safety 
Price 
Taste 
Naturalness 
Antibiotic use 
Hormone use 
Labeling of beef products 
 
 
4.83 
5.92 
5.67 
5.87 
4.73 
4.91 
4.97 
5.07 
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Consumer 
Knowledge 
Portion of beef cattle produced in the U.S. believed are 
given antibiotics: 
 10% or less 
 11-30% 
 31-50% 
 51-70% 
 71-90% 
 91% or more 
Portion of beef cattle produced in the U.S. believed are 
graded USDA Choice: 
 10% or less 
 11-30% 
 31-50% 
 51-70% 
 71-90% 
 91% or more 
 
 
159 (5%) 
321 (11%) 
695 (23%) 
860 (29%) 
718 (24%) 
247 (8%) 
 
 
154 (5%) 
492 (16%) 
917 (31%) 
831 (28%) 
429 (14%) 
177 (6%) 
 
RNAi 
Acceptance 
Consider the following statements: 
I am willing to eat beef products produced with the use 
of RNAi technology.  
I am willing to purchase beef products produced with 
the use of RNAi technology. 
In general, I support the use of RNAi technology in 
beef production. 
 
3.74 
 
3.75 
 
3.57 
 
Impression or 
Expectation 
of RNAi 
Impression or expectation of this technology in the 
beef industry 
Impact on health of beef cattle 
Impact on production costs 
Impact on price paid by consumers 
Impact on taste of beef products 
Impact on human health from beef consumption 
 
 
4.00 
4.13 
4.07 
4.09 
3.90 
 
Opinion on 
New 
Technologies 
Being 
Implemented 
into the U.S. 
Beef Industry 
New beef technologies are something I am uncertain 
about.  
New beef products are not healthier than traditional 
beef products.  
The benefits of new beef technologies are often 
grossly overstated.  
There are plenty of tasty beef products around so we 
do not need to use new beef technologies to produce 
more.  
New beef technologies decrease the natural quality of 
beef products.  
New beef technologies are unlikely to have long-term 
negative human health effects.  
New beef technologies give people more control over 
their beef product choices.  
5.11  
 
4.59  
 
4.67  
 
4.59  
 
 
4.67  
 
3.68  
 
4.17  
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New beef products using new technologies can help 
people have a balanced diet.  
New technologies in beef may have long-term 
negative environmental effects.  
It can be risky to switch to new beef technologies too 
quickly.  
Society should not depend heavily on new 
technologies in the beef industry to solve its food 
problems.  
There is no sense trying out high-tech beef products 
because the ones I eat are already good enough.  
The media usually provides a balanced and unbiased 
view of new beef technologies  
3.92  
 
4.76  
 
5.10  
 
4.75  
 
 
4.49  
 
3.38  
 
RNAi 
Concern 
Indicate your agreement with the following 
statements: 
RNAi technology in beef production will not pose 
risks to my family and me.  
My family and I could be exposed to great risks from 
RNAi technology in beef production. 
The side-effects from eating RNAi technology in beef 
production are largely unknown. 
There is little danger that RNAi technology in beef 
production will results in new disease for humans. 
 
 
3.54 
 
4.52 
 
5.10 
 
3.63 
 
Desirability 
of Adopting 
RNAi 
Keep beef production and processing in the U.S.  
Lower the price paid by beef consumers  
Improve the nutritional content of beef  
Reduce use of antibiotics  
Protect cattle from disease  
Reduce use of hormones  
Increase overall animal health  
Reduce death in cattle  
Increase carcass yield (the amount of meat produced 
per head)  
Reduce use of feed additives  
Reduce farmers' time involved in labor  
5.16 
5.05 
4.93 
5.08 
5.24 
5.14 
5.17 
5.03 
4.47 
 
5.00 
4.37 
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Summary Statistics for demographic variables by Choice Experiment design. 
Variable 
Design 1 
(n = 750) 
Design 2 
(n = 750) 
Design 3 
(n = 750) 
Design 4 
(n = 750) 
Mean (Standard Deviation) 
Female 0.49 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) 
Age 41.53 (15.08) 42.38 (15.17) 42.02 (15.51) 41.77 (14.73) 
Education 0.36 (0.48) 0.32 (0.47) 0.35 (0.48) 0.37 (0.48) 
Adults 2.15 (0.95) 2.19 (1.01) 2.11 (0.96) 2.21 (1.10) 
Children 0.80 (1.10) 0.77 (1.11) 0.76 (1.10) 0.77 (1.09) 
Consumption: 
Groundbeef/hamburger  
Steak 
Chicken 
Pork 
Fish 
 
2.97 (0.84) 
2.35 (0.74) 
3.43 (0.76) 
2.56 (0.85) 
2.41 (0.87) 
 
3.00 (0.86) 
2.32 (0.77) 
3.44 (0.76) 
2.47 (0.84) 
2.41 (0.85) 
 
3.03 (0.83) 
2.38 (0.77) 
3.40 (0.78) 
2.52 (0.85) 
2.42 (0.84) 
 
2.90 (0.87) 
2.37 (0.78) 
3.46 (0.77) 
2.55 (0.86) 
2.42 (0.85) 
Income 
Annual income ($) 
Less than 25,000 
25,000-49,999 
50,000-74,999 
75,000-99,999 
100,000-124,999 
125,000-149,999 
150,000-174,999 
175,000 or more 
 
 
176 
264 
154 
66 
23 
21 
25 
21 
 
 
189 
270 
130 
79 
26 
19 
17 
20 
 
 
185 
267 
148 
69 
19 
22 
23 
17 
 
 
170 
273 
140 
88 
15 
21 
19 
24 
Count (Percentage) 
Opt-out 2,222 (42.3%) 1,900 (36.2%) 1,866 (35.5%) 1,701 (37.8%) 
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144 
Appendix E - Choice Experiment Design Framework 
Figure E.1 Framework of Choice Experiment Design 1 
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Figure E.2. Framework of Choice Experiment Design 2 
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Figure E.3. Framework of Choice Experiment Design 3 
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Figure E.4. Framework of Choice Experiment Design 4 
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